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THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON JOB DESIGN AND WORK ORGANISATION
BERNARD BURNES
SUMMARY
This thesis is an examination of the selection, introduction, use
and effects on job design and work organisation of a particular
form of new technology: Computer Numerically Controlled machine
tools (CNC).
Part One, Chapters 1 - 6, reviews the new technology literature
and the historical development of contemporary approaches to
job design and work organisation. From this examination, a
conceptual framework is constructed showing the factors which
influence and guide the choices that organisations make with
regard to new technology. It draws special attention to the role
played by the values, beliefs, self-interest and power of indiv-
iduals and groups within organisations, and the philosophy and
precepts of Scientific Management. The section concludes by
describing the aims, objectives and methods of the research, and
by examining the development of, and literature regarding, CNC.
Part Two, Chapters 7 - 10, presents case studies of the intro-
duction and use of CNC into nine engineering companies, differ-
entiated according to company size and product batch size.
Part Three, Chapter 11, presents the conclusions from the study.
It firstly compares the case studies with each other, and then
with the conceptual framework. It shows that the empirical
studies supported the framework, but that two additional factors
need to be taken into account: (a) that there is a need to
recognise that those involved in the process of technological
change can be "dazzled" by the technology, and (b) that the
change process can be significantly affected by the competence
of those involved. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework,
and especially the influence of Scientific Management, are
confirmed. The Chapter concludes by putting forward guidelines
for the introduction of new technology.
(vi)
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, there has been an increasing flood of
books, articles, specialist magazines and radio and television
programmes all devoted to the subject of "New Technology" (Benson
and Lloyd, 1983). Some commentators believe that "we are in the
midst of a revolution" (Rumelt, 1981, p1). Others believe that
the changes which the new technologies will bring about are
likely to be "evolutionary rather than revolutionary" (Bessant,
1983, p16). However, no-one seems to doubt that, whatever the
pace of the change, new technology will have "a major societal
impact" (Hedberg and Mehlmann, 1981, p1).
Quite obviously, and properly, this development has raised many
questions, and these will be examined in Chapter 1. However, as
an essential introduction to that examination, the development of
new technology, its applications and the growing governmental and
public awareness of it will be described first.
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
Whilst the term "new technology" tends to be used to cover almost
all scientific advances over the last 20 years, the development to
which this title is most commonly applied and which it is said
will have the main impact is the micro-processor - the computer on
a silicon chip (Braun and Senker, 1982).
As one basic text has put it, "The Computer is a machine which
automatically accepts, processes and outputs data" (Rackham,
1984, p 13). The computer has a long antecedence. In 1642,
Pascal designed and built a mechanical calculator to aid trade
and navigation (Albury and Schwartz, 1982). In the 19th century,
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Babbage designed a mechanical computer with data banks and the
ability to repeat routines. However, due to the limitations of
engineering at that time, it could not be built (Council for
Science and Society, 1981). A number of developments in the late
19th and early 20th centuries led to the building of the first
digital computer by Konrad Zuse in Germany in 1939 (Rackham,
1984)
However, it was the Second World War and the race to build the
atomic bomb which gave the greatest impetus to computer develop-
ment. It was the Manhattan Project, the American bomb programme,
which can be said to have built the first generation of computers.
The computer, ironically called MANIAC (Mathematical Analyser,
Numerical Integrator And Calculator), was needed to do the
extensive numerical calculations necessary to design and build
the first atomic bomb (Albury and Schwartz, 1982). Its peacetime
successor, ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator And Calculator),
was built in 1946. Like all the early computers, it was phenomen-
ally costly and built on a massive scale: it used over 18,000
valves, occupied a large room and consumed considerable amounts
of electricity (Council for Science and Society, 1981; Albury
and Schwartz, 1982). Not unnaturally, there were few takers for
these early computers. The breakthrough came with the development
of the transistor in 1947. This provided a solid state substitute
for the valve, which meant that the capacity of computers could be
enlarged and the size and cost reduced (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox,
1980).
The first British commercial computer (LEO) was built by J Lyons
in 1949, and was used to calculate the value of output from their
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bakeries (Land et al, 1983a). In the 1950s, the progress of the
computer was further accelerated by the invention of printed
circuits. Thereafter, computers became a viable proposition for
large and medium-sized businesses, which in turn led to the rapid
growth of the computer industry (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980).
Despite these developments, the computer was still a large,
expensive and relatively inflexible machine. Itwas the United
States Aerospace and Defense industries which changed all this.
They needed small and flexible computers, and were prepared to pay
for their development. Between 1958 and 1976, the United States
computer industry received $350 million in direct aid from the
military, and, in the late 1960s, this aid bore fruit with the
invention of the micro-processor (Albury and Schwartz, 1982;
Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980).
The development of the micro-processor has reduced not only the
size of computers but also their cost. By 1980, it was possible
to buy a micro-processor for £1, and £200 would be enough to
purchase a home computer more powerful than the first commercial
computers marketed in 1950 and which, at present-day prices,
would cost £1 million (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980).
The falling cost and size of computers has meant that their use
has now become pervasive and has spread even into small businesses.
Indeed, it seems that there is almost no activity to which the
computer cannot be applied (Land et al, 1983a).
The application of the micro-processor
tn general, micro-processors can only duplicate the functions of
computers which have been available for the last two decades.
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However, the cheapness and size of the micro-processor now mean
that many of the theoretical prospects offered by the computer
can now be realised in practice (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox,
1980). There are four areas in which micro-processors are having,
and will have, an impact upon advanced economies.
The first area is the development of new products which were not
previously available. These range from TV games, pocket calcul-
ators, word processors, to mammoth projects such as the Americans'
"Star Wars" initiative. Perhaps the most widespread development
has been the "home" computer. Sales of these have been enormous;
in Britain, almost 1 in 5 households now possesses one (Large, 1984c;
The Star, 28.2.1985; White, 1985).
The second area is where the micro-processor is being applied to
improve existing products. These include the digital watch, the
computer-controlled washing machine, the control of some functions
within cars by computers, the electronic cash register linked to
a mainframe computer, which can instantaneously link manufacturers,
suppliers, banks and shops, and the replacement of electro-
mechanical telephone exchanges by electronic ones such as British
Telecom's System X (Sleigh et al, 1979).
The third area is the increasing trend towards automation. This
is taking place not just in factories but also in offices and the
service sector in general. In manufacturing industry, the
Advisory Council on Applied Research and Development (ACARD,
1978) forecast that micro-processor technology would be applied in
design, part manufacture, assembly, inspection and testing. They
also predicted that robots, controlled by computers, would assume
a major importance in many of these functions, indeed, talk of
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the peopleless factory is now commonplace (Crane, 1982). In
fact, studies have shown that new technology will have a major
impact on all industries (Braun and Senker, 1982; Gunn, 1982;
Sleigh et al, 1979).
The office and service sectors, traditionally more difficult
areas than manufacturing in which to introduce automation, are
likely to be affected relatively to a much greater degree. In
offices, this has become possible with the advent of such devices
as the word processor, and in shops, the micro-processor means
that such operations as the automatic billing of goods may become
commonplace. In the area of the storage and retrieval of inform-
ation, the computer is becoming paramount; conventional, paper,
filing systems are disappearing. This development not only allows
many people to consult the same file at once, but thepeople need
not be in the same building or even the same country. Indeed,
it is possible to envisage the automated office paralleling the
development of the peopleless factory (Bessant et al, 1981;
Giuliano, 1982; Sleigh et al, 1979).
The fourth area where the micro-processor is having, and will
have, a major impact is in telecommunications. Electronic mail
has already arrived. This is achieved by connecting computer
terminals together using telephone lines, radio or even satellites,
and transmitting a letter or document from one computer terminal
to another without using the postal services (Bessant et al, 1981).
A variant of this is exemplified by the Ford Motors' computer
centre in the United States. 	 The centre has six general purpose
computers and 100 special purpose systems that are in use seven
aays a week. During the American day, they are used by Ford
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engineers in North America. During the night, they are accessed
via a cable link-up and data processing system by Ford engineers
in Europe (Shaiken, 1980). The same principle lies behind the
development of portable computer terminals, which enable workers
to link up with computers via the telephone when away from their
office (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980).
Another major development in communications is taking place in
the entertainment field, with the development of satellite and
cable television (Ward and Blunkett, 1983).
As can be seen from a brief examination of these four areas, the
impact of the micro-processor will be enormous. However, as
outlined earlier, these developments did not spring up overnight;
yet it is only in the last few years that governments and indiv-
iduals have awoken to the potential changes that the micro-
processor could bring about.
GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AWARENESS OF MICRO-ELECTRONICS
Whilst these developments in the field of computers were taking
shape during the 1960s and early l970s in America, the rest of
the world, with the exception of Japan, seemed either oblivious
or unconcerned. It was only in the late 1970s that Western
Europe became aware that the micro-processor had arrived and would
bring about massive change.
The report that shocked the French and other European governments
into considering the importance of the micro-processor was "The
Computerisation of Society: A Report to the President of France"
(Nora and Minc, 1980). When this report was first published in
France in 1978, it reportedly sold out within a week of its
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publication. There is little dispute that it was this report
that sent shock waves throughout Europe and precipitated other
Western European governments into commissioning their own
research into the impact of new technology on their economies
(Lynch, 1982).
In Britain, the Computers, Systems and Electronics Board of the
Department of Industry commissioned a study at the University of
Sussex in 1978 to assess the future developments in computing.
The report (Barron and Curnow, 1979) called for greater government
emphasis on and public awareness of both the problems and
opportunities presented by the new technology. The government
followed up these recommendations and published its own policy
document, based on work by the Advisory Council on the Application
of Research and Development (ACARD, 1980). In May 1981, a further
government report was published as a result of a House of Lords
investigation into various aspects of micro-electronics (House
of Lords Select Committee on the EEC, 1981). This pointed to the
need for the EEC to develop a community-wide strategy for new
technology, as opposed to merely national strategies, in order
to face the challenge of the American and Japanese computer
industries.
Much of what was written in these reports bore fruit in respect
to initiatives by the British Government to encourage the take-up
and development of new technology. This began in 1979 with the
appointment of a Government Minister responsible for Information
Technology, and was accompanied by the Department of Industry's
Support for Innovation Scheme, which in 1984/5 has a £250 million
budget. In 1984, the Government launched the Alvey Programme to
develop strategic initiatives in the field of computers, currently
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with a £350 million budget. The EEC has also launched its own
scheme: the European Strategic Programme for Research and Develop-
ment in Information Technology (ESPRIT) which has a budget of
£400 million over five years (Large, 1984b; Commission of the
European Communities, 1983).
In terms of public awareness of micro-electronics, much has
changed. At the beginning of 1982, which the Government
designated "Information Technology Year", a MORI poll found that
only 17% of the British populatiPn were aware of what new
technology was. By the end of 1982, the figure was 62% (Large,
1982)
THIS RESEARCH
The growth of public awareness of new technology has been para-
lleled by the publication of an enormous number of studies that
have attempted, by a variety of means, to assess, explain, and
predict its impact.
The problem for the researcher, or anyone else who attempts to
make sense of this body of work, is - as will be shown in Chapter
One - that it is large, confused, and often contradictory 	 This
is not surprising given that many studies are based upon secondary
sources, that some are purely speculative, and that only some are
based upon first-hand empirical evidence. Even in the case of
empirical studies, the tendency is for these to be based upon
visits to one or two organisations, carried out at a single point
in time.The problems with the literature are further exacerbated
by the fact that many studies treat new technology as an isolated
phenomenon which can be understood without recourse to the
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existing body of knowledge about organisations and their members.
This thesis, by combining the new technology and organisational
literature with empirical evidence, will hopefully overcome these
problems.
The objective of the research is to examine the impact of new
technology on job design and work organisation in order to
develop a conceptual framework which can be used to understand
and predict the effects of new technology in these areas.
This will be done by:-
i) Reviewing the new technology literature and drawing out
the factors which are cited as influencing its organis-
ational impact.
ii) Describing the factors that have influenced the historical
development of job design and work organisation, in order
to demonstrate their relevance for contemporary theory
and practice in these areas.
iii) Examining four contemporary approaches to work organisation
and job design.
iv) Presenting nine case studies of the introduction and use
of a particular form of new technology - Computer
Numerically Controlled machine tools (CNC).
The structure of the Thesis
This thesis is split into three parts. Part 1 contains six
chapters: Chapter 1 reviews the new technology literature;
Chapter 2 describes the historical development of organisations;
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Chapter 3 examines contemporary approaches to job design and work
organisation; Chapter 4 draws together the threads of the previous
three chapters and presents a conceptual framework for under-
standing the organisational impact of new technology; Chapter 5
presents the aims, objectives and methodology of the research;
and Chapter 6 describes the technology that is examined in the
case studies.
Part 2 contains four chapters which present the nine case studies
of the introduction and use of new technology in the South Yorkshire
engineering industry.
Part 3 contains the concluding chapter, in which the case studies
are compared with each other, and are also examined in the
context of the conceptual framework in order to show its strengths
and weaknesses.
One last point needs to be made: the use of "he" throughout the
thesis reflects both the reality of the male-dominated engineering
industry and the clumsiness of terms such as "his/her" or "s/he"
rather than any bias on the author's part.
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PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE
NEW TECHNOLOGY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The objective of this research is to examine the impact of new
technology on jobs and work organisation; therefore, this Chapter
will review the main conclusions that have emerged from the
literature on these two subjects. However, two other issues will
be examined first in order better to understand some of the hopes
and fears that new technology has raised. Firstly, and very
briefly, the literature on its posited societal impact will be
discussed. Secondly, and at greater length, the debate regarding
the impact of micro-electronics on employment levels will be
described. The issue of employment levels is, obviously, crucial
to the discussion of job design and work organisation which follows
it, because if new technology does lead to the "collapse of work",
then these issues become irrelevant.
The Chapter concludes by arguing that the impact of new technology
cannot be understood solely with reference to the characteristics
of the technology itself, but needs to take into account the
effects of wider organisational and societal factors.
THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MICRO-ELECTRONICS
The last two decades have seen the development of strongly
contrasting views regarding the social benefits of scientific and
technological development. For some, the progress of technology
has become associated with a variety of contemporary problems,
amongst them hazards to health and safety; pollution and the
depletion of natural resources; conflict between civil liberties
and national security; and the whole question of the nature of
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democracy within advanced societies. Others, whilst recognising
the problems, have seen technology as the cure rather than the
cause (Bell, 1974; Boyle et al, 1980; Martin and Norman, 1973).
Many of the hopes and fears about technological progress in
general have been carried over into the debate on the impact of
micro-electronics on society.
The debate about the effects of computers on society has been
going on since the 1950s, but it has become more intense with the
advent of the micro-processor. Many have seen the computer as an
instrument which will create a wealthier and more open society.
This development has been given many names. Muchiap (1962) saw
it as the creation of a "Knowledge Economy"; Etzioni (1968) has
named it the "Post-Modern Age"; whilst to Brzezeinski (1970) it
is the "Technotronic Age"; and Dahrendorf (1975) has called it
the "Post-Capitalist Era". Perhaps the best-known term is that
coined by Daniel Bell (1974) who saw computers creating a "Post-
Industrial Society":
A post-industrial society is based on services. Hence,
it is a game between persons. What counts is not raw
muscle power, or energy, but information. The central
person is the professional, for he is equipped, by his
education and training, to provide the kinds of skill
which are increasingly demanded in the post-industrial
society. If an industrial society is defined by the
quantity of goods as marking a standard of living, the
post-industrial society is defined by the quality of
life as measured by services and amenities - health,
education, recreation and the arts - which are now
deemed desirable and possible for everyone. (p127)
Others paint a less rosy picture, seeing computers as a threat to
individual privacy and to civil liberties and leading to a
lessening of democratic control of Western societies. In a
number of countries, there have been growing calls for 1aw to
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protect individuals' rights where information about them is kept
on computer. This has led to legislation in both Europe,
including Britain, and America, to protect individual records
which are kept on computer. However, in Britain, one of the
areas for most civil liberties concern, the collection of data by
the police and the security services, has been excluded from the
Data Protection Act (Boyle et al, 1980; Home Office, 1984; Mahood
and Mahood, 1977).
In terms of democracy, Bjorn-Andersen (1983) has stated that new
technology is concentrating power in the hands of fewer people.
This echoes earlier criticism by Dickson (1974), who sees
computerisation as bolstering the power of a ruling elite.
Elliott and Elliott (1976) have also seen new technology as
reinforcing the power of existing institutions rather than
allowing greater participation in decision-making.
As well as the discussion of civil liberties and democracy, there
has also been considerable debate about the economic benefits to
be gained from micro-electronics.
Coombs (1979) has argued that the role of science and technology
is to ensure the best quality of life for all, and that the
challenge of new technology is to ensure that all share its
benefits and not just those who already have wealth and power.
However, the Council for Science and Society (1981) has
questioned whether this will happen. They havesuggested that
whilst it is possible to see the benefits to industry and commerce
of new technology, the direct benefits to society as a whole seem
open to doubt. There are others, of course, who disagree with
this view.
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The Institute of Management Services has stated that there "are
significant national economic advantages to be gained from
embracing the potential of new technology" (Wakeham and Beresford-
Knox, 1980, p7). Sussex University's Science Policy Research
Unit, in a report commissioned by the Manpower Services Commission,
concluded that "the introduction of new technology is essential
for Britain under conditions of international competition. The
alternative is to drift into obsolescence and relative economic
decline" (Braun and Senker, 1982, p 1.1). This view is shared by
a number of other government and non-government-sponsored reports
(Attenborough, 1984; Cowgill, 1981; Sleigh et al, 1979), all of
which take the view that Britain's future economic welfare
depends on the rapid adoption of micro-electronics.
Therefore, as can be seen, the hopes and fears for society that
new technology raises are not only wide-ranging but also unresolved,
and perhaps, at present, insoluble. However, it is in this context
that the debate on job numbers, job quality and organisational
structure is taking place, and it is the discussion of these
issues which will occupy the rest of this Chapter.
THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MICRO-ELECTRONICS
The issue which has perhaps caused most controversy and concern
with regard to micro-electronics has been its effect on employ-
ment levels.
Three distinct views have emerged: that new technology will create
more jobs (ACARD, 1980); that it will lead to the "collapse of
work" (Jenkins and Sherman, 1979); and that, by itself, new
technology will have a minimal effect on employment (TUC, 1979).
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By and large, most of what has been written falls into o of
these three camps: the optimists; the pessimists; and the
agnostics -
The Optimists
Probably the most optimistic detailed forecast of the effect of
new technology was that prepared by the American Management
Consultants, A D Little, for, amongst others, the British
Government (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980). The report,
published in 1979, forecast that by 1987 new technology would
provide a net increase of at least one million jobs in Britain,
France, West Germany and the USA. The report concluded that 60%
of the increase would be taken by the United States, and Britain's
share of the remainder would depend on how quickly and extensively
it responded to the challenge.
Warwick University's Institute of Economic Research has also put
emphasis on rapid diffusion of new technology as being a job
creator (Whiteley and Wilson, 1981 and 1982). Using a computer
model to simulate the workings of the British economy, they
concluded that if Britain could adopt micro-electronics rapidly
enough to increase productivity by one per cent net per annum
relative to its main competitors, then by 1990 an extra 420,000
jobs would be created. However, as the Department of Industry
has recently pointed out, this would have only a net effect of
creating 80,000 jobs, because some 340,000 jobs would be lost
as a direct effect of introducing new technology (AttenborougE,
1984).
In the United States, Leontieff and Duchin (1983) have concluded
that micro-electronics will have a positive effect on employment.
This was also the conclusion of the Australian Government's
Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia
(1980). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment likewise appears to take an optimistic view of the impact of
technical change on jobs in Europe and America, pointing to job
losses being offset by job growth in the micro-electronics
industry and to jobs being created in user industries (Beckler,
1982).
Many other writers and organisations share this optimistic view
(Bennett, 1979; Hargreaves, 1982; Kassler, 1981; Sheehan, 1980;
Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980; Williams, 1983; Williams,
1984).
In addition to contemporary evidence, one of the main driving
forces behind this optimistic view is historical evidence that in
the past a link has existed between technological progress,
economic growth and increased employment (Abramovitz, 1956;
Kuznets, 1966; and Solow, 1957).
Nevertheless, there are those who would dispute that, in this
instance, the past is a reliable indicator of the future.
The Pessimists
Jenkins and Sherman (1979), who start from a historical perspec-
tive, have produced a very detailed argument for stating that
technological progress will no longer be linked to increases in
employment but instead to decreases. They have concluded that by
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1990, registered unemployment in the UK will reach five million,
ue to the introduction of new technology.
Jenkins and Sherman are not along in predicting job losses due to
new technology; indeed, newspaper headlines such as:-
"Robots threaten million jobs" (Large, Guardian, 28.12.1983)
"New technology destroying jobs" (May, Guardian, 27.2.1984)
appear with alarming frequency. Nor are these stories based solely
on speculation or prediction. A survey by the Policy Studies
Institute (Northcott and Rogers, 1984) found that the introduction
of new technology into British manufacturing industry had caused
a net loss of 34,000 jobs between 1981 and 1983. The Department
of Industry recently estimated job losses in manufacturing owing
to the introduction of new technology to be between 50,000 and
90,000 up to the end of 1982 (Attenborough, 1984). However, they
attempt to put this into perspective by pointing out that between
1979 and 1982 some 1.4 million jobs were lost in manufacturing
owing to the world recession. The implication is that when world
recovery begins, employment will again rise irrespective of the
technology being used.
It is on this point, that future economic growth will lead to more
jobs, that the pessimists take greatest issue with the optimists.
There is a wide spectrum of opinion, from economic journals
(The Economist, 1984), to government agencies such as the Manpower
Services Commission (Brady and Liff, 1983), and even including
leading Conservative politicians (Pym, 1984), who believe that
new technology could create job losses in times of boom as well
as slump. They argue that the productive potential of micro-
electronics is such that only relatively few people need to be
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employed to create the goods and services necessary for
society.
Indeed, paradoxically, the concept of "Jobless Growth" is at the
heart of the argument by the optimists of the Post-Industrialist
school, such as Bell (1974) and Dahrendorf (1975). They acknow-
ledge that new technology will allow industry to produce more
goods with far fewer people. However, they are optimistic about
job prospects because they believe that just as manufacturing in
the 19th and 20th centuries created jobs for those displaced in
the mechanisation of agriculture, then so the service sector in
future will provide employment for those displaced by the
automation of manufacturing industry. However, their critics,
whilst agreeing with them on "jobless growth", criticise their
optimism for two reasons. Firstly, that it greatly under-
estimates the importance of manufacturing industry as a provider
of employment (Cowgill, 1981; Mumford, 1979); and secondly, and
most importantly, that jobless growth can take place just as
easily in the service sector as it can in the manufacturing
sector. In fact, new technology is likely to have a relatively
greater impact on jobs in the service sector than manufacturing
and, therefore, this area is unlikely to be in a position to
provide jobs for those displaced in other sectors of the economy.
This view is supported by a wide range of research. In Britain,
the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer
Staff have reported that, in a survey they carried out in the
West Midlands, for every one new office job created by new
technology, 50 are lost (May, 1984). A survey of Britain, Europe
and Australia with regard to technological change has concluded
that more blue collar and white collar unemployment is inevitable
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(Hall, 1979). In Germany, Siemens, the giant electronics group,
has estimated that 40% of all office jobs could be lost through
automation. A French report suggests that 30% of all jobs in
banking and insurance could disappear as a result of the intro-
duction of new technology (Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980). A
similar forecast for jobs in Britain's financial sector has been
made by the Institute of Manpower Studies (Rajan, 1984). Similar
findings have emerged in Austria
	
(Schenk et al, 1981); in
Australia (Robson, 1979); and in America (Shaiken, 1984).
There are also many others, in Britain and abroad, who share the
pessimists' viewpoint (Blatt, 1979; Council for Science and
Society, 1981; Cooley, 1983; Jones, 1982; Young, 1979). However,
the pessimists' argument, like that of the optimists, is by no
means as soundly-based as they would like it to appear, and there
are those who reject both these arguments.
The Agnostics
The agnostics are a somewhat disparate group who are held together
not so much by a common belief as by a common disbelief. For
differing reasons, they prefer either to reject the importance
of technology or to take the view that it is not possible to
predict its impact on jobs. Evans. (1982) and Wilkinson (1982)
believe that whilst some jobs will be lost due to the introduction
of micro-electronics, others will be created, and that the result-
ant overall outcome will have less to do with the technology and
more to do with the economic policies that governments pursue.
Winch (1983) and Forester (1980) have also pointed to the import-
ance of the overall economic context of particular societies in
shaping the final outcome in terms of jobs. In Sweden, Eliasson
19
(1982) and Eliasson and Carisson (1980) have concluded, using
computer models of the economy, that new technology will have no
effect on job numbers one way or the other.
In contrast to that view, Sleigh et al (1979) have stated that
"the overall employment effect is virtually impossible to gauge"
(plO6). Sorge et al (1982) have made the same point: "A great
number of studies have been carried out . . . However, no
reliable assessment of the impact [of micro-electronics on jobs]
has been possible" (P169). Indeed, having looked at the cases
prepared by the optimists, pessimists and agnostics, it is easy
to see why they take this view. As Land et al (l983a) have
pointed out in a review of the literature, "it is clear that
most of the judgments made by authors [re jobs and new technology]
are based on their own preconceptions, and their forecasts are of
doubtful value" (pl63).
Indeed, even those studies that have used complex mathematical
models to predict the employment effect of micro-electronics have
not escaped criticism: "such simulations are highly sensitive to
the assumptions employed" (Attenborough, 1984, p35). A similar
view has been expressed by Barclay (1983).
Summary
However, regardless of whether writers fall into the optimistic,
pessimistic, or agnostic camps, none seem to quarrel with the
Rathenau Commission (1980) report on the impact of micro-electronics
on employment in the Netherlands. The report concluded that more
jobs would be lost by not introducing new technology than by intro-
ducing it.
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As Stubbs (1980) has stated, such is the nature of international
competition that failure by a country to adopt technical innovations
at the same rate as other countries will lead to loss of home
and foreign markets and loss of jobs in that country. Therefore,
whilst there are problems in predicting the consequences of
adopting new technology, there seem few problems in predicting
the outcome of not adopting it. It is the fear that they might
be left behind in the race to modernise that has driven governments
in advanced manufacturing countries to adopt national strategies
to encourage the adoption of new technology.
However, the British Government's strategy for new technology has
come under increasing criticism (Huhne, 1985; NEDO, 1980 and 1984).
The British information technology industry is growing at a much
slower rate than in other countries and has not only been losing
its share of the home and foreign market, but, significantly,
employment in that sector has fallen by 12% between 1980 and 1984
(Large, l984a).
In conclusion, it appears that the only widely-held view on the
issue of employment and new technology is that more jobs will be
lost by not adopting it than by adopting it. This does not mean
that the debate on this subject is sterile, but it does mean that
it may have to be carried out, as Evans (1982) and Wilkinson
(1982) argue, in the context of the general economic and employ-
ment policies adopted by particular governments.
Important as the issue of employment levels is, equally important
is the effect of technological change on the nature of individuals'
jobs.
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THE EFFECTS OF MICRO-ELECTRONICS ON ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES
AND JOB DESIGN
For organisational psychologists, the main area of interest with
regard to technological change is how it affects the individual
worker and, through him, the effectiveness of the organisation.
There are two principal ways that new technology could affect the
individual at work. The first is by changing the structure of
the organisation: it may become larger or smaller; more or less
centralised; flatter or more hierarchical; more or less bureau-
cratic. These changes can all have differin g effects on the
individual and on the effectiveness of the organisation (Child,
1984).
The second way is by altering the actual job that the individual
does. It has been demonstrated that job satisfaction and
performance are related to variety, task completeness and, above
all, autonomy (Wall et al, 1984). The introduction of micro-
electronic equipment may give the worker more freedom to control
what he does and to develop new skills, or it could reduce his
discretion, and fragment and deskill his job (Walton, 1982).
This section will examine what has been written about the effects
of new technology: firstly, on the structure of organisations,
and secondly, on the individual. Hbwever, it should be borne in
mind that whilst it is useful to separate the organisational
effects of new technology from its effect on individual jobs, in
practice, as far as the individual is concerned, the result may
be the same. This is because it makes little difference to
someone if their job has been made more onerous because a new
organisation-wide computer system has centralised decision-making
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in the company and thus reduced his, and many others', personal
discretion, or if the job they do has been automated and that has
reduced their decision-making scope, but not affected anyone else
in the organisation.
therefore, the inter-relationship between the design of individual
jobs and the structure of the organisation needs to be recognised.
This is especially the case with individual discretion, which is
the area where most overlap takes place between job design and
organisational structure.
The impact of micro-electronics on organisational structure
There appears to be little disagreement in the literature on new
technology that its introduction will lead to organisational
change. Rothwell (1984) has argued that it affects the total
management system. Ahlin and Svensson (1980) have observed that
it will lead to organisational change affecting all workers. The
disagreement in the literature is not, then, about whether change
will take place, but about the nature of that change. At the
risk of over-simplifying what is a very complex, and confused,
picture, there seem to be three distinct views on what changes
will take place.
The first is that the introduction of micro-electronics will lead
to greater centralisation of control - that is, more rigid
bureaucratic structures with less discretion for those at the
lower end of the organisation. The second view is the reverse
of the first; that computerisation will aid decentralisation and
delegation of authority. The third view is that whilst new tech -
nology will have an impact on organisational structures, the
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exact effect will depend on a range of other internal and external
factors which are separate from the technology.
More centralisation of control: Bjorn-Andersen (1983) has argued
that the introduction of computers leads to substantial power
changes within organisations. He believes that computers will
come to co-ordinate functions that were previously co-ordinated
by people, and that this will lead to greater centralisation of
decision-makinq by fewer people. This point has also been made
by Hennestad (1982), who points out that whilst computers can
lead to less human supervision, this is merely replaced by
increased control by comouters over what workers do.
Brady and Liff (1983) concluded from an examination of manufact-
uring companies that the introduction of computerised equipment
onto the shopfloor resulted in the transference of decision-making
farther up the organisational hierarchy. Blumberg and Gerwin
(1981) have made similar comments about the introduction of new
technology into American companies.
Wieser (1981), in a five-plant Austrian study, has also noted
that the introduction of computers leads to a reduction in
workers' discretion at the lower levels of the organisation.
Hennestad (1982), commenting on the effect of new technology on
industrial democracy, has pointed out that computerisation leads
to greater formalisation of practices and procedures, which
results in more rigid and centralised organisations. Perrow
(1973) has observed that computers do make it easier to centralise
control, and in a later article (Perrow, 1983), he also noted
that there is a tendency for senior managers to introduce new
technology in such a way that it bolsters and extends their power.
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This view, that computerisation leads to more centralisation of
control, is shared by many other writers (Cooley, 1980; Lund,
1978; Lungren and Sageser, 1967; Whistler, 1970). However, there
are others who disagree.
Less centralisation of control: Withington (1969) and Blau et al
(1976) have suggested that computers will lead to the decentral-
Lsation of decision-making. Klatzky (1970) has also noted that
computers allow the delegation of authority to take place.
Land et al (1983a) believe that up. to the l970s, it was the case
that computers led to the centralisation of control in Electronic
Data Processing (EDP) departments. However, they point out that
the advent of micro-computers has led to a reversal of this trend.
Lucas (1984) denies that there was ever a tendency towards the
centralisation of control in EDP departments.
Walton (1982) has pointed out that the cheapness and flexibility
of micro-electronic equipment will lead to the decentralisation
of power within organisations. Both Sell (1984a) and White (1983)
believe that new technology will lead to flatter organisational
structure, and Child (1984) has pointed out that this sort of
structure is associated with more participative types of
organisations.
As with the case for centralisation, there are many others who
see computers leading towards more decentralisation (IR-RR Survey,
1984; Reif, 1968; Stewart, 1971; Tarling, n.d.; Warner, 1984).
However, there is also a third view.
The case against technological determinism: Whilst there are
many writers prepared to argue that new technology has a particular
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impact on the structure of organisations, there are others who
would argue against such a determinist view.
Mumford (1979) has pointed out that, in practice, new technology
is flexible and can be used in a variety of ways. Kemp et al
(1984) have also observed that micro-electronics offers a wide
range of choice in how it can be used, and that it would be
misguided to adopt a deterministic view of its effects.
Sorge et al (1983) have reported that a variety of organisational
arrangements can and do accompany the introduction of the same
technology. Wilkinson (1982) has concluded that there is no
general impact of new technology, and that its effects will vary
from organisation to organisation, depending on their particular
circumstances.
There are many others who share this view (Keen, 1981; Lay and
Rempp, 1981; Nicholas et al, 1983; Robey, 1977; Rothwell, 1984),
and the discussion of it will continue at the end of the next
section, which deals with the impact of new technology on
individual jobs.
The impact of micro-electronics on job design
The aim of this section is to consider the implications of new
technology for the nature of the jobs that people perform.
Writers have used a wide range of terms in describing the effects
of micro-electronics on jobs: skill, control, variety, boredom,
monotony, division of labour, responsibility, etc. However, in
the main, these terms tend to be subsumed under the general
heading of skill. Increased variety, responsibility and control
for the individual are seen as increasing his skill and creating
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a better job. On the other hand, fragmenting the job, increasing
boredom and reducing control are seen as reducing skill and thus
creating a worse job for the individual.
Using the concept of skill, it is possible to separate the writers
on new technology into three groups, in a familiar pattern: those
who see new technology as deskilling people; those who see it as
reskilling people; and a third group who believe that new tech-
nology does not, by itself, determine the level of skill and
that, indeed, there are choices in how it can be used.
The deskillers: It should be said that no writer has suggested
that everybody will be deskilled by new technology. In the main,
the deskillers would adhere to Braverman's (1974) polarisation
thesis. He argued that micro-electronics would lead to the vast
majority of the workforce being deskilled whilst a few, at the top
end of the organisational hierarchy, would be highly skilled and
highly rewarded.
In reviewing the literature, there is much evidence to support
this view. In Sweden, Ahlin and Svensson (1980) surveyed 16
engineering companies which had introduced new technology. They
found that this led to a worsening of shopfloor jobs; there was
an increase in job fragmentation, shift work and the use of
unskilled labour. Artandi (1982), in America, found that the
introduction of computers onto the shopfloor turned skilled
workers into "button-pushers". She found that computers tended
to mystify the production process for shopfloor workers and that
this led to alienation. Blumberg and Gerwin (1981), also in
America, come to similar conclusions. In addition, they found
not only that the introduction of computers removed shopfloor
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workers' decision-making skills and put decisions into the hands
of a few experts, but that this led to inefficient production
methods which would not have been the case if skilled workers had
been able to exercise control.
Dostal (1982) has observed that new technology is leading to
skill polarisation in West German manufacturing industry. Cooley
(1983), in Britain, has pointed out that deskilling is not
isolated to the shopfloor. Such developments as Computer Aided
Design can, he believes, result in the deskilling of draughtsmen
and designers.
These findings are not just related to manufacturing industry;
the deskilling of clerical jobs has been observed in the service
and other sectors. Whistler (1970) has noted that the skill and
discretion of white collar workers were reduced by the intro-
duction of computers. Bjorn-Andersen commented that the computer
introduced the "assembly-line effect" into the office that is to
say, it reduces workers' discretion and variety and also controls
the pace at which they work (quoted in Hennestad, 1982). The
HUSAT Research Group at Loughborough University found evidence
that computers introduced into offices could have long-term
adverse effects upon motivation, job satisfaction and career
prospects (Damordaran et al, 1980).
Wynn and Otway (1982) concluded that even middle management were
not immune. They found that computer systems that were supposed
to aid them actually resulted in their being deskilled and
alienated.
As well as noting a general tendency towards deskilling, particular
groups have also been singled out as being more at risk. These
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include women (Williams, 1984) and older workers of both sexes
(Ahlin and Svensson, 1980).
There are many other researchers who have also concluded that new
technology will have adverse effects on job design (Hennestad,
1982; Lund, 1978; Lungren and Sageser, 1967; Mumford and Banks,
1967; NEDO, 1983; NOU, 1980; Senker et al, 1976).
The skillers: The viewpoint that new technology will maintain
and increase skill is put forward by a wide range of writers from
different countries. Aguren et al (1984) examined the Volvo car
plant at Kalmar in Sweden and found that new technology had
improved jobs. Forslin et al (1979), also in Sweden, came to a
similar conclusion when examining another large engineering
company. Lay and Rempp (1981) concluded that in West Germany
the introduction of computer numerically controlled machine tools
(CNC) tended to maintain and upgrade shopfloor skill.
Hyer and Wemmerlov (1984), surveying the American engineering
scene, found that new technology offered opportunities to create
better jobs for those at the lower levels of organisations.
Cross (1983), in Britain, noted that micro-electronics required
shopfloor workers to develop new and wider skills. Ouellette et
al (1983) have observed that shopfloor automation can cut out
boring, monotonous and dangerous jobs. From a trade union
perspective, a Labour Research Department (1982) survey found no
evidence of a deskilling tendency with new technology; instead,
they found it tended to bring increased responsibility for
workers.
In terms of white collar jobs, Kassler (1981) has argued that
computers have led to jobs with a higher level of skill than
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before. Cockburn (1983) has pointed out that the computerisation
of printing opens up skill opportunities not previously open to
clerical workers, especially women. Bird (1980) found that new
technology created better, more highly skilled, office jobs.
Others have also concluded that new technology will lead to
better jobs (Sell, 1984a; Tarling, nd.; Walton, 1982).
The case against technological determinism continued: As can be
seen, there is plenty of evidence to support both those who
believe micro-electronics will create better jobs and those who
believe it will create worse jobs. Nor is it the case that these
contradictory views arise because researchers are looking at
different applications of new technology. A look at what has been
written about word processors, for example, confirms this.
Bird (1980) found that 75% of the word processor operators she
surveyed reported that it had made their job more satisfying than
before. Stonier (1980) also found this to be the case with word
processor operators he studied. On the other hand, C Davis (1979)
observed that boredom was a major problem for them, whilst Baxter
(1979) argued that word processing led to deskilling.
A possible way of reconciling these differing reports of the
effects of word processors, and maybe new technology in general,
is put forward by Wall et al (1984). They point out that, within
limits, choices exist with regard to how the word processor is
used, and, dependent upon these choices, the resultant jobs can
be good, bad or indifferent.
The issue of choice, and what factors influence the choices made,
was also noted with regard to organisational structure.
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Pts pointed out, a large number of writers have rejected a deter-
ministic view of new technology. They have argued, both in terms
of organisational structure and job design, that there are options
as to how new technology is used, and that the actual choices that
are made, whilst being influenced by it, are not determined solely
by the technology (Buchanan, 1984; Cooley, 1980; Kemp et al, 1984;
Land et al, 1983b).
Choice and New Technology
If it is the case that new technology is not deterministic, then
it raises the question of what does determine the way the tech-
nology is used? A wide range of factors have been put forward
by researchers as being important in determining the outcome of
technical change.
Research by Buchanan (1984) and Buchanan and Boddy (1983) has
demonstrated that in particular instances, it was management
control objectives, especially by lower management, which deter-
mined the outcome of technical change. They also pointed out
that the control objective pursued by one level of management
could conflict with the objectives of other levels of management.
Francis et al (1982) have also found evidence that control of
labour is a factor when introducing new technology. Perrow
(1983) has taken this point one step further. He believes that
not only do senior managers use technology to bolster their
control of the organisation, but they also influence the design
of the technology to this end as well. Cooley (1980 and 1983)
and Noble (1979) have also suggested that management control
objectives affect the design of technology.
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Shaiken (1984) is another writer who sees management as deliber-
ately choosing to use technology in such a way as to increase
their control. White (1983) has also mentioned this as a factor
which influences technical change.
Jones (1979) concluded that the outcome of technical change
depended on the power, values and interests of those involved.
Williams and Steward (1984), whilst pointing out the importance
of control, also point out that technical change in Britain has
to be understood within the context of the particular economic
circumstances that companies in this country face with regard to
the effects of the world recession.
Clegg et al (1984) have drawn attention to the particular organis-
ational context within which change takes place as being important.
They draw especial attention to managerial style and organisational
structure. Gough and Stiller (1983) have pointed to the constraints
on choice imposed by existing control and information structures,
as well as the values held by those responsible for introducing
new technology.
Likewise, Mumford (1981) has pointed to the importance of indiv-
idual and organisational values. She has also (Mumford, 1979)
drawn attention to a "powerful ideology" which grips Britain and
other industrial countries: this is the belief that people are
expendable, that they are an easily replaced commodity, and,
therefore, they need not be taken into account when designing
organisational systems or jobs.
Warner (1984), Hartman et al (1983), Sorgeet al (1983) and
Nicholas et al (1983) are a group of researchers who have studied
the introduction of new technology within and between Great
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Britain and West Germany. Their conclusions give societal
differences an important role in shaping the variety of organis-
ational arrangements that accompany the introduction of new
technology in these countries.
They also stress the importance of company size, market and product
in influencing choice. Dunn (1984) has suggested that size and
structure are both important with regard to the introduction and
use of technology.
Tarling (n..d.) is another who has pointed to product and product
market as important. Littler (1983) has not only drawn attention
to the importance of market pressures but also to historically
specific managerial ideologies such as Scientific Management.
Both Cooley (1980) and Rosenbrock (1981) have stressed the need
to see present organisational, job design, and technological
developments within their historical context, and especially, in
the case of Britain, the importance of the Industrial Revolution
in shaping the values and attitudes of managers and workers.
Whilst the above review of non-technological factors which
influence change is by no means exhaustive, it is representative
of the work in this area. From it, seven factors, other than the
technology itself, emerge as being important in shaping the
outcome of technical change within particular organisations.
The first factor is the power relations within the organisation.
In many cases, the outcome of technical change is seen as a
purely management-worker clash. Management are seen as using
technology to gain greater control over the workforce. However,
this issue also includes power battles between different sections
of management and between different sections of the workforce.
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The second factor is the organisation's existing structure and
philosophy/culture. The structure is seen as important in
restricting the options that are seen as possible by those in the
organisation; whilst the organisation's philosophy/culture is
seen as important in shaping the choices that individuals or
groups pursue.
The third factor is the organisation's market and product. These
are seen as influencing what is "best" for the organisation:
different markets and products lead to different "best" solutions.
The fourth factor is the size of the organisation. In the
literature, increasing size is associated with bureaucracy and
the fragmentation of jobs.
The fifth factor is the values, attitudes and self-interest of
the individuals involved. Regardless of the organisation's
philosophy/culture, individuals' values, etc., are seen as
important because they are the ones who have to take choices and
live with the results of the choices made by themselves and
others.
The sixth factor is societal differences. The structure of
individual societies, their industry, economy and culture, are
seen as important in shaping the pattern of organisational
arrangements that apply in particular countries.
The last factor is historical developments both within and
between countries. This relates to how particular economies
develop, but also the development of ideologies which shape
organisational and individual choices.
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No one writer or group of writers seems to espouse all of these
factors, but all of these are given in the literature as being
important determinants of the outcome, for individuals and
organisations, of technical change. These issues will be returned
to in Chapter 4.
CONCLUS ION
As can be seen, a number of overlapping, but not necessarily
inter-linking, factors have been cited in the literature as being
important in shaping the outcome of technological change. Super-
ficially at least, they bear some relation to Contingency Theory
(Child, 1984); however, in some very important instances, such as
power relations, organisational philosophy and values, and
individuals' values, they depart significantly from it.
The importance of developing a clear conceptual framework in
order to understand the factors involved in successfully choosing
and using new technology cannot be overstated. Only by under-
standing the factors which influence the change process can the
outcome of that process be beneficial to individuals, organis-
ations and society as a whole. At the moment, as Rosenbrock
(1981), Cooley (1983) and Bessant (1983) have pointed out,
Britain and other countries are at a historic turning point.
The choices about technology and how it is to be used are
relatively open, but, in a few years' time, fixed patterns will
emerge, and these will shape the design of individual jobs,
Drganisational structures, and even the type of societies we will
Live. in oi generations to come.
'rom the previous section, it becomes obvious that the development
Df a conceptual framework is dependent upon an understanding of
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the role played by non-technical factors in the process of
technical change.
It will be demonstrated that the forces which influence contemporary
practice with regard to work organisation and job design are
products of, and cannot be understood without recourse to, their
historical development. Therefore, Chapter 2 will examine the
origins and development of work organisation and job design, and
Chapter 3 will examine contemporary approaches to these issues.
Chapter 4 will link together these chapters, with Chapter 1, in
order to present a conceptual framework for understanding the
impact of technical change.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF WORK ORGANISATION AND JOB DESIGN
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is split into two parts. Part one examines the
origins of modern work organisation and job design by looking
at the emergence of the factory system in Britain's Industrial
Revolution. It describes the role played in this by labour and
technology, and argues that the factory system emerged for
organisational reasons concerned with the control of labour rather
than technological ones, and that technological developments were
shaped by the needs of the factory system rather than the reverse.
Part two deals with the development of work organisation and job
design in the 19th century. It is demonstrated that, from a trial
and error basis, a pattern based on the division of labour and
the fragmentation of skills does emerge. This pattern, arising
out of a variety of organisational arrangements, develops through
the 19th century and reaches its culmination as a concrete theory
in the work of F W Taylor.
These developments are tempered by the opposition of labour, but
this opposition also helps to fuel the dominant management
ideology which emerges in this period and underpins Taylor's
work. This is the view that labour is unreliable and would, if
not controlled or eliminated, pose a serious threat to the main
business objective of organisations: profitability.
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PART ONE
THE ORIGINS OF WORK ORGANISATION AND JOB DESIGN
The Oriqins of the Factory System
The origins of the factory system lie in Britain's Industrial
Revolution, and as Weber (1928) has pointed out, its distinguishing
characteristic was ". . . in general . . . not the implements of
work applied [i.e. the technology,] but the concentration of
ownership of workplace, means of work, source of power and raw
material in one and the same hand, that of the entrepreneur."
(P 302).
Factories of sorts had existed in other countries before the
Industrial Revolution, but these were few and tended to be
staffed by slave labour. Those who were involved in industrial
production were either independent artisans, members of guilds,
or involved in it part-time as an agricultural by-occupation.
In none of these instances was production concentrated under one
roof nor were producers employed by someone else (Gorz, 1976).
Therefore, the factory was something new and, at least in the early
19th century, synonymous with textile production.
Before, and during the early part of, the Industrial Revolution,
textile production was based in the countryside where 80% of
the population lived (Hobsbawm, 1968; Tillett, 1970). As
Ashton (1948) has commented: "There was probably no county in
England or Wales in which woollen cloth was not produced by the
part-time work of peasants, farmers and agricultural labourers."
However, as the 18th century progressed, the demand for textiles
grew and sorne"men and women [became] specialist spinners or
weavers, thinking first of wool, treating work on the land as, at
most, a by-occupation." (p 23).
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As demand for, and production of, textiles grew (particularly
international demand), new mechanisms sprang up to link producer
to consumer. The "putting-out" system became the standard
mechanism. This was a system where a large merchant would "put
out" work to an independent domestic producer. This arrangement
had three advantages for the merchant: it was cheap - there were
few overheads; it was flexible - production could easily be expanded
or contracted as demand fluctuated; and it avoided the problems of
directly employing a workforce (Gospel, 1981).
However, as demand further increased, this system became more
elaborate and more costly. The merchant would himself employ
putter-outs who themselves might employ an intermediary. In
many cases, the putter-out came to supply raw materials and even
the tools of production, looms, etc. (Ashton, 1948).
The point to note is that increased demand was not, initially at
least, caused by the cheapening of the product due to technological
change, but to the opening up of new markets and the multiplier
effect this had on international trade.
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape,
opened up fresh grounds . . . The East-Indian and
Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade
with the colonies, the increase in the means of
exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce,
to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before
known . . . (Marx and Engels, 1888, p8O).
The move from handicraft production to putting-out sufficed the
needs of the market for a time, but eventually, as the system
grew, it became strained. The long chain of organisation which
linked producer to consumer became ever more complex and difficult
for the merchant to control. It was the merchant, developing
39
new markets and finding new sources of production, who was the
dominant and dynamic force in the system, and it was the merchant
who wished to change the system. The incompatibility between the
large and complex organisation of distribution and the "innumerable
tiny domestic workshop units, unsupervised and unsupervisable"
was bound to "set up tensions and drive the merchants to seek new
ways of production", whereby they could impose "their own managerial
practices on the productive sector" (Pollard, 1965, p44).
Dishonesty was rife on both sides; merchants tried to cheat
producers and producers retaliated. For the merchant there was
also the problem of getting the producer to deliver the goods when
required. The merchant increasingly used the law to impose his
will on the producer. Acts of Parliament, with increasingly heavy
penalties, were passed in 1703, 1740, 1749 and 1777. These were
not just to stop dishonesty on the part of the producers, but
also to impose strict delivery conditions (Ashton, 1948, p 44).
Nevertheless, the law could not overcome the basic incompatibility
between producer and distributor. It was a clash of different
economic and social systems which had different values. For the
capitalist merchant, the expansion of markets was a chance to
increase his profits. For the rural domestic producer, it merely
created the conditions for increased leisure. As Marglin (1976)
has put it: ". . . wages rose and workers insisted in taking out
a portion of their gains in the form of greater leisure. However
sensible this may have been from their own point of view, it is
no way for an enterprising capitalist to get ahead" (p 35).
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Some histories of the Industrial Revolution tend to dwell on
technology as being the moving force towards centralisation of
production (Ashton, 1948; Mathias, 1969). However, the evidence
would tend to suggest other forces were also at work, notably the
need of merchants to gain better control of the production process.
• . . the agglomeration of workers into factories was
a natural outgrowth of the putting-out system (a result,
if you will, of its internal contradictions) whose
success had little or nothing to do with the technological
superiority of large-scale machinery. The key to the
success of the factory, as well as its inspiration, was
the substitution of capitalists' for workers' control
of the production process; discipline and supervision
could and did reduce costs without being technologically
superior (Marglin, 1976, pp 28 - 29).
Ashton (1948) points to specific cases where:-
• . . the reasons [for factory production] were economic
rather than technological . . . it was the need for
supervision of work which led Peter Stubbs to gather the
scattered file makers into his works at Warrington. In
the pottery trade, the economies to be made from the
division and sub-division of labour were the chief
inducements to the creation of Wedgwood's Etruria. (p88)
Therefore, the impetus for the creation of the factory system
came from merchants who believed it would give them greater
control of the production process. They would then be able to
take full advantage of expanding markets and reap greater profits.
However, whilst the advantages to be gained by centralising
production under one roof were evident from the employers' side,
it was equally evident that there were disadvantages from the
employees' side.
Labour and the early factory system
The factory of the Industrial Revolution tends to be described
as a place where free men and women sold, of their own volition,
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their labour power to an entrepreneur who would supply the other
elements of production: machinery and raw materials (Ashton,
1948).
However, the reality was somewhat different, at least as far as
the suppliers of labour were concerned. The fact is that labour
was very reluctant to take up factory employment. The reasons
for this were three-fold. The first was that it involved a
wholesale change of culture, environment and way of life.
The reasons for the "attractions of cottage industry",
or rather the repulsion of factory industry, were
many and varied . . . there was a whole new culture to
be absorbed and an old one to be traduced and spurned,
there were new surroundings, often in different parts
of the country, new relations with employers and new
uncertainties of livelihood, new friends and neighbours,
new marriage patterns and behaviour patterns of children
and adults within the family and without. (Pollard, 1965,
p191)
This was especially the case in the weaving communities which
had developed their own rich and distinct cultures.
Every weaving district had its own weaver-poets,
biologists, mathematicians, musicians, geologists,
botanists . . . there are accounts of weavers in
isolated villages who taught themselves geometry by
chalking on the flagstones, and who were eager to
discuss the differential calculus. (Thompson, 1968,
p322)
The second was the harsh and unremitting discipline of the factory.
The following quotations give some flavour of factory life:-
the worker was treated as a piece of mechanism,
who obeys the simplest behaviourist stimulus and
response rules, and whose other mental capacities and
interests could be ignored. (Pollard, 1965, p243).
In the handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes
use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use
of him.	 (Marx, 1886, p422).
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The main difficulty [with the early factory system]
• . . lay . . . above all in training human beings to
renounce their desultory habits of work and to identify
themselves with the unvarying regularity of the complex
automaton [the factory]. (Ure, 1835, p15).
The penalties for "desultory habits" were swift and unpleasant.
Beatings were common for child labour and even some adults.
Fines were arbitrarily imposed and dismissal, with only the
workhouse to fall back on, was the ultimate sanction (Pollard,
1965)
The final obstacle to enticing labour into factories was, as
Pollard (1965) has pointed out; the "modelling of many works on
workhouses or prisons, a fact well known to the working population"
(p190). It was not just that the regime inside was fashioned on
these establishments, but also that they supplied much of the
labour for the early factories. Up to one-third of factory
labour was pauper children hired out by the workhouses. Indeed,
to complete the process, many workhouses turned themselves into
factories in order to "see idle men punished and educated to
work". It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the "association
of factory labour with pauper compulsion was strong in many
people's minds" (Pollard, 1965, pp 192 - 195).
Given the tradition of the peasant whose life was conditioned and
given variety by the seasons, and the artisan, who controlled
his own work, the rejection of the factory was quite natural.
Nevertheless, what took place in the Industrial Revolution was
not just a clash between two systems of production: cottage and
guild versus factory. It was also a clash between two economic
systems which put different values on human labour. On the one
hand was the agrarian, exchange, economy which was based on
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subsistence farming and craft production. It was a system where
"most workers were free in some measure to determine their hours
of work" (Ashton, 1948, p42), and where the:-
labourer responded to material incentives, insofar
as he wanted to earn enough to enjoy what was thought of
as comfort at the social level to which it had pleased
god to call him . . . If he earned more than the pittance
he regarded as sufficient, he might . . . take it out in
leisure, in parties and alcohol. (Hobsbawm, 1968, p87).
On the other hand was the capitalist, money, economy where
workers were treated like any other commodity: to be bought and
used; where the needs of capital necessitated regular and stable
workers, and where a "preference for leisure" by workers was seen
as a "desultory habit" by employers - a habit which had to be
overcome by harsh discipline (Gorz, 1976, pp 34 - 35).
Employers justified this harsh treatment of labour not only on
economic grounds but also on moral grounds: "The discipline
demanded by the factories was viewed, in the minds of owners and
men of property, as a moral corrective for godless men".
(Tillett, 1970, p36). Or, as one contemporary observer put it:-
It is a fact well known . . . that scarcity, to a
certain degree, promotes industry . . . We can fairly
aver that a reduction of wages . . . would be a national
blessing and advantage, and no real injury to the poor.
By this means we might keep our trade, uphold our rents,
and reform the people into the bargain. (Quoted in
Thompson, 1968, p3O6).
Even the phraseology of the time leaves no doubt as to how
employers saw their relationship with labour. Terms such as "the
organisation and its members" or "employers and employees" were
unknown; instead, phrases such as "masters and men" or "masters and
servants" were used. When Parliament, in 1824, passed legislation
to regulate the terms of contract between employers and employees,
it was called "The Master and Servant Act" (Storey, 1983).
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Given this situation, and given what modern theorists of job
design have said about the importance of autonomy (Child, 1984),
it comes as no shock that "workers were reluctant to enter
factories because in doing so, men lost their birthright:
independence." (Hobsbawm, 1968, p 68).
Nor should it come as a surprise that, on occasions, the resistance
to the factory system turned into violence against people and
property. The 19th century was marked by periodic eruptions of
violence caused by the establishment of factories and the intro-
duction of machines. For example, in the 1810s and l820s, there
were outbreaks of "Luddism"; and in 1830, agricultural labourers
revolted against the introduction of farm machinery. Even as
late as the l860s, there were serious outbursts of violence when
employers in the Sheffield cutlery industry and the Manchester
construction industry began to introduce machinery. (Berg, 1979;
Friedman, 1978; Thompson, 1968; Tillett, 1970).
It was not just potential factory workers who opposed the factory.
Small businessmen and farmers also opposed it because they saw the
new economic system as a threat to their way of life. Many went
so far as to support and even instigate the bouts of machine-
breaking that took place (Hobsbawm, 1968).
The factory system and the market economy were also opposed on
moral grounds. The factories housed large numbers of young men
and women, side by side, and could therefore, it was argued, lead
to degeneracy; whilst the market economy undermined the age-old
religious-based system of the "just price" and the "fair wage".
(Pollard, 1965).
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Despite the difficulties of recruiting and keeping labour and
despite opposition from other quarters, the factory system
flourished because it provided employers with better conditions
for profitable production. Consequently, other sources of employ-
ment opportunities dwindled and so the supply of labour grew.
Much of the credit for the success of the factory system has been
given to the role played by technology in increasing productivity;
however, there is evidence to suggest that this overstates the
importance of technology.
Technology and the Early Factory System
In describing the Industrial Revolution, historians often resort
to the production of a list of inventions: Hargreaves' spinning
jenny; Crompton's mule; Arkwright's water frame; Roberts' self-
acting mule, etc. (Council . for Science and Society, 1981;
Mathias, 1969). By so doing, the impression is given that it was
the appearance of new inventions which created the need for,
shaped the form of, and developed the factory system. In fact,
the reverse seems to have been the case in most instances; it was
the needs of the factory system that created the demand for, and
shaped the form of, technological development (Berg, 1979;
Friedman, 1978; Marglin, 1976; Rosenbrock, 1982).
As argued in the previous sections of this chapter, the initial
impetus to bringing workers together under one roof was not the
appearance of "factory technology", but the merchants' need for
better control over the supply and quality of the goods they were
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selling. Indeed, the earliest factories of the Industrial
Revolution, if that is not too grand a word for them, were small,
un-powered, weaving or spinning sheds which used existing tech-
nology. It is true that a few large factories, using water and
later steam power, did quickly appear, but in the main, factories
were small and not at all capital-intensive (Marglin, 1976;
Thompson, 1968; Tillett, 1970). As Hobsbawm (1962) has pointed
out, the technical basis of the cotton industry, the leading
sector in the Industrial Revolution, was "exceedingly modest"
( p 48).
In 1780, the investment in fixed equipment and stock was only
£10 per factory worker. Even by 1830, when the factory system
was well established, the figure was still under £100 per worker
(including stock). Or, to put it in a wider context, the textile
industry, which in 1830 employed 160,000 people, had fixed equipment
and stock valued at only £15 million (Pollard, 1965).
Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that capital invest-
ment was quickly recovered and that it was running expenses,
mainly wages and raw materials, which formed the bulk of a manu-
facturer's costs (Hobsbawm, 1968; Tillett, 1970). Consequently,
it was the factory owner's ability to control the length of the
working day and week, whilst keeping wages low, which caused the
significant increases in overall productivity per worker that
were seen under the factory system, rather than the adoption of
water or steam power, or any other specific technical change.
Indeed, throughout the 19th century, increases in output always
required increases in labour (Thompson, 1983).
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It was the need for a workforce which could be "persuaded" to
work long hours for low wages that led factory owners to use
child and female labour. At that time, women made up half the
working population of the textile industry, because they provided
a cheap supply of labour and were considered ". . . more reliable
than adult males" (Tillett, 1970, p36). In fact, it has been
argued that the plentiful supply of cheap labour that had become
available to employers due to urban population growth and the
fall in rural and agricultural job opportunities was an economic
discouragement to the adoption of new inventions in Britain in
the 19th century. The argument is that cheap labour costs make
it difficult to justify, economically, the introduction of
capital equipment (Habakkuk, 1962; Levine, 1967; Payne, 1974).
Certainly, it seems to be the case that employers in the 19th
century concentrated on using machinery to replace labour that
was expensive and/or in short supply. Whilst there were many
unskilled workers at this time, there were also significant
numbers of workers who possessed crucial skills and who used
the fact to bargain for higher wages and a degree of freedom
not given to those less skilled (Berg, 1979; Littler, 1982).
An example in the textile industry were the woolcombers.
They gained a reputation, amongst employers, for lax time-keeping
and insubordination. A contemporary observer remarked that:-
They come on a Monday morning, and having lighted
the fire in the comb pot, will frequently go away,
and perhaps return no more till Wednesday or
Thursday . . . (Quoted in Thompson, 1968, p311).
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Not surprisingly, the disruption this type of behaviour caused
to production, perhaps more so than the actual cost of wages,
was greatly resented by employers, whose aim was to maximise
production in order to maximise profits.
Certainly, Andrew Ure (1835), a propagandist for the factory
system, saw it in this fashion. He urged employers to use
technology to eliminate skilled workers, such as woolcombers,
and to replace them with less skilled, more compliant, labour.
Quoting the example of printers, he wrote:-
In the spirit of Egyptian task-masters the operative
printers dictated to the manufacturers the number
and quality of the apprentices to be admitted into
the trade, the hours of their own labour, and the
wages to be paid them. At length capitalists sought
deliverance from this intolerable bondage in the
resources of science, and were speedily re-instated
in their legitimate rule, that of the head over
the inferior members . . . This . . . confirms
the great doctrine . . . that when capital enlists
science in her service, the refractory hand of
labour will always be taught docility.
(pp 368 - 369)
This view - that machinery would, and did, allow employers to
reduce the need for, and increase control over, skilled labour
- was held by many of Ure's contemporaries (Babbage, 1835;
Colley and Thompson, 1867; Journeymen Bookbinders, 1831;
Nasmyth, 1867 - 8; Taunton, 1867 - 8).
This point can be further illustrated by looking at the design
of technology under the cottage system of production and under
the factory system. Rosenbrock (1981 and 1982) has argued that,
under the cottage system, new inventions had two characteristics:
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they increased productivity and/or quality, and they maintained/
increased the skill of the producer. Under the factory system,
he argues, new inventions and innovations still increase prod-
uctivity and/or quality, but instead of maintaining or increasing
skill, they actively reduce it by building skill into the tech-
nology in order to reduce the control labour has over the prod-
uction process. He has illustrated this (Roseribrock, 1982) by
looking at Hargreaves' development of the spinning jenny for the
cottage system, and Roberts' development of the self-acting mule
for use in the factory. Hargreaves designed the spinning jenny
for his own or his family's use, and it was therefore "natural
for Hargreaves to envisage the machine as an aid to existing
skill. It did not reject the skill of the spinner, but rather
co-operated with it to make it more productive" (pi). In the
case of the self-acting mule, "Roberts was an engineer inventing
on behalf of the mill-owners, and none of these intended to work
the machines themselves . . . Above all the mill-owners wished
at all costs to eliminate skill. First, because it was
expensive . . . Secondly, and more importantly, only the skilled
in that day could strike" (p2). Ure (1836) commented that the
principal benefit of Roberts' invention was ". . . a release
from the domination which he [the spinner] had for so long a
period exercised over his employer . . . " (p199).
It has been argued that, in the Industrial Revolution, the main
contribution of technology was to replace muscle power with
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mechanical power (Ashton, 1948; Mathias, 1969). However, as
can be seen, this was not always the case. In fact, in the
19th century, there were three overlapping phases of mechanisation,
and in the second and third of these phases, the replacement of
skill was more important than the replacement of muscle power.
The first phase was the linking of existing technology to water,
and later steam, power. This did replace muscle power with machine
power, and in some cases allowed children to take over the work
previously done by adults, but, in the main, did not reduce skills
(Thompson, 1968; Tillett, 1970). Indeed, in some cases, workers
found their skills in greater demand than ever before, and it was
this that sparked off the second phase of mechanisation.
This second phase saw the invention of new machines and improve-
ment of existing ones. Roberts' self-acting mule is one example;
there were many others in all industries. These inventions did
reduce or eliminate the skill necessary to carry out production
processes, thus facilitating the introduction of less skilled
labour into previously skilled trades and crafts (Berg, 1979;
Nasmyth, 1867-8; Swift, 1895).
However, the greater use of machinery which this brought about
increased the demand for, and bargaining power of, the skilled
workers who built the machines. This in turn created the con-
ditions for the third phase of mechanisation.
This third phase saw the standardisation of the machines themselves
through the use of interchangeable parts and more accurate
production and measuring techniques. This not only reduced the
cost of machinery, thus allowing it to be used on a wider scale,
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but also reduced the skills necessary to construct the machines
(Hobsbawm, 1968; Levine, 1967; Tillett, 1970).
Thus it can be seen that technological change was not, in itself,
the spur to the invention of the factory nor a stimulus to its
continued development. Instead, the reverse was the case: the
factory system, or rather the needs of those who controlled it,
determined how, and in what areas, technology would be developed
(Marglin, 1976).
The needs of factory owners were very simple: they wanted a com-
pliant, low-cost workforce in order to take advantage of the
growing demand for their goods, to allow them to maximise profits.
Where skilled labour threatened the predictability of production
and/or profits, then they would seek out methods to overcome
this problem, technology being one of these methods.
However, more important than technology in reducing skill and in
increasing output was the opportunity that the factory system
offered for re-organising work and re-designing jobs.
PART TWO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORK ORGANISATION AND JOB DESIGN IN THE
19th CENTURY
The Beginnings
The key figure in the early factory system was the factory owner
or "entrepreneur". As Flinn (1966) has pointed out:
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He it was who brought together the capital and the
labour force, selected the most appropriate site for
operations, chose the particular technologies of
production to be employed, bargained for raw
materials and found outlets for the finished
product.	 (p79).
Most of these functions were not new; they had been carried out
by merchants under the putting-out system. What was new was
that workers were directly employed and organised under one
roof (Pollard, 1965; Weber, 1928). Being a new development,
there were no blueprints that could be used to guide the owner
in his endeavours; both employers and employees had to invent
the rules of the game as they went along. It was probably for
this reason that most early factories were small - many employed
no more than 10 or 12 people - and that they concentrated on
one aspect ofproduction, such as spinning, rather than attempt-
ing to bring the entire production process under one roof
(Tillett, 1970). This meant that the early factory systems
still had to rely either on the putting-out system or on other
factories for key elements of production. Even in the textile
industry, where the factory system began, there were still only
50% of textile workers employed in factories by 1830
(Hobsbawm, 1968).
Therefore, in the sense that he still had to co-ordinate external
contractors, the early factory owner resembled the "putter-out"
rather than the modern manager of today.
Nevertheless, owners had to devise methods for organising and
controlling labour. In the beginning, these were quite simple.
The objective was to ensure that workers arrived on time, did
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not leave early, and, in the opinion of the owner, worked hard
whilst they were there. In the smaller establishments, the owner
might supervise this process himself or, as firms got bigger, he
might subcontract supervision out to someone else. Consequently,
a wide variety of systems for organising work and controlling
labour sprang up. It was not uncommon to have direct employees;
subcontract supervisors who were paid in relation to the output
of the workers they supervised; and skilled workers responsible
to the owner for their production, but paid in relation to their
output, all working side by side. Indeed, the direct employees,
paid a fixed rate, might even employ their own helper. Therefore,
in the beginning at least, the factory owner solved his labour
management problems by both internal and external subcontraction,
where to do so did not conflict with profitability (Clawson,
1980 a and b; Friedman, 1978; Storey, 1983; Tillett, 1970).
In his attitude towards labour, the factory owner shared the
common prejudices of the day. Workers were seen as unreliable,
only interested in money, and as considering work as a burden.
For this reason, discipline, they believed, needed to be severe
in order to make them work, but, if this task could be subcon-
tracted out to somebody else without threatening profits, then
so much the better (Davis and Taylor, 1979; Pollard, 1965).
In the early days of the factory, employers were more interested
with increasing the hours of work in order to increase output
than in the actual details of work carried out in the factory.
However, this was not so in all factories. There were a few
factories where production was on a large scale, and where
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employers paid detailed attention to the organisation of work
and the production methods employed. Wedgwood's pottery works
was one such example. He employed large numbers of people and
had developed a system for organising production that split the
process down into separate departments with specialist super-
visors. Work was organised almost on a flow-line basis, and the
skill involved in each operation had been sub-divided so as, in
Wedgwood's words, "to make machines of men as cannot err" (quoted
in Tillett, 1970, p 37). Boultori and Watt's engineering works,
established in the l770s, was another example where work was
organised and jobs designed in such a way that the need for
skilled labour was reduced; but even there, it was not possible
to dispense with the services of highly skilled millwrights.
Their factory was also unusual in that it kept detailed production
records, a practice unknown in the vast majority of establishments
(Roll, 1930).
Though examples of factory organisation such as these were rare,
they were a pointer to the future and, importantly, became
training grounds for the next generation of factory owners and
managers (Ashton, 1948).
A Pattern Emerges
By the l830s, Britain had a growing population of workers
acclimatised to the factory system, who knew no other way of
life. It also, more importantly, had a generation of owners who
had not only grown up with the factory system, but were actively
developing it. The smaller factories which employed 10 - 12
people were disappearing, and whilst large factories were still
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a rarity (there were only 7 textile mills that employed over
1,000 people in 1833, and only 23 that employed over 500), the
average size of factories was increasing; in 1838, it was 137
employees (Hobsbawni, 1968; Tillett, 1970). Therefore, almost for
the first time, common management problems were beginning to
emerge and be discussed. Trial and error was still probably the
most common method of solving problems, but the methods used by
innovative factory owners, such as Wedgwood, Boulton and Watt,
etc., were being written about and gaining adherents (Berg, 1979).
Slowly, a pattern of work organisation and job design was emerging.
It was based on the principle of the division of labour, which had
been popularised by Adam Smith in his book "The Wealth of Nations"
published in 1776 (Smith, 1776).
Smith used the now famous example of pin-making to illustrate
what he saw as the advantages of the division of labour. He
pointed out that a pin could be made entirely by one person doing
everything, or by a number of different people each specialising
in one aspect of its production. He believed the latter was
more efficient and productive, for three reasons:
ii A workman who constantly performs one simple task will
quickly acquire greater dexterity than one who performs
a variety of tasks;
ii) It avoids the loss of time necessitated by one person
moving from one task to another;
-ii) The concentration of attention on one special task leads
to the invention of machines which aid the productivity
of labour and allow one person to do the work previously
performed by many.
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More and more, in accordance with Smith's advice, production was
split up into smaller elements and skills were fragmented
(Berg, 1979; Thompson, 1983; Tillett, 1970).
Highly skilled occupations such as that of the millwright
disappeared. What one man previously did alone might be done
by 2, 3 or 20 different, and less skilled, workers. This process
was aided by technical developments, such as the lathe slide-rest
which reduced the skill involved in turning, but it was not driven
by them; rather the reverse (Rosenbrock, 1981; Swift, 1895).
One of the key theorists and propagandists of these developments
was Charles Babbage, who, in 1835, published his famous book
"On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures". Drawing on the
writings of Adam Smith, and anticipating the later work of
Frederick Taylor, he showed how the division of labour could
be applied to the microscopic analysis of workshop behaviour.
He emphasised the advantages, to employers, of dividing tasks
between and within mental and manual labour. He envisaged
three "classes" involved in the production process: the
entrepreneur and his technical aides would design the machinery;
operative engineers would execute their plans, based on a
partial knowledge of the processes; and the mass of workers,
with a lower level of skill, would be employed in using the
machines. This, in Babbage's view (1835), would reduce the
cost of labour:-
• . . the master manufacturer, by dividing the work to
be executed into different processes, each requiring
different degrees of skill or force, can purchase
exactly the precise quality of both which is necessary
for each process . . • (pvii)
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Babbage also advocated the use of bonus systems to encourage
productivity, and the keeping of accurate production records
so that, amongst other things, the level of output from each
worker could be recorded.
Another influential writer was Andrew Ure, who pointed to the
role that technology could play in cheapening and controlling
labour: -
By developing machines . . . which require only unskilled
instead of skilled labour, the cost of labour can be
reduced [and] the bargaining position of the worker
can be weakened. (Ure, 1836., pp viii - ix)
The next 40 years saw the diffusion of these ideas into many
factories. This process was aided by the further growth of
the factory system: 50% of the population worked in factories
by 1871; and by the increase in factory size - by 1870, the
average factory employed 181 people (Storey, 1983; Tillett,
1970)
One reason for the growth in factory size was the increase in
demand for manufactured goods; another was the trend towards
the integration of production under one roof. For a variety of
reasons, problems with outside contractors, costs, and, perhaps,
a growing confidence in their own managerial abilities, factory
owners wanted more direct control over all aspects of production
(Thompson, 1983).
For workers, the growth of factory size posed a double threat.
On the one hand, it made it easier for employers to fragment
tasks and skills; on the other hand, the increase in size meant
an increase in overheads, more administration, more supervisors,
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more machines, which could only be justified by a reduction in
production costs - which in the final analysis meant either
lower wages, higher productivity per worker, or both.
Therefore, factory owners began increasingly to examine the
details of work, the norms of production, the utilisation of
plant and machinery, which in turn led to an increased division
of labour and reduction in skills (Berg, 1979; Tillett, 1970).
However, these changes met both political and industrial oppos-
ition from labour. Politically, the period 1830 - 1870 saw the
rise and decline of Chartism, the widening of the Parliamentary
franchise, and legislation regarding safety in factories and
regulating the hours of work of children. There were increasing
demands for a shorter working week for adults, a 10-hour day,
and even for machines to be taxed in order to discourage their
use by employers. All these developments reflected the rising
importance of the industrial working class (Hobsbawm, 1968;
Pollard, 1965).
Amongst industrial workers, this period saw the emergence of
craft unions which were established to defend the status and
wages of skilled, male, workers. These unions, especially in
the textile and engineering industries, used two main tactics
to achieve their aims. The first was to restrict entry to the
craft or trade by making it dependent on a long, union-controlled,
apprenticeship, and by limiting the number of apprentices in any
one establishment. This, where it was effective, meant that the
supply of labour was kept at a level that would maintain the
union in an advantageous bargaining position. The other main
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tactic employed was to resist employers' demands for changes in
work organisation or methods which would either reduce or elim-
inate their members' skill and/or control over the work process.
This included resisting attempts to put boys on machines instead
of skilled men, refusing to work more than one machine at a time,
and bitterly opposing attempts to remove traditional areas of
discretion from them, such as the determining of the pace and
quality of work, and giving this responsibility to supervisors.
The result of these tactics for workers was double-edged. On
the one hand, the efforts of factory owners to reduce the skill
and control of workers were, to an extent which varied from
factory to factory and industry to industry, thwarted. On the
other hand, the formation of strong craft unions acted as an
incentive to employers to intensify the process of undermining
workers' status and skill (Berg, 1979; Friedman, 1978; Littler,
1982; Nasmyth, 1867-8; Penn, 1982; Thompson, 1983).
Therefore, as can be seen, as the factory system developed, and
especially as factories grew in size, the problem of labour
control grew in importance. Factory owners responded to the
problem in a variety of ways, but increasingly they turned to
the division of labour and the use of machines to control and
deskill workers. This in turn brought an adverse reaction from
skilled workers who began to organise in craft unions to resist
employers' attacks on their skills and bargaining strength.
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The Division of Labour Accelerates
The onset of the Great Depression in the l870s reduced company
profits, which in turn forced factory owners to take a greater
interest in production costs and methods. The subsequent
economic recovery in the l890s also saw increased interest by
owners in, and control over, the details of production. Therefore,
this period saw an acceleration of the organisational trends
that had been developing over the previous 50 years.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a "Merger
Boom" brought about by the need to reduce competition. This was
one of the reasons why the average size of factories increased
by 50% between 1880 and 1919. Another reason was the fact that
companies were continuing to reduce their reliance on outside
subcontractors, and integrating production under one roof in
order to cut costs (Allen, 1970; Levine, 1967; Payne, 1974;
Tillett, 1970).
The growth in size caused organisational and control problems
for management, which in turn led to the development of new
management specialisms. This period saw, really for the first
time, the emergence of a distinct managerial class as averse to
the traditional owner-managers. Within companies, in order to
cope with the problems of size, there was a growing separation
of management functions. Firstly there was a separation between
those involved in strategic, long-term, decision-making, and those
involved in day-to-day decision-making. Then these functions
themselves began to be divided. On the strategic side, such
specialisms as planning, marketing, finance, etc., appeared;
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and on the production side, managers began to seek specialist
assistance from accountants, progress-chasers, rate-fixers and
professional engineers charged with examining and cheapening
production methods. The internal contractor disappeared in
most industries and new, specialist, supervisors were given
responsibility for functions previously carried out by many
workers themselves, such as checking quality, determining the
pace of work, and selecting the most appropriate tooling and
methods (Clawson, 1980 A and B; Edwards, 1983; Locke, 1982;
Storey, 1983; Williamson, 1973).
This explosion of managerial functions was accompanied and aided
by the growth of publications dealing specifically with the
analysis of management problems (Tillett, 1970).
Not surprisingly, there was also an increased acceleration in
the division of labour on the factory floor. The production
and ancillary processes were broken down into a greater number of
separate departments. Within departments, work roles became
narrower and the decision-making latitude of individual workers
became more constrained. New incentive schemes were introduced
to relate pay to production, and production quotas came to be
determined more by management, through forms of work study,
than through the imposition of "traditional" output norms by
skilled workers. These changes were facilitated by developments
in technology; a move to standardise products; and tighter quality
specifications. However, this process would not have been possible
without the information on production methods and times that was
being collected, recorded, and used by the new management spec-
ialists involved in work study (Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983).
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Indeed, the paradox that faced this new managerial group, or
groups as they quickly became, was that only by reducing the
skills, wages, and status of other employees could they justify
and increase their own status and remuneration (Locke, 1982;
Tillett, 1970).
To the economic pressures on owners and managers to rationalise
production was added, in the 1890s and l900s, a growing public
concern, almost hysteria, about the performance of British
industry. As one British industry after another was overtaken
by its German or American competitors, so the British public,
or at least that section of it that read the "respectable" press,
came to ask, to demand, "why?"
The answer that became accepted was that the British workman
(or woman) was workshy in comparison with his foreign counter-
part. The specific allegation was that they practised "go-slow"
methods in order to restrict output and maintain wages/employment
levels.
How widespread, or important, this practice was, no one could
quantify; though it is hardly surprising, as work became, for
many, denuded of intrinsic value and related purely to money,
that workers should betray a more instrumental attitude towards
their work. Nevertheless, whatever the rights and wrongs of
the situation, it acted as an extra incentive for managers and
owners to develop methods to extract more work from labour
(Davis and Taylor, 1979; Levine, 1967; Thompson, 1983).
However, management did not have it all their own way. This
period also saw a growth in, and widening of, trade union
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membership and militancy. Not only were craft unions recruiting
more members, but also, from the 1880s, new unions were emerging
to cater for the needs of semi- and unskilled workers of both
sexes. The late 1890s and 1900s saw an increasing number of
industrial disputes, many related to issues of pay, but others,
such as the "Engineers' Lockout" of 1897/8, were concerned more
with changes in the organisation of production (Hobsbawm, 1979;
Pelling, 1976).
Therefore, whilst the 19th century saw the development of factory
organisation, it also saw the development of organised resistance
by labour.
Yet, from a managerial perspective, the changes in British
industry, whilst being significant in terms of previous practice,
were modest in comparison with what had taken place in America
in the last few decades of the 19th century. This was a fact
that the British public, as well as British managers, were well
aware of. In international terms, British companies were too
small, too conservative in work organisation and technology,
and under-capitalised. Many of the organisational innovations
and managerial developments were only feasible in large organis-
ations, as were the technological developments. In Britain, the
tendency was still for firms to be owned by one family or a small
group of partners, and it was the case, in most instances, that
the capital needed to foster growth was not available without
outside investment. Faced with the choice between retaining
control and remaining small, or losing control and expanding,
owners chose the former (Allen, 1970; Levine, 1967; Payne, 1974).
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Equally important was the fact that no theory existed that linked
all the separate piecemeal organisational developments together
in one set of guidelines for managers to use in re-organising
work and jobs. However, developments in America were to remedy
this situation.
The Origins of Scientific Management
America, up to 1860, had been an agricultural economy which
lagged well behind Britain in terms of industrial production.
However, from 1860 onwards, this changed rapidly, and by 1918,
America had become the world's premier industrial nation (Rose,
1981; Zinn, 1980).
The scale of industries and the size of individual organisations
was far greater than anything that existed in Britain at that
time. Whereas the typical organisation in Britain was the small
family-owned business, in America it was the monopoly, which
dominated an entire industry, or the corporation which would
have substantial holdings in a range of industries. Unlike
Britain, the banks played a substantial part in merging together
companies and linking together industries into giant industrial
combines. Whisit individuals, such as J D Rockefeller, who
acquired a personal fortune of two billion dollars, could and
did own entire industries, the norm was for corporations to be
owned by stockholders and run by professional managers who,
whilst they might have shares in the corporation, did not own
it. The evolution of the giant US Steel Corporation, which
employed 200,000 people, is a case in point. Carnegie sold
his steel company in 1900 for 419 million dollars. The company
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was then amalgamated with others to form US Steel, whereupon
it was sold to shareholders for 1.3 billion dollars.
This was at a time when the British steel industry consisted of
100 blast furnaces owned by 95 separate companies.
The number of people employed in American manufacturing industry
grew rapidly: in 1880, it was 3.21 millions, and by 1910, it had
nearly tripled to 8.99 millions. Not unnaturally, given the
structure of American industry, much of this growth was in white
collar and administrative staff. As an example, there were
19,000 women office workers in 1870; by 1900, there were 500,000
(Levine, 1967; Zinn, 1980).
As can be imagined, given the organisational problems caused by
the relatively modest growth in size of British organisations,
American companies faced enormous organisational problems.
These problems were made all the more severe by the rapidity
of the rise of American industry. One of the main organisational
concerns in America, as with Britain, was labour: its cost, its
efficiency and its militancy. The period from 1860 to the First
World War saw many bitter and violent clashes between employers
and workers. The period also saw growing demands from trade
unions and political groups for collective ownership of produc-
tion, demands which employers treated as serious threats to
their existence. Therefore, relations between employees and
employers were, at this period, very hostile (Locke, 1982; Rose,
1981; Zinn, 1980).
In terms of the efficiency of labour, the frequently-voiced
concerns of American industrialists sound remarkably like those
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of their British counterparts. They believed that workers
consistently underperformed - that they collectively and indiv-
idually restricted production to a level below what it should
be (Locke, 1982; Tillett, 1970).
Another publicly-aired worry concerned the cost of labour. The
demand for labour at this time, despite the continuous waves of
immigration, outstripped the supply, and American employers
believed that this led to higher wages than was the norm in
Europe (Levine, 1967; Tillett, 1970).
Therefore, for a range of reasons, the concern with, and innov-
ations in, work organisation and job design in America were
more advanced than in Britain.
The 1880s and l890s saw a number of well-thought-out and well-
publicised attempts at work organisation in America. These
were designed to increase production by the re-organisation of
work, and to reduce workers t bargaining power by reducing the
skill and discretion needed to carry out tasks. Most involved
elaborate work study and recording methods as well as individual
incentive schemes. There was also a greater standardisation of
products and production methods than was common in Britain.
The use of labour-saving, and deskilling, technology was also
more advanced in America than Britain. This reflected labour
costs, labour control problems, and the larger production runs
in America (Levine, 1967; Tillett, 1970).
Given this situation, it is not surprising that there was a
greater demand by American employers for a system of work
organisation and job design which pulled together the various
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piecemeal developments into a coherent whole. In the 1900s,
such a system emerged. Its originator, F W Taylor, termed it
"Scientific Management", but it rapidly gained the alternative
name of "Taylorism" (Locke, 1982). A detailed description of
Scientific Management and its subsequent developments will be
given in Chapter Three.
CONCLUSION
The important point to note about Scientific Management is the
ideology which underpinned it. It was an ideology whose seeds
were present at the birth of the factory system, but which came
into its own as the profit motive developed.
The key to understanding the ideology is to recognise, as
Drucker (1955) has put it, that the primary responsibility of
management is to make a profit. This was the measure of
managerial and organisational success and survival then as it
is now. However, in order to achieve this, they had to produce
goods, and the key to that process was labour. Therefore,
profitability and the control of labour came to be seen as
synonymous. It was the problems caused by the lack of control
over labour that led the putter-outs to start to employ labour
directly, thereby creating the factory system. This gave rise to
more problems for employers; firstly, the problem of getting
people into the factories, and secondly, getting them to work
productively and cheaply once they were there. This was the
paradox that labour posed for employers: it was an indispensable
factor in creating profit, but its very indispensability was a
threat to that profit. This led employers in Britain to adopt
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harsh devices to "encourage" labour to work. This was not
because they were vicious men, though some obviously were, but
because, in their ignorance, they knew no other way to achieve
their aim of profit. They did not seek control for control's
sake; indeed, they were quite happy to gain compliance by other
methods, or to subcontract the responsibility to others, if
profitability was not put at risk. However, as the 19th century
proceeded, employers increasingly took on the responsibility of
directly controlling labour and in so doing developed less harsh
methods for gaining workers' co-operation. The culmination of
that process was Scientific Management.
The employers' ideology that emerged from the 19th century and
which underpinned Scientific Management was that in order to
make profits, it was necessary to have the strictest control
over what workers did, that the skill involved in individual
jobs should be kept to a minimum, and that financial incentive
was the only way to make people work.
Therefore, the culmination of over a century of the factory
system was an ideology that saw the main component of the system,
the worker, as a necessary evil whose input had to be kept to
a minimum.
As will be described in the next two chapters and in the ca
studies, this ideology still dominates a great deal of tho
practice of work organisation and job design.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WORK ORGANISATION AND JOB DESIGN IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
This chapter will examine four major approaches to work organis-
ation and job design which have. e.ge.1 it' the. 2th cx'c, wf1
which inform the current debate on these issues. These are, in
chronological order:- Scientific Management, Job Design,
Contingency Theory and Labour Process theory. The first and
last of these have their roots in the 19th century, whilst Job
Design and Contingency Theory are products of post-1945 social
and economic changes.
Scientific Management is the key reference point for the other
three approaches. It was developed by Frederick Taylor in
Iinerica at the turn of the century, and its core elements are
the creation of jobs with low levels of skill and discretion,
coupled with the belief that monetary incentives and strict
managerial control are the only way to motivate workers.
Job Design is both a rejection of, and reaction against,
Scientific Management. It argues that boring and monotonous
jobs with little worker discretion are counter-productive to
both individual and organisational well-being. Job Design
theorists advocate creating jobs which demand skill and the
ability to exercise discretion from the worker. Jobs of this
kind would be intrinsically motivating and lead to both hqhe
worker and organisational performance.
Contingency Theory is again a reaction against the "one best
way" method advocated by Taylor. This theory argues that
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organisational structure and performance are dependent upon
certain contingent variables which organisations face. These
are environment, technology and size. Organisations maximise
their performance by securing the appropriate fit between
their structure and the contingencies they face. Therefore,
whilst there is no "one best way" for all organisations,
individual organisations do have only one choice if they are
to maximise performance.
Labour Process theory is a Marxist approach to the analysis of
job design and work organisation. This argues that the survival
of capitalist enterprises is dependent upon their ability to
exploit their workers. It sees this being achieved by the use of
a combination of Scientific Management and technology to deskill
and control workers.
The Chapter examines the contribution of these approaches and
their shortcomings in order better to understand the factors
influencing how organisations cope with change. It concludes
by arguing that a range of factors from managerial values and
beliefs to the prevailing social and economic climate are
important in determining work organisation and job design within
organisations, and that these will also influence the way that
new technology is used.
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
Scientific Management, or Taylorism, to give it its popular
title, was the "invention" of an American engineer, F W Taylor.
It is, both in its theory and its practice, a highly contro-
versial subject. For some, Taylor was a genius, whilst for
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others, he was an anti-trade union autocrat whose ideas were
both barbaric and foolish (Locke, 1982; Pignon and Querzola,
1976; Rose, 1981).
His work has been praised both for its originality and its
enduring relevance as a managerial philosophy (Boddewyn, 1961;
Drucker, 1976); on the other hand, there are those who deny
both its originality and its relevance to modern managerial
problems (Rose, 1981; Tillett, 1970). For some, Taylor's ideas
had relevance only for the period in which they emerged. Others
argue that there are universal elements in Scientific Management
which inform and influence current managerial ideas and practice
and which have made Taylorism the dominant managerial philosophy
of the 20th century (Kelly, 1978; Littler, 1978; Thompson, 1983).
Any examination of Scientific Management must begin with the
period and circumstances in which it emerged. Taylor first began
to promote his theory in turn-of-the-century America. America
was in this period a rapidly-industrialising society; its
economy was becoming dominated by very large industrial and
commercial organisations. Such was the speed of economic
growth that the demand for labour far outstripped the ability
of the indigenous population to meet it, and this demand was
therefore met by successive waves of immigrants who, in the
main, had no previous industrial experience. America, at this
time, was above all a rapidly-changing society with few stable
features. Not surprisingly, these circumstances threw up
tremendous social problems, not least of which was the issue of
managerial authority.
72
Management-labour conflict was widespread; violence was not
uncommon, and there was a growth of groups who challenged existing
property rights and called for the collective ownership of
property through the overthrow of capitalism.
The dominant managerial ideology of the period was Social-
Darwinism, the survival of the fittest. Not only did this
stress that the pursuit of individual wealth and success was the
natural order of things, but that success in itself, no matter
how achieved, bestowed on those who attained it authority over
those who had not. Out of this developed a view that working
men and women were somewhat wayward and unreliable machines
who could be motivated only by money and controlled only by
severe discipline. Partly for this latter reason, the division
of labour was seen as being the most effective form of work
organisation.
It was in this confused and antagonistic environment, with
management seeking to legitimate its authority and workers
challenging it, that Scientific Management emerged (Cherns, 1982;
Locke, 1982; Rose, 1981; Tillett, 1970; Zinn, 1980).
Taylor started out in life as a pattern maker/machinist, though
he had been expected to follow his father into the legal prof-
ession. He quickly became a machine shop foreman, which was a
position that allowed the incumbent a great deal of autonomy at
this time. As a machinist, he had developed the view that his
fellow workers deliberately under-produced, which he called
"soldiering" - the practice of doing very little whilst appearing
to be busy. When he became a foreman, he declared that his aim
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was to increase productivity to the level that he believed it
should be. Indeed, for the rest of his life, he was obsessed
with tI notion of eradicating "soldiering" and increasing prod-
uctivity. His methods were harsh; he unilaterally cut piecework
rates, increased speeds and feeds, changed methods and sacked
people in order to achieve his aims.
Not surprisingly, this led him into intense conflict with those
below him and even had an adverse effect on his own health.
The experience of his first attempt to re-organise work in order
to increase productivity led him to review his ideas. He believed
that for any new system of job design and work organisation to be
accepted and to work, it must meet three criteria.
The first was that it should be systematic. He argued that
arbitrary and inconsistent changes in working arrangements would
not only meet opposition from workers but, because of their
inconsistency, would fail to achieve the increases in productivity
that he believed were possible.
The second criterion was that any system must be seen to be fair
and objective by both workers and management; that it should
be seen to be "scientific". He believed that existing systems
of work measurement and organisation were based on guesswork,
and for this reason were opposed and rejected by workers.
Thirdly, it should enhance and legitimate managerial authority
and control. He argued that until workers accepted that managers
had complete authority to organise the production system, then
change would be resisted by workers. He believed that this
acceptance would be achieved by developing a scientific approach
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to work and by demonstrating that only management were capable
of prescribing the best work methods (Cherns, 1982; Council for
Science and Society, 1981; Locke, 1982; Rose, 1981; Taylor, 1911
a and b).
He believed that a system based on these criteria would be to
the mutual benefit of both workers and management because increased
productivity would lead to both increased pay and increased profit.
He shared the then common view that money was the only way to
motivate people.
Over a period of some 20 years, in which he gained an inter-
national reputation for his innovations in cutting tool technology,
he experimented with various systems of work organisation and
analysis, before, in the 1900s, he launched Scientific Management.
What emerged was a set of guidelines for the systematic analysis,
specification and control of workers' jobs by management.
Scientific Management consists of three core elements: the
systematic collection of knowledge about the work process by
managers; the removal/reduction of discretion/control allowed
to workers; and the laying down of standard procedures and times
for carrying out particular tasks (Braverman, 1974; Gorz, 1976).
The managers assume . . . the burden of gathering
together all of the traditional knowledge which in the
past has been possessed by the workman and then of
classifying, tabulating and reducing this knowledge
to rules, laws and formulae . . . (Taylor, 1911b, p 36).
This lays the groundwork for increased control. As long as
workers possess a monopoly of knowledge about the work process,
increased control is impossible. But once the knowledge is
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also possessed by managers, it becomes possible not only to
establish what workers actually do with their time, but also by
"reducing this knowledge to rules, laws and formulae", to
decrease the knowledge that workers need to carry out a given
task. It also, importantly, paves the way for the division of
labour.
The next stage is that "All possible brain work should be removed
from the shop and centred in the planning . . . department . . ."
(Taylor, l9lla, pp 98-9). The divorce of conception from execution
removes control from the worker, who no longer has discretion as
to how tasks are carried out, and creates the conditions for the
last element of Taylorism.
Perhaps the most prominent single element in modern
scientific management is the task idea. The work of
every workman is fully planned out by management .
and each man receives in most cases complete written
instructions, describing in detail the task which he
is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in
doing the work. This task specifies not only what is
to be done but how it is to be done and the exact time
allowed for doing it. (Taylor, l9llb, p 39).
This completes the process of gaining control over workers by
managers. The workers become "human machines", told what to do,
when to do it and how long to take. But, more than this, it
allows new work organisation to be developed and new work
processes and equipment to be introduced, and so workers move
from having a monopoly of knowledge and control over their work
to a position where the knowledge they have of the work process
is minimal and their control is vastly reduced. The result is
not only a reduction in the skills required and the wages paid,
but also the creation of jobs which are so narrow and tightly-
specified that the period needed to train someone to do them is
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greatly reduced. This removes the last bargaining counter of
labour: scarcity of skill (Braverman, 1974; Kelly, l982a; Littler,
1978; Pignon and Querzola, 1976).
Scientific Management was not, despite Taylor's undoubted talents
as a self-publicist, an overnight success with either workers or
managers. It met with opposition at home and was ignored abroad
(Levine, 1967; Rose, 1981; Tillett, 1970).
Nevertheless, during, and especially after, the First World War,
the precepts of Taylorism did begin to become widely adopted,
firstly in America and later in Europe (Littler, 1978 and 1982;
Wren, 1979). In America it was taken up by the new breed of prof-
essional engineer whose job it was to reduce production costs by
examining and improving production methods. Scientific Management
appealed to them for two reasons. Firstly, Taylorism, with its
emphasis on "science" and the legitimation of managerial authority,
was seen by this group, who grew from 7,000 in 1880 to 120,000
in 1920, as a system that would enhance their professional status.
Secondly, its emphasis on work measurement, task reformulation
and specification, and centralised control, was seen as a blue-
print for how professional engineers should approach their work
(Benson and Lloyd, 1983; Tillett, 1970).
Whilst many question the benefit and relevance of Scientific
Management, few would deny that it has had a major impact on
managerial thinking and practice in the 20th century. Indeed,
from the 1950s onwards, a series of studies have emerged which
show that Tayloristic principles underlie much of current job
design and work organisation theory and practice (Clegg, 1984;
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Davis and Canter, 1955; Davis et al, 1955; Hedberg and Mumford,
1975; Locke, 1982; Thompson, 1983).
Nevertheless, as Tillett (1970) points out, it would be a mistake
to overestimate the originality of Taylor's work. His work drew
together in one theory many of the practices and beliefs that had
(as described in Chapter 2) become common currency in the 19th
century: the recalcitrance of labour; the belief in motivation
by money; the analysis of work; the fragmentation of jobs,
especially the division of physical and mental tasks; and the
rigid control over workers' activities.
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that Scientific Management
became widely accepted and used, as it built on, and appealed to,
deeply-held beliefs regarding the behaviour and motivation of
workers. Perhaps Taylor's greatest achievement was that he
brought these disparate beliefs and practices together in such a way
as to provide both a formula for job design and work organisation
and a legitimation of managers' authority over workers (Council
for Science and Society, 1981; Rosenbrock, 1981; Tillett, 1970).
However, the fact that Scientific Management has become so
institutionalised as a managerial philosophy has not protected
it from serious criticism; rather the reverse. There are six
main criticisms of it, ranging from attacks on its efficacy to
moral objections, which are as follows:-
i) That Taylorism's preoccupation with narrow, tightly-controlled,
fragmented jobs is counter-productive in terms of worker
motivation and performance. The argument is that workers
are alienated by such meaningless jobs and not only cease
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to give any more than the minimum effort that is forced
from them, but also actively seek ways to restrict prod-
uctivity. Therefore, rather than increasing the efficiency
of the production process, Taylorism is seen as achieving
the reverse (Buchanan, 1984; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980;
Council for Science and Society, 1981; Davis et al, 1955;
Friedman, 1978; Johnson, 1968; Slater, 1968).
ii) That, following on from (i), Taylorism can have an adverse
effect on total costs by increasing labour turnover and
absenteeism, and reducing flexibility and product quality
(Council for Science and Society, 1981; L E Davis, 1979;
Storey, 1983).
iii) That the separation of planning from execution, and the
consequent creation of numerous specialist management
functions, leads to a plethora of separate departments, all
pursuing different, though theoretically complementary,
objectives. This is seen as being counter-productive, in
that it leads to friction between different functions rather
than the co-operation that is essential to efficient
production (Bell, 1983; Hutton and Lawrence, 1979 and 1982).
iv) That Taylorisin reinforces the belief of managers that
workers need to be tightly controlled and only respond to
financial incentives. Workers react to these restrictive
conditions by being "recalcitrant" and by maximisirig the
only satisfaction that is open to them: money. Thus, a
vicious circle is created whereby fragmented and tightly-
controlled jobs lead to alienation, and the management
response to alienation is increased fragmentation and
79
control. In such a situation, it becomes almost impossible,
without major changes in managerial personnel, to reverse
this state of affairs by creating better, more intrinsically
motivating, jobs (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; L E Davis, 1979;
Friedman, 1978; Mumford, 1979).
v) That Scientific Management is not really "scientific" at all,
and that the supposed objective and systematic analysis and
design of jobs is merely a cover behind which managers
pursue control objectives (Grant, 1983; Gorz, 1976;
Pignon and Querzola, 1976; Rose, 1981; Thompson, 1983).
vi) That there are alternatives to Taylorism, i.e. Job Design,
which create better, more fulfilling, jobs, and which bring
overall cost benefits, without any loss of individual
productivity; and, therefore, managers are morally obliged
to reject Scientific Management in favour of such alternatives
(L E Davis, 1979; Mumford, 1979).
JOB DESIGN
In the last twenty to thirty years, Job Design, or work humanis-
ation as it is less familiarly called, has come to challenge
Scientific Management's dominance in the theory, though by no
means the practice, of how jobs and work should be designed and
organised.
Strangely enough, even while Scientific Management was still
struggling to become established, the seeds of Job Design were
being sown. Its origins can be traced back to studies in
Britain during World War One on fatigue amongst women munitions
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workers, and work carried out in America at the same time on
employee testing and selection. This work was further developed
in the 1920s by Myers in Britain and Mayo in the United States.
It was out of the latter's work with the Western Electric Company,
the famous "Hawthorne experiments", that a new, non-economic
explanation of workers' behaviour emerged and the Human Relations
school was established. This school of thought rejected Taylor's
model of "rational-economic man" in favour of "emotional man".
The theory states that man needs more than just money from his
work; that man has emotional needs which he seeks to fulfil.
The Western Electric studies also revealed that within the formal
rules and structure of the organisation laid down by management,
workers created their own "informal" rules and structures.
Taylor had also noticed similar tendencies with regard to output
norms, but whilst he believed these could and should be eradicated
by better and tighter control of what workers do, the Hawthorne
experiments contradicted this view. It emerged that workers
constructed their own rules and norms not because management
control was too lax, but as an attempt to create a sense of
identity for themselves in what they saw as a hostile environment.
This not only drew attention to the issue of whether too much
control of work could be counter-productive, but also whether or
not it was possible to control all aspects of work in any case.
The Human Relations school advocated better communication between
management and workers, and highlighted the crucial role played
by supervisors in motivating and involving the workforce. They
also drew attention to the need to see organisations as social
systems composed of groups of workers; this view reflected in
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part the emergence of collectivist ideas, as opposed to Social-
Darwinism, in America in the 1930s (Cherns, 1981; Katz, 1973;
Mayo, 1938; Rose, 1981; Wilkinson, 1981).
These theoretical developments away from Taylorism were further
strengthened by Maslow (1943) who suggested that human behaviour
was driven by sets of needs or motivations. These form a
"hierarchy of needs", ranging from physiological needs, through
safety, love, esteem, and finally to seif-actualisation; as one
level of need is satisfied, so man pursues the next.
It was in the 1950s that Davis and Canter (1955), influenced by
these theoretical developments, questioned the Tayloristic basis
of job design and work organisation. They suggested that it would
be possible to design jobs which would better satisfy not only
human needs, but also organisational needs, in that as individual
workers' satisfaction increased, so would their productivity.
Since then, many other writers have also contributed to the
development and consolidation of Job Design theory (Davis et al,
1955; Guest, 1957; Hackrnan and Oldham, 1980; Herzberq, 1968;
Likert, 1961; McGregor, 1967; Trist et al, 1963).
Job Design theory is a direct attack on the precepts of job
design and work organisation that were embodied within Scientific
Management. Whereas the tradition with Taylorism was to fit
people to rigidly-defined and controlled jobs, Job Design theorists
argued that jobs could be and should be fitted to human needs.
The basic tenets of Job Design are relatively straightforward.
Following on from the work of Maslow, it is argued that work
should be organised in such a fashion that it allows peopie to
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fulfil their needs as human beings. The view is that Scientific
Management, with its emphasis on removing autonomy and discretion
from workers and on fragmenting jobs, is counter-productive to
individual fulfilment. This in turn, it is argued, is damaging
to the performance of the organisation, because boring, monotorous
and meaningless jobs lead to poor mental health, and engender
feelings of dissatisfaction in workers who have to perform them,
which in turn leads to lack of motivation, absenteeisrr, labour
turnover, industrial unrest and even sabotage. Phrases such as
"blue collar blues" and terms like alienation have been used to
describe this process.
The solution to these problems follows from the analysis. If
Tayloristic trends in job design are counter-productive, then
they should be reversed and "variety, task completeness and,
above all, autonomy" should be built into jobs a1l et al, 1,
p 15). This would increase workers' mental health and ob satLs-
faction, which in turn would lead to increased motivation aed
performance. Just as Taylor believed his system would benefit
both workers and management, so too do the proponents of Iob
Design; the difference is that the benefit to workers is
fulfilment and development rather than increased wages, though
in both systems the benefit to management is increased roduc-
tivity (Blauner, 1964; Davis and Canter, 1955- Frieana 1L-
Hackman and Lawler, 1971; Herzberg et al, 1959- e11y 19
a and b).
In practice, there are three main variants of Jo	 sigrt
Job Enlargement, which concentrates on increasim work varLet
either by combining previously fragmented tasks together- or

There are three main reasons why Job Design has become so
influential as a theory.
The first was related to the collectivist ethos and economic
policies that emerged from World War Two. Just as Scientific
Management reflected the divided and antagonistic milieu of
pre-World War One and Inter-War societies, so Job Design reflected
the Keynesian consensus that emerged after 1945. Not only was
there a greater commitment to equality in society, a feeling that
all should benefit from a nation's wealth, but this was also
reflected in the full-employment policies pursued by governments.
These policies led to a "changed distribution of power between
capital and labour [and] enhanced trade union bargaining power"
(Kaldor, 1983). This, coupled with increased expectations by
workers, led to a rejection, both at a collective and individual
level, of boring, monotonous, and tightly-controlled jobs. This
was manifested in labour turnover, industrial unrest and many
other ways. Thus, at a societal and an organisational level,
there was a willingness, and a need, to examine and develop more
humanitarian methods of organising work (Cherns, 1982; Friedman,
1978; Kelly, l982b).
The second reason relates to one of the issues raised by the
Hawthorne experiments: the existence of informal systems within
the formal organisation of work. It became apparent that it was
neither possible nor practicable to control all that a person did
whilst at work; although certain aspects could be monitored and
closely controlled, others could not. From this, it became clear
that elements of willing co-operation by workers were necessary
if organisations were to operate efficiently. Therefore, for this
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reason, more co-operative methods of work organisation were
sought (Burawoy, 1979; Katz, 1973; Purcell and Earl, 1977;
Selznick, 1948; Strauss et al, 1973; van Aken, 1978).
The third reason, and the one that was probably most influential
in pushing individual organisations into change programmes, was
linked to market changes brought about by such factors as the
removal of barriers to international trade. The pre-Worid War
Two system of tariffs and import controls was removed and comp-
anies faced not only domestic competition but also international
competition. In these circumstances, it became apparent that
rigidly-defined and controlled jobs and work organisation could
act as a barrier to flexibility and increased productivity.
Certainly, Kelly (1982b), in his major review of Job Design,
found that it was economic reasons aimed at increasing productivity,
decreasing staffing levels and increasing the flexibility of
production which tended to lead to job redesign rather than
humanitarian reasons.
Therefore, for a variety of reasons, especially changing product
and labour market conditions, Tayloristic forms of work organis-
ation were being rejected both by workers and managers. New ways
of designing jobs, based on the premise that motivation and
co-operation were necessary for efficient working, emerged.
Managers began to recognise that the detailed control of indiv-
idual workers was not an automatic corollary to the overall
control of production and the pursuit of organisational goals.
This was especially the case where a reduction in detailed control
of work and the expansion of work roles led to greater stability,
predictability and flexibility of production, by increasing
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workers' satisfaction (Cammann and Nadler, 1976; Gorz, 1976;
Kelly, 1982b; Pignon and Querzola, 1976; Williams and Steward,
1984).
In the decades since the Second World War, most European countries
have initiated some form of officially sponsored "Work Humanisation
Programme". Norway and Sweden have led the way both in terms of
financial and legal backing, but other countries, notably West
Germany, have also initiated Government-financed programmes as
well. In Britain, however, despite the establishment of the
Work Research Unit in 1974, the backing from Government seems
less than enthusiastic and it is left, in the main, to individual
organisations to provide the initiative for change. It also
tends to be the case in North America that "Quality of Working
Life" programmes by organisations are the result of internal
rather than external encouragement. Nevertheless, there can be
no doubt that Job Design precepts have permeated Western society
on a large scale.
Yet despite the impact of Job Design theory, Scientific Management
is still, in practice, more influential in the design of jobs
and work organisations than its newer rival. Even where change
prograrnnies have been initiated, there have been many failures or
cases where the changes have not been sustained over time (Child,
1984; L E Davis, 1979; Sell, l984b; Taylor, 1979; Wilkinson, 1981).
There appear to be three key reasons why Job Design has failed
to supersede Scientific Management, which are as follows:-
i) That Taylorism is not just a blueprint for the fragmentation
of jobs and control of workers: it is in fact part of a
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powerful and dominant ideology regarding the nature of work
and the role of workers, which developed in the 19th century
and which is still influential in forming the beliefs and
values of managers today. Job Design theory appears to have
had only limited impact in challenging this ideology, and
therefore many managers still believe that fragmenting
jobs and removing workers' discretion is the most effective
way of designing jobs from the point of view of organisational
needs (Bibby et al, 1979; Hedberg and Mumford, 1975;
Mumford, 1979; Mumford, 1981; Rosenbrock, 1981; Sell, l984b;
Taylor, 1979; Williamson, 1973).
That there are substantial managerial and technical barriers
which prevent change. The two main characteristics of Job
Design are increased control and increased variety for
workers. Yet in order to increase workers' control, it is
often, in fact almost always, necessary to reduce the power,
and therefore the status, of supervisors and/or lower
management. In some cases, their jobs may be eliminated
altogether. The co-operation of these people is often
essential if successful change is to take place, but instead
of co-operation, their most likely reaction will be resis-
tance. As for increased task variety for workers, this is
often only possible if the technology employed is modified
or changed altogether. As this can be a very costly
exercise, it is unlikely to take place (Bjorn-Andersen,
1983; Clegg, 1984; Davis and Taylor, 1979; Flickson and
Butler, 1982; Klein, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981; Tipton, 1982).
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jJ. j) That existing organisational structures block or undermine
change. On the one hand, organisational inertia makes it
difficult to convince managers that the great effort needed
to initiate and carry through structural changes is worth-
while. On the other hand, the fact that Job Design exper-
iments tend only to change one part of the organisation,
leaving the rest untouched, are likely, because the new
procedures and practices are incompatible with the rest of
the organisation, to fail or be disregarded (Clegg and
Fitter, 1981; Friedlander and Brown, 1974; Gough and Stiller,
1983; Pfeffer, 1981).
Pherefore, for a variety of reasons, Job Design has failed to
effect widespread change.
CONTINGENCY THEORY
Contingency Theory, like Job Design, emerged in the wake of
World War Two. In part, again like Job Design, it was a reaction
to, and a rejection of, Scientific Management. But, unlike Job
Design, which concentrates in the main on the design of individual
jobs, Contingency Theory is concerned with the entire organisational
structure rather than just parts of it.
With the ending of the Second World War, organisations had to
adjust to the shock of moving from a planned and tightly-controlled
war economy back to a free-market economy, albeit Keynesian-style.
The dislocation that this caused would in any case have raised
questions regarding the impact on organisations of sudden changes
in their environment. However, also present was a reaction against
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Taylorism; there was a questioning of the previously unchallenged
view that there was "one best way" for all firms to be organised
in order to be competitive. There were also two other factors
present which posed questions about the determinants of organis-
ational structure. One was the development of automation, which
was bringing about large-scale changes in technology; the other
was the growth in company size, and especially the emergence of
multi-national corporations. Therefore, for these reasons,
questions about the impact of environment, technology, and latterly
size, on the structure of organisatioris were beginning to be
asked (Barratt-Brown, 1972; Bright, 1958; Cherns, 1982; Clegg
and Fitter, 1981; Robinson, 1953-4).
What emerged from this process was a view that organisations
were not the closed and changeless entities they had been con-
sidered to be; that in fact organisations were "open systems",
the structures of which were dependent or "contingent" on a range
of situational variables. In turn, it was argued, the performance
of the organisation was dependent upon its structure.
Thus the belief that a "one best way" for all organisations to
structure themselves was replaced by a view that there was a
"one best way" for each organisation. Contingency Theory puts
forward the view that every organisation faces different situ-
ational variables; managers who are involved in organisational
design have to assess the situational implications of the contin-
gencies they happen to face. Thus the role of management is to
fit their organisational structure to the contingencies that
emerge, and by so doing, they will ensure good organisational
performance.
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However, Contingency Theory conflicts not only with Scientific
Management but also, to an extent, with Job Design. According
to the latter, good organisational performance is dependent upon
creating satisfying jobs, but according to Contingency Theory,
it is achieved by structuring the organisation to cope with one
or more situational variables.
Burns and Stalker (1961), two early proponents of Contingency
Theory, argued that there are two basic types of structure that
organisations can adopt to cope with contingencies. The first
is a Mechanistic Structure; this refers to rigid and tightly-
controlled structures which, they advocate, would be appropriate
in stable and predictable environments. On the other hand, in
environments which are complex, uncertain, and rapidly-changing,
they advocate an Organic Structure. This is a loose and flexible
structure which coild easily cope ith sudden changes and high
levels of uncertainty.
Whilst Job Design practices would fit in with an Organic Structure,
the Mechanistic Structure would be more suitable for Scientific
Management precepts.
Therefore, in terms of work organisation and job design, Contin-
gency Theory appears to accommodate both Scientific Management
and Job Design, depending upon the situation the organisation
finds itself in (Child, 1984; Hendry, 1979 and 1980; Katz and
Khan, 1978; Mansfield, 1984; Pettigrew, 1973; Wood, 1979).
The situational variables which have been cited in the literature
as having most impact on structure are:- environmental uncertainty
and dependence; technology; and size. Mintzberg (1979) has sugges-
ted that other contingencies, such as the age of the organisation,
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are also relevant, but it is the latter three which are considered
most important. However, there is no consensus amongst contingency
theorists as to which of these three factors is most important, though
those who support the view that environment is the key contingency
argue that the survival of an organisation depends upon maintain-
ing a balance of exchange transactions with the environment
sufficient to provide resources for future activity. It is
recognised that the management of an organisation is undertaken
in conditions of uncertainty and dependence, both of which create
risk for management. Uncertainty arises from an imperfect under-
standing of events and from incomplete control over the actions
taken both by employees and parties outside the organisation.
These sources of uncertainty make prediction a hazardous exercise.
The dependence of management upon the goodwill and support of
other groups, both inside and outside the organisation, carries
with it an element of vulnerability with regard to the success of
its policies and possibly to the survival of the organisation in
its present form.
The levels of uncertainty and dependence, and therefore risk,
facing management will vary between different cases, but these
factors will never be wholly eliminated. This lack of perfect
control over the organisation's environment means that the context
and conditions in which its work is carried out have to be
regarded as contingencies: that is, they are relevant and variable
parameters for which allowance and adjustment in management
practices and organisational design have to be made (Hage and
Aiken, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Sadler and Barry, 1970;
van Aken, 1978).
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The argument for technology being the key variable follows
similar lines as the argument for environment. However, there
are distinct variants of it which reflect different definitions
of technology at the organisational level of analysis that
theorists and researchers have employed (Hickson et al, 1969).
The two most developed approaches are. proba1r ori in ooara's
(1965 and 1970) studies of the "operations technology" of manu-
facturing organisations, and Perrow's (1967 and 1970) more
generally applicable analysis of "materials technology".
Operations technology refers to the equipping and sequencing of
Lctivities in an organisation's workflow, whilst materials
technology refers to the characteristics of the physical and
.nformational materials used. Both Woodward and Perrow consider
hat the nature of technological variables present important
implications for the design of effective organisational structures.
s an example, Woodward (1965) described three types of materials
technology, which related to Unit production, Batch production
and Mass production. She argued that each type of technology
had its own most appropriate structure and that if, say, the
structure appropriate for unit production technology was grafted
onto mass production techniques, it would result in sub-optimal
organisational performance. This view is also shared by other
writers such as Thompson (1967) and Zwerman (1970).
The third contingency is size; for many, this is the key variable
that influences structure. This argument has a long antecedence
within organisational theory, being first cited by Weber (1947).
However, in terms of Contingency Theory, its main proponents are
the Aston School (Pugh et al, 1969 a and b), who found that
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larger size was the most powerful predictor of higher values on
their main structural factor, which related to the bureaucratic
dimension of specialisation, use of procedures, and reliance on
paperwork. l3lau (1970) has suggested that increased size gener-
ates structural differentiation within organisations, which in
turn enlarges the absolute size of the administrative component.
There are two strands to the argument for the izrtportarice of size,
both of which have similar ultimate implications for effective
structural design. The first argues that increasing size offers
more opportunity to reap the benefits of increased specialisation.
This is likely to manifest itself in the form of greater structural
differentiation, which exhibits high heterogeneity amongst sub-
units. This in turn makes managerial co-ordination of sub-unit
activity more difficult, especially as tendencies towards func-
tional autonomy may well appear. Therefore, for this reason,
pressure will be placed upon senior managers to impose a system
of impersonal controls through the use of formal procedures, the
recording of information in writing, etc. The second argument
reaches a similar conclusion by pointing out that the problem of
directing larger numbers of people makes it impossible to continue
to use a personalised, centralised, style of management. Instead,
a more decentralised system, using impersonal mechanisms of control,
has to be developed. The operation of such a system requires
higher numbers of administrative and clerical personnel (Child,
l972a).
It is easy to see why, in the changing economic and technological
environment after 1945 and with the tendency towards larger and
larger organisations, Contingency Theory has become so attractive
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to organisational theorists. Indeed, it has become, in the 1970s
and the 1980s, the dominant perspective on organisational design.
However, despite its widespread acceptance, the evidence against
it, both at a theoretical and practical level, is very strong,
as Azma and Mansfield (1981), Child (1972 a and b and 1984),
Hendry (1979 and 1980), and Wood (1979) have all pointed out.
There are nine main criticisms of Contingency Theory, which are
as follows:-
i) Probably the most damaging criticism relates to the posited
link between structure and performance. A number of
writers ha'e drawn attention to the problem of adequately
defining "good performance", and they point out that, in
the literature, there is no agreed definition of this.
Therefore, it becomes difficult to determine whether or
not an important link does exist between structure and
performance. This has led some researchers to argue that
no such link has been satisfactorily established. If
this is the case, then obviously the whole basis of
Contingency Theory is undermined (Child, 1984; Hendry,
1979 and 1980; Mansfield, 1984; Terry, 1976; Wood, 1979).
ii) Organisations have to accommodate multiple contingencies.
Khandwalla (1973) has suggested that these can be jointly
fitted to structure. However, each contingency may have a
different implication for organisational design. Thus,
conflict between contingencies, causing tension and other
problems of integration, can arise.
	
This may be
one of the reasons why structure rarely emerges as a strong
correlate of performance (Child, 1984; Wood, 1979).
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ii) Contingency Theory assumes that organisations pursue
clear-cut, well thought-out, stable and compatible
objectives. However, in practice, they may pursue a
number of different and conflicting goals at the same
time. It can also be the case that the choice of organis-
ational goals can affect structure, rather than other
factors.
iv) Rather than the environment affecting the organisation,
the reverse may, in some cases, be the case. Such measures
as advertising or vertical integration can have a signif-
icant impact upon the environment in which an organisation
operates (Hendry, 1979 and 1980; Liefer and Huber, 1977;
Wood, 1979).
v) Despite the length of time Contingency Theory has been
in circulation, there is still no agreed definition for
eithertechnology or environment. The literature gives a
wide and conflicting range of definitions for these two
variables which, therefore, make it difficult to prove a
relationship between these factors and structure. In this
situation, it comes as no surprise that the result from
some studies challenges whether or not an important
relationship does exist between situational variables and
structure (Dastmalchian, 1984; Hendry, 1980; Mansfield,
1984; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Warner, 1984).
vi) Whilst a relationship does appear to exist between size
and structure, it does not appear to have an appreciable
impact on performance. Some researchers have suggested
that the link between size and structure relates to
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preferred systems of control which may have little or
nothing to do with performance. Indeed, it has been
noted that Woodward, in her later work (Woodward, 1970),
suggested that control systems might be a mediating
variable between contingencies and structure; this would
be consistent with the arguments in the two previous
sections regarding control objectives and work organisation
(Child, 1984; Hendry, 1980; Mansfield, 1984; Marginson,
1984; Wood, 1979).
vii) Researchers, in comparing contingencies, structure and
performance, use the organisation's formal structure for
comparison purposes. Yet, as Woodward (1965) has noted,
formal structures, as laid down for example in organisation
charts, fail to show important organisational relationships
which, taken together, may have a significant impact upon
performance. Therefore, by examining the organisational
structure as laid down by management, researchers may be
using inaccurate or incomplete data, and thus reaching
erroneous conclusions (Argyris, 1973; Burawoy, 1979;
Selznick, 1948).
viii) Rather than managers being the prisoner of organisational
contingencies when making decisions regarding structure,
almost the reverse may be the case. It appears that
managers have a significant degree of choice not only about
organisational structure but also about situational variables.
Whether this is called "Strategic Choice" (Child, 1972 a
and b); "Organisational Choice" (Trist et al, 1963);
or "Design Space" (Bessant, 1983), the meaning is the same:
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those senior managers who are responsible for decision-making
can exercise a high degree of freedom in the selection of
the technology to be used, the environment in which they
operate, and the size of the organisation and its structure
Indeed, Perrow (1983), one of the architects of the
technology - structure hypothesis (Perrow, 1967 and 1970),
now argues that technology is chosen and designed in order
to maintain and reinforce existing structures and power
relations within organisatioris rather than the reverse
(Abell, 1975; Child, 1984; Clegg, 1984; Hendry, 1979;
Lorsch, 1970; Mansfield, 1984; Wood, 1979).
ix) Contingency Theory is too mechanistic and deterministic,
and ignores the complexity of organisational life. There
is a need to see organisations as political systems rather
than rational, deterministic ones. In this view, structure
becomes the product of a series of clashes between indiv-
iduals and groups within the organisation, fighting to
increase or maintain their power and influence (Buchanan,
1984; Hendry, 1979; Hickson and Butler, 1982; Pfeffer,
1981; Wood, 1979).
Therefore, for all the above reasons, Contingency Theory, despite
its appeal, fails to provide convincing guidelines for the design
of organisational structure.
THE LABOUR PROCESS
Over the last decade, there has been a major resurgence of interest,
by Marxists and non-Marxists alike, in Labour Process theory -
the Marxist critique of work organisation and job design.
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Bowever, Labour Process theory, unlike Job Design and Contingency
Theory, does not put forward alternatives to Scientific Management,
but instead argues that in capitalist economies, organisations
have no alternative but to control and exploit their workforces
by the use of Tayloristic techniques and deskilling technology,
in order to remain profitable and so survive (Braverman, 1974).
In order to understand why this should be so, it is necessary to
understand the basis of Labour Process theory and the reasons for
its current resurgence in popularity.
Whilst discussion of the Labour Process was one of the central
themes of Volume One of Marx's "Capital" (Marx, 1886), it was
virtually ignored by Marxists until the 1960s. Instead, Marxists
concentrated their attention on macro-level manifestations of
capitalist development, especially the rise and consolidation of
large-scale, monopoly, capital. The focus of attention shifted
from capitalist methods of rninimising costs and maximising
workers' effort and productivity; instead, it was argued that the
major problem faced by monopoly capitalism was to maintain demand
for products in economies saturated by consumption goods. The
view was that, in this situation, sales and profits were less
dependent upon price than upon the nature of product markets.
This, therefore, concentrated attention on the strategies that
organisations adopted to protect, divide and create markets,
rather than the actual costs and methods of production (Baran
and Sweezy, 1968; Tarling, n.d.). Because the focus moved from
problems of production to problems of marketing, little attention
was paid by Marxists to job design and work organisation and how
these affected organisations' ability to compete.
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However, in the 1960s, this gap in Marxist theory was raised by
Baran and Sweezy (1968), in their study of the development of
monopoly capital. They argued that an examination of the Labour
Process was essential to any comprehensive study of how organis-
ations and economies functioned under monopoly capital. Even so,
it was another eight years before Braverman (1974) produced his
now famous study of "Labor and Monopoly Capital", which attempted
to fill this gap and to re-establish the central importance of
Labour Process theory to the Marxist debate on the development
of capitalism.
Bravernian began by restating the basic tenets of Marxism as they
apply to the capitalist production process. These are that,
under capitalism, the means of production - raw materials, tools,
etc. - are owned by a small elite, the capitalist class. However,
labour-power must be employed in order to transform the raw
materials into products. This is why Marx believed that only
labour created value, because without labour, the tools of prod-
uction would remain idle, the raw materials would not be trans-
formed, and the capitalist would have no products.
However, the production of a commodity is not enough for the
capitalist; it must be capable of being sold, in competition with
similar products, in order for the capitalist to make a profit,
accumulate further capital and thus stay in business. Therefore,
the costs of production must be less than the market price of the
product. As only labour creates value, this is achieved by
denying workers the full value of their labour. This constitutes
the basis of Marx's view that capital must exploit labour, deny
workers the full value of their effort, in order to survive in
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business. Marx argued that, under capitalism, the tendency was
for the rate of exploitation to increase, because capitalists
ifiust compete against each other to sell their goods, and only
those who produced the cheapest goods - i.e. only those capitalists
who could effect the greatest level of exploitation - would stay
in business.
Therefore, to ensure profitability, the capitalist must organise
the production process - the Labour Process - in such a way as
to maximise output and minimise costs. The result, according to
Marx, is that a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict exists
between capital and labour. On the one hand, the capitalist, in
order to stay in business, must extract as much work as possible
for as little pay as possible; on the other hand, workers will
resist this exploitation and seek to obtain the full value of
their labour power (Braverman, 1974; Marx, 1886).
Braverman then goes on to examine the development of work organis-
ation and job design in the 20th century. His analysis is built
around three central propositions:-
i) That modern industry and commerce is run by a homogeneous
managerial group who pursue, consistently and single-
inindedly, the imperative of profit-seeking and capital
accumulation;
ii) That because of the openly-exploitative nature of the
employment relationship, management assume that they are
dealing with a refractory workforce who do not willingly
display loyalty, commitment and effort;
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ii) That the management response to these conditions is
characterised by a preoccupation with labour control, which
is manifested through the use of Scientific Management
techniques and changes in technology which together deskill
labour and reduce the dependence in the production process
on human intervention and control.
rhe publication of Braverman's book acted as a catalyst for a
large-scale re-opening of the Labour Process debate. However,
before examining the main criticisms of Labour Process theory
which emerged from this debate, it is important to understand the
context in which the renewed interest in the Labour Process is
taking place.
As mentioned earlier, the period up to the mid-l960s saw little
interest by Marxists in the Labour Process. The explanation for
this is two-fold. Firstly, as mentioned above, the rise, and
problems, of monopoly capital had become the main preoccupation
of Marxists; and secondly, developments within organisations
appeared to contradict the Marxist orthodoxy that, as capitalism
developed, workers would face increasing exploitation and unemp-
loyment. The adoption of Keynesian economics in this period led
to full employment, rising real wages, an expansion of general
welfare provision, and a change in managerial philosophy. As
described in the section on Job Design, there was a move from
confrontational management policies to more co-operative initiatives.
these developments within organisations were, by and large, ignored,
Dt written off, by Marxists, who found them difficult to incorporate
within the framework of Marx's theory of capitalist development
(Crouch, 1980; Friedman, 1978; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Storey,
1983; Thompson, 1983).
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everthe1ess, there were underlying trends in this period which
would lead to a renewed interest by Marxists in the Labour Process.
The key development taking place was the decline in the rate of
profit, which was parallelled by a rise in unemployment and
inflation. In Britain, the pre-tax rate of profit declined
steadily from 16.5% in the period 1950-4 to 9.7% in the period
1970-4 (storey, 1983).
The declining rate of profit, coupled with the rise of inflation,
led to the rationalisation of production capacity, in order to
reduce costs, which in turn led to the inexorable rise in unemp-
loyment. What emerged as a minor problem in the 1960s mushroomed
into a major world economic crisis in the l970s. The enormous
pressure upon management to reduce costs led, initially, to a
shake-out of labour but, as the crisis deepened, attention turned
to other methods of cutting costs and increasing productivity such
as work re-organisation, and changes in technology. The rise in
unemployment also brought about a reduction in the bargaining
strength of labour and a resurgence of managerial power, which
many commentators saw as a pre-requisite for the re-organisation
of the production process. Managers began to rely less on co-
operation and more on imposition as a method of implementing
change. In some cases, such as at British Leyland, there were
quite dramatic changes in management style as a prelude to
wholesale changes in work organisation and technology (Gamble
and Walton, 1976; Kaldor, 1983; Scarbrough, 1984; Storey, 1983;
Thompson, 1983).
For two reasons, this brought about a renewed interest in the
Labour Process theory. Firstly, Marx had asserted that in
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capitalist crises, the misery and exploitation of labour would
increase. The increase of managerial power, the drive to cut
costs, and the rise in unemployment seemed to bear this out.
Therefore, it was a situation more conducive to a Marxist analysis
than had previously been the case. Secondly, as markets collapsed,
the focus of attention changed from marketing strategies to
production costs and methods. In this situation, it is not
surprising that a renewed interest in Labour Process theory
should emerge.
The focus for this debate is still Braverman's book on "Labor
and Monopoly Capital", which has been hailed as a Marxist classic,
and has been praised by many as a highly important work (Hell-
broner, 1975; Rowthorn, 1976; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983).
Yet it has also attracted much criticism, even from Marxists
(Friedman, 1978; Nichols, 1977). All concede that the book is
of outstanding quality, but they also accuse Braverrnan of serious
shortcomings, including the view that his analysis is based upon
shaky theoretical grounds (Brighton Labour Process Group, 1977;
Elger, 1979).
There are in fact eight major criticisms of Labour Process theory
as developed by Braverrnan, which are as follows:-
i) That Braverrnan over-estimates both the homogeneous nature
of management and their ability to pursue, single-mindedly,
the profit motive. Critics point out that not only are
management split vertically by status and horizontally by
function, but they are also separated by the different goals
they pursue. It is, for instance, the norm that middle and
junior managers pursue short-term, narrow output measures
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rather than profit per se (Buchanan, 1984; Coombs, 1978;
Edwards, 1983; Hickson and Butler, 1982; Rose and Jones,
1983; Storey, 1983).
iL) That Braverman over-estimates managers' foresight, knowledge
and ability to plan ahead. Whilst in some organisations
management may be able to carry out consistent and well-
planned control strategies, this appears not to be the
case in many other organisations. In these cases, control
strategies tend to be piecemeal and variegated, and may be
responses to situations as they arise rather than the
product of conscious planning. Indeed, one recent criticism
of British managers is that they pursue short-term tactics
rather than long-term strategy (Brown, 1983; Buchanan, 1984;
Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1983; Rose and Jones, 1983;
Storey, 1983).
ii) That Braverman concentrates too much on Scientific Management
as the control strategy, thus ignoring the evidence that
management have at their disposal a wide range of techniques
for ensuring production such as Job Design, welfarism, and
paternalism, and that many of these do not involve the need
for management to control in detail what workers do
(Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1983; Friedman, 1978; Nichols, 1977).
'i) That Braverman fails to realise that all systems of work
must include some element of co-operation or consent by
labour and that, therefore, managers may, and usually will,
choose to pursue consent as well as control in order to
achieve production goals. After all, control is not an end
in itself, but a means to an end, and therefore if objectives
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such as production quotas and, especially, quality, can
be more efficiently achieved by gaining the consent and
co-operation of workers, then managers may seek to do
this. It is also the situation that, whilst an antagonistic
relationship between capital and labour may exist, it does
not mean that open conflict will take place, and in any
case, as well as conflict, there is also an interdependence
between capital and labour in that capital needs workers
and workers have an interest in the survival of the unit
of capital employing them (Buchanan, 1984; Burawoy, 1979;
Cressey and Maclnnes, 1980; Edwards, 1983; Littler and
Salaman, 1982).
v) Braverman sees an irreversible and inevitable trend towards
deskilling under capitalism; yet this may not be so.
Certainly, compared with pre-industrial or early industrial
craftsmen, modern factory workers are less skilled, but
compared on a decade by decade and an industry to industry
basis, as some studies do, the tendency towards deskilling
does seem debatable (Davis, 1975; Lazonick, 1979; Montgomery,
1979; Palmer, 1975; Storey, 1980; Storey, 1983).
vi) Braverman concentrates on the formal system of work organis-
ation as laid down by management, and ignores the power
workers have to modify this and, to an extent, mould it
to fit their needs. Therefore, managers' control over
workers is not as great as an examination of the formal
system of work organisation or responsibilities might
imply (Buchanan, 1984; Burawoy, 1979; Purcell and Earl,
1977; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983).
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vii) Braverman assumes that management is all-powerful and that
workers are forced to accept the control strategies that
management put forward. Yet there is evidence that workers'
resistance, either at an individual or at a collective
level, can cause management to modify or reverse their
intentions. In any case, as mentioned above, what manage-
ment appear to have imposed on workers in terms of work
organisation, and what actually takes place in practice,
can be two different things (Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979;
Friedman, 1978; Lee, 1980; Penn, 1982; Storey, 1983;
Thompson, 1983).
viii) Braverman sees technology as being deterministic and
deskilling, yet the evidence from studies of the intro-
duction of new technology, as outlined in Chapter One, tend
not to confirm this view (Buchanan, 1984; Lee, 1980;
Thompson, 1983).
Therefore, Labour Process theory, like the other approaches to
work organisation and job design discussed in this chapter, is
riot without its problems.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen, these are four important but contradictory
approaches to the understanding of the determinants of work
organisation and job design. What unites them is that they all
imply that good organisational performance is dependent upon the
adoption of a particular method of work organisation and job
design, and that, therefore, the scope for choice in this area
is minimal or can only be exercised at the expense of profitability.
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Those who advocate Scientific Management precepts believe that
tightly-controlled and narrowly-defined work structure and jobs
are in the best financial interests of the organisation and also
of individual workers.
Job Design advocates believe the reverse is true; that Tayloristic
precepts lead to low job satisfaction, mental health problems,
lack of motivation, absenteeism and labour turnover, which not
only are bad for the individuals involved, but also adversely
affect organisational performance. Instead, they advocate the
design of jobs and work organisation which allow variety, task
completeness and autonomy. This is seen as leading to good
orgarilsational performance because it increases individual satis-
faction, motivation, and performance.
Contingency Theorists ignore the contribution of individual workers
to organisational performance and concentrate on the determinants
of structure. Their view, that performance is dependent on the
fit between structure and situational variables, leads them to
advocate structures which would accommodate Job Design principles
or Scientific Management principles, depending on the circumstances
faced by the organisation. Therefore, once again, choice is
United; good performance is dependent upon adopting the
appropriate structure for the situation.
For Labour Process theorists, once again, there is no choice for
organisations operating in capitalist economies. Organisational
performance and survival are dependent upon using Tayloristic
techniques and deskilling technology to control and exploit workers.
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Therefore, with all these approaches, ignoring the fact that they
actually contradict each other, the scope for choice regarding
work organisation and job design is constrained. However, the indiv-
idual criticisms of these approaches present a different picture
of the constraints organisations face when making decisions in
these areas. Instead of decision-making being seen as a rational,
almost mechanical, process, what emerges is a picture of the
internal workings of organisations which is far more complex and
far less rational than is acknowledged by any of the four approaches
examined. Instead of organisational decision-makers having little
choice in the design of work structures and jobs, they appear to
have a high degree of latitude in these and other areas. However,
the freedom of choice they enjoy appears to be constrained and
directed by a variety of factors both external, such as culture,
ideology, economic and social climate, etc., and internal, such
as the values, attitudes and self-interest of decision-makers,
organisational goals and managerial strategy, etc.
It follows from this that, in constructing a conceptual framework
in which to understand how organisations will cope with new
technology and what the impact of that technology will be, these
factors form an important part of that framework.
By drawing together the arguments presented in this and the
previous two chapters, Chapter Four will put forward such a
conceptual framework, and show which factors are important in
understanding the process and outcomes of technological change.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHOICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The impact of new technology upon work organisation and job design
is dependent upon the choices made with regard to the selection
of the technology and, most importantly, how it will be used.
Chapters 1 - 3 have attempted to identify the key factors which
influence these choices, by examining the literature on new
technology and the development of, and approaches to, work
organisation and job design. This chapter will draw together
the arguments developed in those three chapters in order to create
a framework within which to understand how organisations and
their members react to technical change.
This chapter will conclude by arguing that there is a general
tendency in British industry to design work structures and jobs
in accordance with the precepts of Scientific Management, and
that this will significantly influence the way that new technology
is used. However, this tendency will be mediated by factors
external and internal to individual organ isations which may lead
to other outcomes.
THE ARGUMENTS FROM CHAPTER ONE
Chapter One reviewed the literature on new technology, with
special reference to its impact upon work organisation and job
design. What emerged was that there was no agreement amongst
writers and researchers as to what effect new technology would
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have. Some argued that it would create worse jobs, others that
better jobs would be the result; however, it was possib2e to
produce evidence that both had happened. This led to a rejection
of the argument for technological determinism; it was pointed out
that whilst technology might limit choice, it did not eliminate
it altogether. Instead, it was argued that the effect of tech-
nological change would vary from country to country, industry to
industry, and organisation to organisation, depending upon a wide
range of general and specific factors. The factors which were
seen as restricting and guiding choice were:-
* Power relations within organisations
* The structure of the organisation, and its philosophy/culture
* The organisation's market and products
* The size of the organisation
* The values, attitudes and self-interest of the individuals
involved
* Societal differences
* Historical developments, both within and between countries.
The chapter concluded by pointing to the need to examine the
historical development of jobs and work organisation, and
dominant approaches to these issues, in order to gain a deeper
understanding of the factors which influence the process and
impact of technological change.
THE ARGUMENTS FROM CHAPTER TWO
Chapter Two examined the emergence and development of modern
work organisation and job design from the Industrial Revolution
to the beginning of the 20th century.
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It was argued that the factory system emerged for organisational
reasons relating to the control and co-ordination of labour,
rather than to take advantage of specific technological developments.
Furthermore, it was contended that technological advances in this
period were driven and shaped by the needs of factory owners to
control and cheapen labour.
The pattern of work organisation and job design which emerged in
Britain in the 19th century was based upon the belief that the
division of labour and the fragmentation of jobs and skills was
the most effective way of controlling labour and reducing costs.
These developments generated technical change, and also created
the need for a plethora of separate supervisory, managerial and
technical functions, thus creating organisations where functions
were split not only vertically, but horizontally as well.
In terms of shop floor workers, the tendency was for the multi-
skilled craftsman to disappear and for some of his decision-making
functions to go to staff specialists, whilst his manual skills
would be split amongst lower-paid, semi- or unskilled workers.
This process was encouraged by economic developments which not
only created bigger markets, but also generated more competition,
thus putting pressure upon individual organisations to increase
production whilst reducing unit costs, more often than not labour
costs.
These developments brought in their wake the creation of trade
unions designed to protect, and resist changes in, craft status
and wages, and which in turn laid the basis for present-day
forms of industrial relations.
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Towards the end of the 19th century, America began to overtake
Britain as the world's premier industrial nation. The problems
of organisation and control which faced managers in Britain were
nore pronounced in America because of the greater size of organis-
ations and the more volatile management-worker climate. Managers
in the United States sought a method of work organisation and job
design which not only increased their control over workers, but
which also legitimated it. What emerged was Scientific Management,
which was a set of precepts for reducing the role and importance
of individual workers in the production process.
Both in Britain and America, these developments incorporated
and were underpinned by an ideology which saw workers as unreliable,
recalcitrant, motivated only by money, and who, if not controlled
or eliminated from the production process, would threaten the
continued profitable existence of organisations.
THE ARGUMENTS FROM CHAPTER THREE
Chapter Three examined four key approaches to work organisation
and job design in order to understand the theoretical and
practical developments that had taken place in these areas in the
20th century.
The first of these approaches was Scientific Management, which,
it was contended, has become the dominant managerial practice
in Western society in the 20th century. It was argued that
Scientific Management is a set of precepts for deskilling,
cheapening, and controlling workers; however, in terms of
organisational and individual efficiency, it is seen as having
serious drawbacks. Firstly, the creation of a plethora of
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separate departments pursuing differing, though theoretically
compatible, goals could lead to inter-departmental friction and
conflict which would produce a sub-optimal overall organisational
performance. Secondly, the designing of jobs that had little
scope for the exercise of skill and choice has a detrimental
effect upon workers' satisfaction and motivation and leads to the
pursuit of instrumental goals, and can result in poor industrial
relations. This not only affects organisational performance, but
also acts to reinforce managerial beliefs about workers' recal-
citrance and lack of motivation, and thus becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
The second approach, Job Design, arose partly as a reaction to
Scientific Management and partly as a product of the changed
economic and social climate that emerged after the Second World
War. Job Design theory advocates the redesigning of jobs in
such a way that they provide skill, autonomy and variety. It
is underpinned by theoretical research and practical experiments
within organisations which have shown that workers not only have
physiological needs which can be met by monetary payment, but
also have psychological needs which can only be met by jobs
which are intrinsically motivating, and allow them to develop
their skill and knowledge, and to exercise control over what
they do. Researchers also discovered that whilst organisations
are composed of formal rules and structures, workers create or
negotiate their own informal systems of rules and norms within
these. This development revealed not only that workers are
capable of exercising more control over the work process than the
formal system would appear to allow, thus scotching the Tayloristic
belief that it is possible to control all that workers do, but
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also that these informal systems are necessary in order to make
the formal system work, thus demonstrating that workers' co-
operation in the production process is essential.
However, whilst Job Design theory has become fairly widely
established, Job Design practice has not. This appears to be
for two reasons. The first relates to organisational structure
and power relations. Redesigning jobs involves changing an
organisation's structure, and maybe also its technology, which
in itself is neither easy nor cheap, and resistance by some
managers and even workers might be expected. However, it also
involves taking control and skills from managers and supervisors
and giving them to workers. It is unfortunate, but not unreason-
able, that managers and supervisors will resist this process;
and as they are often crucial to redesign experiments, it is not
surprising that many of these fail or are never initiated. The
second reason is that Job Design precepts conflict with the
values and beliefs of many managers that workers need to be closely
supervised, and only respond to monetary incentives. Therefore,
for these reasons, Job Design, whilst making some advances, has
failed to overthrow Scientific Management as a recipe for designing
jobs and the organisation of work.
The third approach considered was Contingency Theory, which
concentrates upon organisational structure rather than the design
of individual jobs. It relates organisational performance to
structure and views structure as being dependent upon certain
contingent variables, the main ones being the organisation's
environment, technology and size. Like Job Design, it arose
partly as a reaction to the "one best way" approach of Scientific
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Management and partly because the changing economic and technical
climate after the Second World War highlighted the problems caused
to organisations by changing situational variables. However, there
are two main criticisms of Contingency Theory. The first is that
it has proved difficult to show a link between structure and
performance, and between structure and the various situational
variables. Indeed, merely defining such variables as technology
and environment has proved a problem. The second criticism is
that Contingency Theory concentrates upon the formal organisational
structure and its relationship to perforn'a1nce and. icrs t
important contribution to performance made by informal structures
within the formal ones.
Critics of Contingency Theory have also argued that it over-
estimates the importance of situational variables and under-
estimates the significant degree of choice that managers have
when deciding upon structural arrangements. The choices made
are seen as emerging from a political bargaining process within
organisations, whereby individuals and groups compete, lobby and
make alliances in order to obtain an outcome favourable to
themselves. The final outcome is not based upon rational
decision-making, but upon who can exert the most power.
The fourth approach to work organisation and job design considered
was that offered by Labour Process theorists. This is a Marxist
interpretation of how organisations operate. At its most
fundamental, it states that for an organisation to make profits
and. to survive, those who control the organisation have to
exploit its employees. Thus work organisation and job design
are geared to exploitation and, because workers are seen as
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recalcitrants who resist exploitation, managers consistently and
single-mindedly pursue a policy of deskilling and control through
the use of Scientific Management and deskilling technology.
whilst having its roots in the 19th century, Labour Process theory,
as an important approach to organisational behaviour, has only
emerged within the last decade. This appears to be linked to
developments in the economy which have led to changes in the
balance of power between managers and workers, and is leading to
changes in work organisation. However, this approach is not
without its problems. It sees management as a homogeneous group
when, in fact, as argued in previous chapters, it is split by
both vertical and horizontal divisions, a factor exacerbated by
the adoption of Scientific Management. It sees managers con-
sistently pursuing Scientific Management objectives when, in fact,
though it is the dominant practice, many organisations have either
rejected it or attempted to reject it. Labour Process theorists
assume that workers are reluctant participants in the production
process, which may be true for some but not all; indeed, worker
co-operation is essential if organisations are to function. It
sees new technology as another step in the deskilling process,
yet there are examples where that is not the case. Lastly, it
assumes that workers are powerless to resist managerial attempts
to reduce their skill and to increase control, yet evidence in
chapters 2 and 3 would appear to indicate that this is not the
case.
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ORGANISATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
It was argued at the end of Chapter One that an examination of
contemporary approaches to work organisation and job design,
together with their historical development, was essential in
understanding how organisations will cope with new technology.
What has emerged from this examination and from Chapter One's
examination of the new technology literature is that there
appears to be no clear, unequivocal approach to how organisations
function and thus how they will cope with new technology.
Nevertheless, it does appear from the evidence presented in Chapters
Two and Three that in Britain at least, there has been, and still
remains a tendency to design jobs and work organisation in
accordance with the precepts of Scientific Management; that is,
to create tightly-controlled and narrowly-defined jobs. However,
this tendency does not apply equally to all organisations, nor
does it operate with the same force all the time; it tends rather
to ebb and flow.
It has become evident, from this and preceding chapters, that the
impact of this tendency on individual organisations is dependent
upon a range of factors which play an important role in influencing
the choices that are made regarding job design and work organis-
ation, irrespective of whether the technology concerned is old
or new.
It is possible to divide these into factors which are external to
the organisation and ones which are internal to it. 	 A further
division in both categories can be made between general and
specific factors. These divisions are obviously arbitrary, but
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they do provide a useful conceptual and practical way of examining
which factors influence the decision-making process and how they
operate. The next two sections will examine this in detail.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
External factors are those features of the host society within
which organisations operate that act to limit the choices available
to, and to influence the decisions made by, organisations when
designing work structures and jobs around new technology.
Sorge and Warner (1980) have pointed out that "there has been
a tendency to ignore the 'societal effect approach' to organisation
structure. . ." ( p 318), whilst Brown (1973) has observed that:
we cannot understand the attitudes of either
management or workers unless they are seen in their
historical context, and unless we realise that much
that has been regarded as due to 'human nature' is,
in fact, purely the product of a particular culture
at a particular stage of its development. ( p 276)
The societal factors which influence how organisations and those
in them behave can be divided into two categories: general factors
and specific factors. An external general factor would apply to
society as a whole and to all organisations, whilst an external
specific factor would apply to the organisation in question, but
not necessarily others, and certainly not all organisations. A
list of general factors would include the following:-
* Nature of the political economy
* Culture
* Historical developments within and between countries
* Ideology
* Social institutions
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* Political stability
* State of the economy
* State of technological development.
(Child, 1979; Littler, 1983; Mansfield, 1981 and 1984; Mumford,
1979; Rosenbrock, 1981; Williams and Steward, 1984).
A list of specific factors which affect organisational decision-
making would include:-
* Product market
* Labour market
* Availability of technology.
(Child, 1984; Hartmann et al, 1983; Littler, 1983; Tarling, n.d.;
Sorge et al, 1983).
Whilst both lists could possibly be extended or the headings
broken down into a multitude of sub-headings, the literature does
suggest that the lists given do incorporate the main external
influences upon organisations. By examining firstly the general
factors and then the specific factors, it is possible to see in
what way they influence organisational behaviour.
A number of researchers have drawn attention to the role of the
political economy in shaping organisational structure (Child, 1979;
Mansfield, 1984; Littler, 1984). They argue that the capitalist
or socialist nature of the economic system in which the organis-
ation is operating will influence organisational structure,
operating strategies and goals.
However, Child (1979) and others (Clark, 1979; Lammers and
Hickson,1979) have suggested that the effects of the nature of
the political economy are moderated by the culture of the particular
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society within which the organisation is based. The view is
that there is an interaction between the cultural characteristics
of a society and the type of organisations that are most likely
to occur in that country, and there is strong support for this
argument. In Britain, it has been said that organisations tend
to adopt structural arrangements which follow the principles of
Scientific Management (Council for Science and Society, 1981;
Cross, 1984; Littler, 1983; Mumford, 1979; Williamson, 1973).
In Germany, the tendency is slightly different. There is less
fragmentation of jobs and skills; the division of labour is less,
with the result that there are fewer specialist departments;
and there is greater worker participation and a blurring of
blue collar and white collar functions (Bell, 1983; Crouch,
1980; Jacobs et al, 1978; Jenkins, 1978; Sorge et al, 1983;
Sorge and Warner, 1980). Sweden and Norway seem even further
removed from British organisational norms and are leaders in the
adoption of Job Design principles (Aguren et al, 1984; Emery and
Thorsrud, 1976; Hennestad, 1982). Another notable example where
the impact of culture is seen as having produced a distinctive
form of work organisation is Japan.	 There is a strong
personal commitment by Japanese workers to the company they
work for and its continued prosperity. This is encouraged by
the companies through such measures as guaranteed lifetime
employment, subsidised housing, free education for children,
and other welfare benefits, but only for some workers.
The result is that Japanese managers can exercise strict
discipline, which is reinforced by peer group pressure, at the
same time as achieving flexibility of work. It is a system
which, to the envy of others, produces both high productivity
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a crucial role in creating the conditions for the emergence of
Job Design. Nevertheless, despite the rise of Job Design theory,
the ideology which underpinned Scientific Management has not been
displaced. Although for a time the popularity of Taylorism did
ebb, when the British economy ran into trouble, as it did in the
1970s, the climate changed and Tayloristic values once again
re-asserted themselves. There was a resurgence of the belief
in the need for strong management and compliant workers.
Organisations responded to collapsing markets and profits by
cutting costs and re-organising production in line with Scientific
Management precepts (Benson and Lloyd, 1983; Cherns, 1982;
Cooley, 1980; Friedman, 1978; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Kaldor,
1983; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983; Williams and Steward, 1984).
This leads to the final point, which is the state of technological
development. It goes almost without saying that for organisations
to be contemplating technological change, there needs to be a
"new" technology to change to. The introduction to this research
and Chapter One described the development and growing public
awareness of micro-electronics. Both in terms of the popular
press and media and in terms of business publications, it is being
continually portrayed as the force which will transform organis-
ations. The climate has been created that leads organisations
to believe that if they do not adopt new technology, then they
will be left behind. This has been encouraged in Britain not only
by government exhortation, but also by hard cash in the form of
grants for new equipment. Therefore, the climate is very much
orientated towards the adoption of micro-electronics (Braun
and Senker, 1982; Cooley, 1984; Gunn, 1982; Large, 1982; Large,
1984b; Lynch, 1982; Shaiken, 1984; Wakeham and Beresford-Knox, 1980).
123
In looking at the external general factors which affect the
environment within which organisations operate, two important
points emerge. The first, as far as Britain is concerned, is
that there is a long-run tendency for organisations to be operated
and to develop along the lines prescribed by Scientific Management.
The second is that this tendency can be either exacerbated or
moderated by contemporary economic and social developments. With
regard to newtechnology, it appears, from the arguments in Chapters
1 - 3 and in this Chapter, that the general tendency in the present
period will be to use it in a Tayloristic manner. However, this
can be moderated or exacerbated by the nature of the organisation
in question.
The external factors which have particular relevance to individual
organisations will now be examined to see the effect these have.
There are three of these: the product market, the labour market
and the technology available to the orqanisation. These can be
dealt th re?&tirely quickly.
In terms of the product market, it is quite possible for the rest
of the economy to be depressed but for some organisations to face
a buoyant market. In this case, the pressures put on other firms
to cut costs to stay in business do not exist, and, therefore,
if they adopt new technology at all, it may be against the
tendency in society as a whole. The stability of the product
market may also play a role in influencing the way that organis-
ations choose to use new technology.
The labour market argument is similar. It is possible at times
of high unemployment for shortages of particular skills still to
exist. Therefore, in order to keep or attract labour, employers
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may have to offer jobs which are designed to be attractive to
prospective employees. On the other hand, a shortage of labour
may lead to the introduction of new technology to displace the
skill that is in short supply. Obviously, the circumstances and
choices will vary (Benson and Lloyd, 1983; Burns and Stalker,
1961; Child, 1984; Hartmann et al, 1983; Thompson, 1967; Warner,
1984).
Though there is much talk of new technology affecting all organis-
ations, it is quite possible that for particular companies there
will be, as yet, no appropriate technology developed. Therefore,
they will not be able to adopt new technology, or the form of
micro-electronics they do adopt will not be suitable and will be
seen as a failure which may discourage its further use (ACARD,
1980; Bessant, 1982; Council for Science and Society, 1981; Sleigh
et al, 1979).
As can be seen, whilst there are general factors within society
which will affect organisations and influence how they use new
technology, there are also specific factors which, for individual
organisations, may counteract any general tendency.
However, despite external factors, it is within organisations that
decisions are taken with regard to new technology, and these
internal factors will now be examined.
INTERNAL FACTORS
As with external factors, it is possible to divide the internal
factors into two groups: general factors, which affect the entire
organisation; and factors which are specific to the decision being
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taken or the area where change is taking place. General factors
include the following:-
* The organisation's history and development
* Its philosophy/culture
* Its structure
* Its size
* Its existing technology and products
* Its profitability/performance
* Its goals and managerial strategy
* Its management - worker relations.
Specific factors include:-
* The size and nature of the proposed change
* Sub-unit performance and importance
* The sub-unit's structure, both formal and informal
* Management - worker relations within the sub-unit
* The values, attitudes and self-interest of those involved
* The power relations of the groups and individuals involved.
Many of these factors will be influenced by external factors
pertaining to the organisation and they, in their turn, as in any
open system, will affect those external factors. However, it is
within the organisation that both external and internal factors
combine to produce the decisions regarding how new technology
will be used.
The general factors affecting organisations will be examined first.
Just as a society is shaped by its history and development, so it
is with an organisation. Its structure, products, organisation
and rules are a result of its development. Indeed, some factors
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within organisations can only be understood within their
historical context.
One of these factors is the philosophy/culture of the organis-
ation. The view that organisations have their own philosophies
or cultures is found in a wide array of publications on organis-
ational behaviour and theory. It arises from the concept of an
organisation as a social system, a miniature society, and
therefore, like all societies, exhibiting distinct cultural
traits. The philosophy/culture of the organisation will be the
product of the ambient society, the organisation's history and
its past leadership, and will be influenced by technology, product
and industry factors. These will come together to produce a set
of organisational norms and values which will influence how the
organisation's members behave or are expected to behave.
In fact, some writers see organisational culture as being important
in gaining workers' co-operation in, and consent to, the production
process. It is argued that a form of cultural indoctrination or
socialisation is undergone by new recruits to the organisation
which brings them to accept the organisation's view of profit-
ability, structure and, importantly, authority as being valid.
It follows from this that philosophy/culture will be important
in shaping how organisations react to change. Those where
Scientific Management values hold sway will be inclined to use
technology to deskill and increase control, but where other values
are active, the reverse may be the case. The point is that
certain methods of use will be seen as legitimate and others
less so (Allaire and Firsiroth, 1984; Allen and Kraft, 1982;
Burawoy, 1979; Eldridge and Crombie, 1974; Fox, 1973; Murnford,
1979; Pettigrew, 1979; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983).
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The organisation's existing structure, especially with regard to
work organisation and job design, is another important factor
influencing how new technology will be used. The examination of
Job Design in Chapter Three revealed that not only will radical
attempts to change existing structures and practices come up
against organisational inertia, but, even where changes are made,
if they are not compatible with existing methods and structures,
they are likely to fail (Clegg and Fitter, 1981; Gough and Stiller,
1983; Pfeffer, 1981)
The size of the organisation also has to be taken into account.
Whilst Contingency Theorists see size as a determinant of structure,
this, as shown in Chapter 3, is by no means an indisputable
assumption. Indeed, it may well be the case that size can be seen
as a factor which limits, but does not determine, the choices
available. In small organisations, it would not be possible to
choose a structure based upon a high degree of specialisation
and the extensive division of labour, whereas in a large organis-
ation, this would be possible. However, within the limitations
itriposed by size, there do appear to be options open between
those structural arrangements that are associated with Job Design
and those associated with Scientific Management. This view
would seem to be supported by the argument put forward in Chapter
Three: that the relationship between size and structure is based
Upon preferred labour control systems (Child, 1984; Hendry,
1979 and 1980; Mansfield, 1984; Woodward, 1970).
It is also the case that existing technology, in that it is part
Of the existing structure that might need to be changed, can
itself act to preclude options as to how the new technology can
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be used. The nature of the products being made is, obviously,
also influential with regard to how the technology can be used.
It has been pointed out that where small batches of products of
high complexity are being manufactured, there is a tendency to
use skilled labour; and where large volumes of simple products
are made, the reverse can be the case. The reason for this
appears to be that in the latter case, there will be less
probability of problems occurring which need worker intervention
in the production process than in the former case. Also, even
where problems do arise, they are likely to be of a simpler
nature than where complex products are being made, and so require
less skill to remedy (Clegg, 1984; Hartmann et al, 1983; Warner,
1984; Williams and Steward, 1984; Williamson, 1973).
Akey factor in promoting or retarding change is the organisation's
profitability/performance. Whilst for most organisations this
is largely a function of the state of the market, it is also
dependent upon internal organisational efficiency; so it is
possible for an organisation to be highly profitable in a
depressed market, and vice versa. If an organisation sees itself
doing significantly worse than its competitors, it may be driven
to change its production methods radically in order to reduce
its costs and become more profitable; British Leyland is a prime
example of this. On the other hand, a market leader may adopt a
policy of modernisation in order to maintain its advantage.
flowever, the particular changes in work organisation in these
situations are not dependent upon the level of profitability
or performance as such, but upon the goals and strategy of the
organisation - or, in some cases, the lack of them. These are
also seen as being key in regard to other internal factors such
as structure, size, technology and products.
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All organisations, whether implicitly or explicitly, have goals.
t the basic level, these may amount to no more than survival.
owever, some organisations have sophisticated and well-thought-
ut goals for growth and development. No matter how well-developed,
r under-developed, the goals are, they will be pursued through a
anagerial strategy which in turn may be explicit or implicit,
well-thought-out and planned, or almost non-existent. It is in
the setting of goals and, importantly, the strategy by which they
re to be pursued that the organisation's culture will be apparent.
Decisions that result in structures which are fragmented and
dominated by tight control systems will show that Tayloristic
values are at work, even though these may not be explicitly
stated (Buchanan, 1984; Burawoy, 1979; Cooley, 1980 and 1983;
Mansfield, 1984; Perrow, 1983; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983;
Williams and Steward, 1984; Wood, 1979).
Goals and strategies have to be broken down and pursued through
various levels of management who may or may not understand and
syrnpathise; this aspect will be examined in the next section when
looking at specific internal factors.
One final factor that affects the whole organisation needs to be
taken into account: management-worker relations, or industrial
relations. Where industrial relations are perceived as being
poor or where management may feel they do not have the control
over production that they should have, then new technology may be
used to remove problem groups or reduce their power. Writers have
cited a number of instances where, it is claimed, new technology
has been introduced to reduce the power of recalcitrant workers.
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On the other hand, management could choose to improve jobs in
order to increase workers' satisfaction and reduce management-
worker tension. The choice made would depend upon whether
management had a particular strategy to cope with the intro-
duction of new technology and upon the specific details of the
situation. It would also depend upon whether or not workers
were in a position to resist management decisions if they
disagreed with them (CSE Micro-electronics Group, 1980; Friedman,
1978; Scarbrough, 1984; Shaiken, 1980; Wilkinson, 1982).
In looking at the general factors that may affect how new tech-
nology is used, it can be seen that whilst technical, structural
and economic factors can play a significant role in limiting the
choices available, they do not by any means determine it. A key
factor is the organisation'sphilosophy/culture, which predisposes
decision-makers to adopt, implicitly or explicitly, certain goals
and strategies for the organisation's development, which in turn
influence the way that new technology is used. However, strategies
have to be applied to specific circumstances which themselves may
produce counteracting forces.
In looking at the specific factors that relate to the decision-
making process regarding new technology, the first one of note is
the size and nature of the change envisaged. New technology which
only affects one or two people in a specific area, has a low
cost, and which could be operated in a manner similar to the old
technology, may produce few problems, and the choices regarding
its use may be obvious. On the other hand, the introduction of
an organisation-wide computer-controlled production control
system, which, at great expense, replaces a manual system, may
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affect a great number of people and radically change their work.
In the former case, decisions may be left to local managers and
supervisors. In the latter case, the decisions may be taken at
the highest levels of the organisation (Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer,
1981; van Aken, 1978). Whatever the particular circumstances are,
it would undoubtedly be the case that one department or sub-unit
would bear the main brunt of the change; in the latter instance,
it would be the Production Control Department, and the nature of
that department would be important in terms of what choices were
made.
The performance and importance of the sub-unit would affect
decision-makers' perception of the change which could or should
be made. If the sub-unit was deemed relatively unimportant, and
its performance relatively good, then the decision on how to
adopt new technology might be left to the managers in that area,
who might, in an attempt to avoid problems for themselves, decide
upon a policy of minimum disruption. On the other hand, if the
sub-unit is seen to be central to the organisation's objectives
and has a poor performance record, then higher management could
decide to use new technology in such a way as to bring about
radical change. If, in either case, cost reduction is an important
factor, then a solution which would reduce the numbers employed
and reduce, or not increase, the wages of those left, might well
be attractive. This sort of solution would be compatible with a
reduction of the skills required to perform the tasks involved
(Buchanan, 1984; Child, 1984; Storey, 1983; Thompson, 1983).
Obviously, the existing structure of the sub-unit would be an
important factor. In a department where jobs were already
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fragmented and which had a hierarchical authority structure, it
might be very difficult, with the existing staff, to use new
technology to increase skill and participation because of the low
calibre of labour available. However, if workers were highly-
skilled, they might be sufficiently well-organised to prevent any
deterioration of their skills and conditions. In either case, the
informal structures within the sub-unit would have to be taken
into account. Whilst on paper some employees have little authority,
in practice, they might be key personnel. Therefore, it is
important to look beyond the formal structure in order to under-
stand the forces at work (Buchanan, 1984; Burawoy, 1979; Purcell
and Earl, 1977).
The management-worker relations within the sub-unit have also
tobe taken into account. Regardless of the organisation's general
industrial relations climate and any strategy that exists across
the organisation to cope with change, the relations within the
particular area affected by change will be a factor that cannot
be ignored by those charged with deciding how new technology in
that area will be used (Buchanan, 1984; Storey, 1983; Thompson,
1983).
The penultimate factor, and one of the most important, in deter-
mining what choices are made, is the values, attitudes and self-
interest of those involved in the decision-making process. It
may well be that those involved share the values and attitudes
of the organisation as a whole and, therefore, the outcome is
likely to reproduce existing organisational arrangements with
regard to the use of new technology. However, if the organis-
ation is orientated to a Tayloristic approach and some of those
involved have a more humanist-orientated approach, then the
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outcome might be different. A key factor in either case might be
self-interest. If those involved see that particular types of
change might work against their career prospects and status,
then they would be likely to resist them. Therefore, in examining
any change process, it is necessary to take into account individual
and group values, attitudes and self-interest (Buchanan, 1984;
Dickson, 1982; Gough and Stiller, 1983; Hedberg and Mumford, 1975;
Jones, 1979; Perrow, 1983; Rosenbrock, 1981).
The last, and to some the most important, factor is the power
relations between the various groups and individuals involved
in the decision-making process. Here, formal authority should be
distinguished from actual power. It may be the case that managers
and supervisors have the formal responsibility for making decisions,
but the power that workers can exercise through collective or
individual action may force them to accede to their demands.
Also, in the process of deciding upon a particular course of
action, the information supplied to decision-makers is crucial,
as this gives a great deal of latent power to those who are
responsible for collecting and providing that information.
These individuals have been called "technical gatekeepers" because
they can control the gateways to information and thus exert
considerable influence on the premises upon which decisions are
taken. Therefore, in the end, those who can exert most power,
regardless of the quality of the arguments and their formal level
of influence, will carry the day (Bjorn-Andersen, 1983; Buchanan,
1984; Hickson and Butler, 1982; Perrow, 1983; Pettigrew, 1973;
Pfeffer, 1981; Rose and Jones, 1983; Williams and Steward, 1984).
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In looking at the specific internal factors that affect decision-
iaking, it can be seen not only that they are complex, but that
they can also be contradictory. However, as with the general
factors within the organisation, it appears that whilst the
technical, structural and economic factors may limit the choices
available, they do not determine the actual outcome. It appears
that the values, attitudes and self-interest of those involved
push them to adopt certain positions, within the limits set by
the other factors, and that the final decision depends upon a
political process whereby groups and individuals bargain with,
and lobby, others, to obtain their preferred outcome. The actual
outcome will depend upon who can marshal the greatest support for
their cause.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF CHOICE
In this, and previous, chapters, the argument has been developed
that the impact of new technology is not something that is
determined either by the characteristics of the technology itself
or by a process of rational evaluation and decision-making in
organisations that are closed and value-free, but, instead, by
a range of external and internal factors (see fig. 1).
This view sees organisations as open systems which are affected
not only by economic and technical forces within the ambient
society, but also by its culture. This culture affects the
organisation, in terms of its own culture/philosophy, and also the
members of the organisation in terms of their values and attitudes.
Within the organisation, many factors, both internal and external,
work to limit the choices that are available or which are seen
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FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE INTRODUCTION AND USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
GENERAL	 SPECIFIC
INTERNAL
FACTORS
EXTERNAL
FACTORS
The organisation' s
history and development
Its philosophy/culture
Its structure
Its size
Its existing technology
and products
Its profitability/
performance
Its goals and managerial
strategy
Its management-worker
relations
The nature of the
political economy
Culture
Historical development
Ideology
Social institutions
Political stability
State of the economy
State of technological
development
The size and nature of
the change
Sub-unit performance
and iniportance
Sub-unit structure
Management-worker
relations within the
sub-unit
The values, attitudes
and self-interest of
those involved
The power relations of
the groups and indiv-
iduals involved
Product market
Labour market
Availability of
technology
Fig. 1
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as acceptable when deciding how new technology will be used.
However, these factors can conflict with each other, and therefore
choices still have to be made; the final outcome is seen as
depending upon the values, attitudes and self-interest of those
involved and whether or not they can command the power or mobilise
those with the power to support their favoured outcome. Therefore,
choice does exist, albeit constrained, but the final outcome will
depend upon who can gain ntst support in a given situation.
It follows from this that the impact of new technology will vary
from organisation to organisation and maybe even within organisations.
However, it is possible to gain some indication of what that impact
might be across society in Britain. Britain, as noted previously,
has tended to adopt organisational practices which reflect
Scientific Management precepts. It can be expected, at a time
when profits and markets are depressed and unemployment is high,
that managers will be predisposed to cut costs, especially labour
costs, when introducing new technology, and that workers in
general will have little opportunity to resist this tendency.
It might then be expected that new technology will be used in such
away as to reduce workers' skill and control, to cut the numbers
employed, and to cut wage costs. If this is so, then the impact
of new technology will be to create low-skilled, low-motivated
workers whose job satisfaction will be minimal. This, as argued
in Chapter 3, may be inefficient for the organisation in the long
term and will certainly be detrimental to workers' mental health.
However, as argued in this chapter, other factors are also at work,
and the outcome of technical change, and the factors involved,
can only be revealed by examining how particular organisations
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have coped and are coping with new technology. This is the
reason for the importance of the nine case studies that have been
carried out; they provide evidence from a wide range of organis-
ations regarding the process and impact of technical change.
Equally importantly, they also provide empirical data which can
be used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
organisation-specific aspects of the conceptual framework and
show where it needs further development.
The case studies will be presented in Chapters 7 - 10, following
a description in the next two chapters of the aims, objectives,
and methodology of the research, and the specific technology
being studied.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This research was based in the MRC/ESRC Social and Applied
Psychology Unit at Sheffield University. However, the research
project itself was a joint one between the Unit and Sheffield
City Council's Employment Department. The research was jointly
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the
Effiployment Department.
The Social and Applied Psychology Unit was established by the
Medical Research Council in 1968 to promote the application of
psychology in work settings. In the last few years, the Unit has
become involved in studying the impact of new technology on work;
at the time that this research began, the Unit had been involved
in evaluating the impact of computers in health care.
The Employment Department was established by Sheffield City
Council in 1981 as a response to the growing level of unemployment
in the city, which was then, and continues to be, above the
national average. Part of the Department's remit was to examine
the impact of new technology on employment levels and job
quality in Sheffield.
In 1982, the Unit and the Employment Department agreed to set up
a joint research project to examine "The Impact of New Technology
on Work Organisation and Job Design". The research was under-
taken by one post-graduate researcher, and was carried out between
October 1982 and September 1985.
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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The broad aim of the research is to examine the impact of new
technology on work organisation and job design. This involves
examining not only the outcome of the change process in particular
organisational settings, but also the process of change itself.
The intention is to develop a conceptual framework for the under-
standing of what happens when organisations adopt new technology,
and how it happens. By so doing, it is hoped to promote the
successful use of new technology. Successful, in these terms,
is defined not only by an organisation's technical and financial
criteria, but also by the needs of human beings for meaningful
and fulfilling work. For this reason, in accordance with Job
Design criteria, particular attention will be paid to the issues
of skill, variety and control when examining the jobs and work
organisation that accompany the introduction of new technology.
Therefore, the main issues being investigated are:-
i) Why do organisations adopt new technology?
ii) How do they decide how to use new technology?
iii) What is the outcome in terms of the organisatiori's technical
and financial objectives, and in terms of work organisation
and job design?
iv) What alternative forms of use were considered/were available?
From the previous chapters, it is argued that a wide range of
factors, both external and internal to the organisation, will affect
the change process. The case studies can only, obviously, examine
the internal factors, but it is hoped that by so doing, this will,
indirectly, illuminate the influence of the external factors. Many
of the external factors will affect all organisations and it is postulated
that, for cultural, ideological and economic reasons, there would be a tendency in
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Britain for new technology to be associated with Tayloristic
methods of work organisation and job design. However, this would
depend upon the particular productand labour market situation
faced by individual organisations. With regard to internal factors,
whilst some of these, such as size, structure and technology,
are seen as limiting the choices available, others, especially
individual beliefs and values and organisational culture, are
seen as predisposing decision-makers to adopt particular solutions
when faced with change. It is concluded that the final outcome
would be related to the preferences of, and power wieLdea by,
those involved rather than a rational assessment of the pros and
cons of the situation.
Therefore, the influence of the following factors upon the change
process also needs to be examined:-
i) The past history and development of the organisation, and
its present structures and practices as they relate to
work organisation and job design.
ii) The orgarlisation's philosophy/culture as it relates to
job design.
iii) The organisation's goals and managerial strategy that
relate to new technology and its use.
iv) The relevant external and internal technical and economic
factors and the perceived importance of these by those
involved.
v) Who is included, and excluded, from involvement in the
change process and their relative influence on the final
outcome.
vi) The effect of the values, attitudes, self-interest, and
power of those involved in the change process.
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By examining these factors, it will be possible to illuminate
sore clearly the four issues involved in the change process that
forms the subject of this research. This examination will also
reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual framework
presented in the last chapter and how this needs to be developed
in order to have a more general understanding of the impact of
new technology.
METHODOLOGY
Choice of Methods
In choosing research methods, the first decision to be made,
and one that appears to be surrounded by some controversy, is
whether to use large-scale quantitative or small-scale qualitative
techniques (Fryer, 1984; Kulka, 1982). Both these approaches
have their benefits, and also their drawbacks and criticisms.
Quantitative methods are usually used to test or verify a specific
hypothesis. These methods involve the collection of data, using
such devices as questionnaires, normally from large sample groups,
the members of which are selected either at random or on the
basis of particular characteristics: age, gender, profession,
etc. These techniques lend themselves ideally to the carrying
out of longitudinal studies of large samples of subjects, spread
over a wide geographical area, in a relatively quick and cost-
effective manner. The data collected is then subjected to analysis,
using advanced statistical techniques, in order to prove or
disprove the original hypothesis.
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The strength of quantitative techniques is that they produce
results which have been tested by widely-available, tried and
tested statistical methods, normally based on large samples.
This gives the results an objectivity and validity which is at
the same time both hard to challenge and easy to replicate.
This allows specific hypotheses to be tested and re-tested using
the same or different data, and, therefore, for scientific
theories to be built upon a recognised body of widely-tested
work (Reichardt and Cook, 1978).
Despite the acknowledged benefits of quantitative methods, there
are also criticisms of the applicability of these methods to
real people in real situations. The first is that human beings
and their environments are far less amenable to control, and far
more complex, than those encountered in the laboratory. The
second is that the statistical techniques themselves, in terms
of such factors as how one measurement affects another, are not
free from error. A final criticism, and probably the main one,
is that whatever the precision and rigour employed, such techniques
cao create a false environment for those involved and, therefore,
the results do not reflect how people behave in their normal
e7eryday setting but rather they mirror the artificially-created
crId of the research design (Deutscher, 1970; Fryer, l84;
Payne, 1982).
¶ierefore, whilst quantitative techniques are a major ad	 luIl
tool of research, they are not free from serious cr
The alternative is to use qualitative methoc1s 	 Su©h teu
are used, normally, to examine processes arid =t tri
all-scale studies rather than to examine
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using a large sample. As with quantitative techniques, the aim
is to contribute to the building and testing of scientific theory.
However, this is done by attempting to describe and understand
social situations through the use of such techniques as personnel
interviews, observation and the collection of relevant documents.
These methods, it is claimed, capture the full richness and
complexity of the real world in which people live and work.
In particular, such techniques allow the researcher to understaid
and to show how, and why, individuals and groups act as they do
(Fay, 1975; Van Maanen, 1979).
Therefore, qualitative methods avoid the main criticisms levelled
at quantitative methods, in that they avoid the artificiality
and the errors of statistical packages by the detailed examination
of people and their actions in their normal environment.
Needless to say, qualitative techniques are also not free of
serious criticisms. They are seen as being extremely subjective
rather than objective; as lacking rigour and reliability in their
approach; and the end product is rarely open to re-testing or
reproduction by other researchers. Another criticism is that
reports based on such research findings can tend to be presented
in an idiosyncratic and individualistic manner, such that
qeneralisations can be difficult to draw (Fryer, l984)
Theref ore, as with quantitative methods, qualitative methods
have both their advantages and disadvantages.
As the above brief examination of the advantages and dantos
of quantitative and qualitative methodologies shows, there s no
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such thing as the ideal methodology which is tree from shortcomings
ar criticisms. This, perhaps, partly explains why the debate
regarding the choice of methods has become the subject of
controversy (Fryer, 1984).
evertheless, the researcher does have to make a choice regarding
the research methods to use, though in so doing he or she must be
aware of, and seek to overcome, the shortcomings of the particular
investigative techniques they eventually decide to use (McGrath,
1982).
However, Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Payne (1982) have suggested
a different approach to the choice of methods. This is an approach
based not upon the merits and demerits of particular methodologies
as such, but upon the subject to be studied. They point to the
need for researchers to have a thorough understanding of the aims
and objectives of their research before deciding upon the tools
to be used to carry out the research. Only when this is done is
the researcher, they believe, in a position to decide upon the
iiaethods to be used. This is because they consider that the need
to adopt different research strategies depends upon the type of
research being undertaken and the issues involved.
They argue that there should be an appreciation that whilst some
studies, where large samples are available and specific issues,
based upon a sound body of knowledge, are to be tested, lend
themselves to quantitative techniques, others do not. Where only
small samples are available, where the body of knowledge about
the subject is small and disputed, and where a process, rather
than a specific hypothesis, is being examined, then qualitative
techniques will be best suited.
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aking this view, it is possible to see quantitative and qualitative
techniques not as being mutually exclusive, but as being inter-
related. The latter can be used to explore particular situations
where the issues may not be clear and where there is a need to
create a body of empirical evidence. On the other hand, quantitative
methods can be used to test particular hypotheses once such a body
of empirical evidence has been established.
The converse can also apply. Qualitative techniques can be used
to examine in greater detail and richness the results of quant-
itative research. Indeed, by taking this view - that quantitative
and qualitative techniques are ways of focussing upon different
aspects of the same problem - it is possible to envisage research
strategies which incorporate both types of methodology.
However, this research was carried out using qualitative techniques.
This was for three reasons.
Firstly, despite the number of articles published in the area of
flew technology, there have been few studies, or had been when
the research began, which had rigorously examined both the
autcome of the introduction of new technology and the process
by which the outcome was reached. Indeed, much of the literature
was, and still is, speculative and based either upon very limited
studies or upon secondary sources.
ierefore, one of the purposes of the research was to find out
hat changes were taking place where new technology had been
latroduced, and to build up, through a case study approach,
sbody of knowledge which, together with other studies that have
sen and are being undertaken, will form the basis for future
antitative studies.
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Secondly, whilst there has been much talk of new technology,
there were still, when this research began, only a relatively
small number of organisations both locally and nationally that
had adopted it, and even in these, only a few people were affected
by its introduction. Therefore, the sample being studied was
small, and it also proved very difficult to find organisations
that were at the same stage of development for comparison purposes.
Even when suitable organisations were located, it was not always
the case that they were willing to co-operate with the research.
Lastly, the research was interested just as much in the process
of change as in the outcome, and was therefore not seeking to
test specific hypotheses.
For these reasons, it was decided that qualitative techniques
were the most appropriate methods of research in this instance.
However, regardless of the methods used, the research must show
a rigour in both its design and execution in order to demonstrate
its validity.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The Industry to be studied
sfflentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the research
as based in Sheffield and was partly sponsored by Sheffield
City Council. Sheffield is famous for its steel and engineering
industries, both of which have been heavily hit by the recession.
Nevertheless, whilst it has a growing service sector, these two
industries are still crucial to Sheffield's future prosperity.
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In choosing the type of organisations to study, there were two
guiding principles;-
i) For consistency and to avoid differences between industries
and sectors, the organisations chosen should be from the
same industry.
ii)The industry chosen should be one that is important to
the local economy of Sheffield.
n terms of Sheffield, the industry had to be either steel or
engineering. For two main reasons, the engineering
industry was chosen. 	 Firstly, the steel industry was
still suffering the effects of the bitter 1979/1980 strike,
and it was anticipated that problems of access and co-operation
might arise. Secondly, the researcher had spent 11 years working
in the Sheffield engineering industry, and it was logical to
take advantage of his experience in the industry.
Therefore, organisations in the Sheffield engineering industry
were chosen for the research, although two companies in Rotherham
were also included because of their suitability.
he New Technology to be studied
The choice of technology to be studied was guided by three
principles : -
1) For consistency and accuracy of comparison, the technology
to be studied should be similar in all organisations.
It should be a form of new technology that was present
in sufficient numbers to allow the research to be properly
carried out.
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iii) It was likely to have a significant effect on the engineering
industry.
In the event, the choice was relatively easy: it was decided to
examine the introduction of Computer Numerically Controlled
Machine Tools (CNC). The technology itself and its development
will be described in the next chapter, but it was chosen for
three reasons:-
ii Since the emergence of CNC in the early 1970s, there has
been a rapid growth in its use: by 1981, CNC accounted
for, by value, one-third of all machine tool sales in
Great Britain (Rodger and Bruce, 1983); although, even so,
CNCs still only constitute 3.32% of all machine tools in
Britain (Metal Working Production, 1983).
11) It appears to be the only form of new technology that has
penetrated the shopfloor in all sizes of engineering
companies, from the very large to the very small.
iii) Beyond its immediate impact, it may bring about a radical
transformation in engineering. This is because by linking
individual CNCs together by transfer devices such as
robots and by controlling them through a central computer,
they form a Flexible Manufacturing System - the so-called
'Peopleless Factory".
For these three reasons, CNC is a significant development which
has important implications for the future of the engineering
industry, and is therefore worthy of study.
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The Choice of Organisations
In selecting organisations that might be suitable for study,
the main objective was to examine, over a period of time, the
introduction of CNC into different organisational settings.
This was to establish if (a) there were different approaches to
its use, and (b) what factors were influential in the selection
of these approaches.
It was decided to select the engineering companies on the basis
of size and product. The reasons for the use of these two reference
points was that size, as argued in Chapters 3 and 4, is seen as
a constraint on the type of organisational structure that can be
achieved. In small companies, it is not possible to divide labour
and fragment skills in the same way that could be achieved in
larger organisations. Consequently, it might be expected that
CNC would be used in a different way in small companies than in
large ones. The argument is similar with regard to product;
as pointed out in Chapter 4, small batches of complex products
are likely to require more operator intervention and skill than
large batches of simple products. It is usually the case that
there is an inverse relationship between batch size and complexity,
i.e. the larger the batch size, the more likely it is that the
product is a simple one. The supposition in the case of both
size and product is not that these factors determine what takes
place, but that they act as a constraint upon choice. Therefore,
as an alternative to selecting companies merely at random, it
was decided to use these two factors as guides to the selection
process. They also have the added benefit of being information
that can quickly and easily be obtained from companies, which
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makes the process of deciding whether or not a company is suitable
for study relatively simple.
In choosing organisations, two other factors were taken into
account. The first was the need not just to compare different-
sized companies with different product, but also the need to
compare like companies, companies of a similar size and similar
products. Therefore, pairs of companies, matched by size and
product, were chosen. The second tactoi 'vas t 1ne	 mite
time and resources available. 	 Only one researcher was
involved and the research was limited to three years' duration,
including writing up. Based on the experience of others, it
appeared that ten case studies would be the maximum number to
undertake in the circumstances.
For these reasons, size, product, the need to "pair" companies
and the limit of ten studies, it was decided to select the corn-
panies on the following basis:-
Two large companies manufacturing large batches;
Two large companies manufacturing small batches;
Two medium-sized companies manufacturing medium batches;
Two small companies manufacturing large batches;
Two small companies manufacturing small batches.
In this instance, large companies are defined as those employing
500 or more on the same site, small as employing less than 100,
and medium as between 100 - 500 employees. A similar division
is made with regard to batch size and complexity: small batches
are those of 100 or less; medium between 100 and 300; and largo
are 300 plus. These divisions were chosen because CNC is designed
to produce batches ranging from 1 to 300/400 (De Barr, 1978).
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When the process of contacting, and obtaining the co-operation of,
companies began, it became apparent that some modification of
this design would be needed. In the end, 9 companies were included
in the sample on the following basis:-
Two large companies manufacturing large batches;
Three medium companies manufacturing medium batches;
Two small companies manufacturing large batches;
Two small companies manufacturing small batches.
The two changes - the exclusion of large companies with small
batches and the inclusion of 3 medium-sized companies - were for
the following reasons.
It proved impossible, at least in South Yorkshire, to find two
large companies that manufactured small batches using CNC.
Therefore, this objective was excluded from the study.
The reason for the inclusion of three medium-sized companies in
the survey relates to a problem faced by all field workers - that
of maintaining access. In this case, one of the medium-sized
companies allowed some interviews but then decided it did not
wish to have any further involvement, the reason given being that
they were too busy. This left the problem of only having "half"
a study. Rather than complete the project with studies in just
1inedium-sized companies, it was decided to seek out a further
company in this area. Therefore, three studies of medium-sized
Companies were carried out, though one, whilst being of interest,
was incomplete.
another problem that emerged when the fieldwork began revolved
around the question of batch size. In practice, the companies
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concerned manufactured a range of batch sizes, and whilst it was
possible to say that some companies made small batches and some
large, there was a degree of overlap. Nevertheless, as will be
demonstrated in the case studies, batch size and complexity is a
useful way of differentiating between companies.
There was one final problem that arose when seeking suitable
companies, which was to find ones where it was possible to study
the introduction of CNC in a situation that allowed "before and
after" comparisons. Whilst it did not prove easy to locate
companies that were already using CNC, it proved extremely difficult
to find companies that not only were contemplating buying CNC, and
introducing them in the period the research was being undertaken,
but would also allow access. For these reasons, before, during
and after studies were only carried out in two of the nine
companies, and in the other seven cases, CNC was already in use
when the studies began.
Not only does this prove the need to use flexible research tech-
niques when field research is involved, but it also proved a
blessing in disguise. The reason, as the studies will show, is
that firms can and do change their CNC organisation over time,
rather than adopting a once-and-for-all system of working.
Therefore, the process of change can be slow and certainly covers
a longer period than the one encompassed by this study.
By looking at companies at different stages in their use of CNC,
a much fuller picture of the change process was obtained than
would have been the case if all the studies had been of the
"before and after" variety.
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ll this, of course, shows that there is a world of difference
between designing research in theory and carrying out research
in the field. This highlights the need not only for a degree of
flexibility in the research design and methods, but also in the
researcher.
RESEARCH METHODS
The primary methods of research were:-
1) Interviews with the various managers, workers, trade unionists;
ii) Observation of working methods and practices, and discussion
of these with those in the organisation, either at the
time or subsequently;
iii)Examination of relevant company documents;
iv) Observation of meetings relevant to the process of change;
v) Discussion with parties outside the organisations who had
been involved in some way in the change process.
Whilst it was always obvious that interviews with those involved
would provide the bulk of information, there was no clear and
obvious preference for any of the methods of data collection,
and the original intention was to use all the methods to the
fullest extent. Of course, this was not always possible in all
cases for a variety of reasons, and whatever source of information
that was available was considered.
The Problems of Access
The problem of negotiating and gaining access is one that all
researchers face and encounter problems with (Kulka, 1982).
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However, even before that stage, there is the need to identify
suitable organisations. If the criteria are very broad, then the
problem is reduced, but if, as in this case, organisations with
particular characteristics relating to technology, size and
product are required, then this can prove a difficult task.
Fortunately, the problem was less than might otherwise have been
the case because the researcher was given access to a survey of
new technology in Sheffield that had been carried out in 1981 by
Sheffield City Polytechnic. This indicated organisations that
were using CNC and a few which were planning to use CNC. Other
information on CNC users was supplied by people in some of the
organisations studied, and the local SkillCentre was also very
helpful in this respect.
However, as mentioned earlier, finding companies who were buying
CNC but had not yet installed it was extremely difficult. Even
when this criterion was set aside, it was still difficult to find
appropriate organisations. This is demonstrated by the fact
that it took 18 months to locate and gain access to nine companies,
and even so, it proved impossible to find large companies that
manufactured small batches of components using CNC. In a number
of cases, contact was made, by mistake, with companies that did
not have, and had no intention of getting, CNC. Only in two
cases did companies actually refuse access, but in both cases
it took them over 3 months to do so, which was not only frustrating
but also time-consuming. In only one case did a company allow
access and then change their mind. Even where access and full
co-operation were gained, this could be a slow process.
Nevertheless, the researcher was struck, in most cases, by the
friendliness and helpfulness of those involved.
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The Duration of the Case Studies
In all cases, except the one medium-sized firm already mentioned,
the studies were longitudinal, covering events over a period of
time, rather than "snapshots" at particular moments in time.
The entire fieldwork covered a period of 28 months. However,
given that it was possible neither to carry out nine studies at
once, because of time constraints, nor to find nine companies
willing to co-operate at the start of the research, the initial
approaches to, and first round of interviews with, the companies
were spread over an 18-month period.
The second visits, in the main, were at 3 or 4 month intervals,
though this might be longer depending upon the circumstances.
In one company, for example, a revisit was arranged to coincide
with the arrival of an additional CNC. This had been due to take
place in July 1984, but the machine was not delivered until
November 1984. In other instances, return visits were delayed
lue to sickness, holidays or even companies being "rushed off
our feet at the moment".
The number of return visits made to each company varied depending
upon when the first contact was made, and what changes were
taking place. In one company, the first visit was made in January
1983 and regular visits thereafter until February 1985; in other
cases, the time between the first and last visit was very much
shorter.
In all the companies, even those where the technology had been
installed for some time, changes in the organisation of work
were taking place. In no instance could the situation be described
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as static, though in some the changes were small. This shows the
folly of seeing organisations, particularly in the present uncertain
economic climate, as static and unchanging. It also shows the
need for longitudinal studies that last longer than two or three
years, if the full effects of the change process are to be
examined.
The Efficacy of the Research Methods
In terms of the efficacy of the various research methods, inter-
views, as anticipated, proved to be the major source of data.
Most of these were tape-recorded, though in some cases this was
not possible. lchilst all the interviews were carried out using
semi-structured interview schedules, after the initial interviews,
when trust had been built up, the interviewees became more relaxed
and open, in most instances at least, and they came to resemble
conversations rather than interviews. (See P1ppendix for questions).
For the most part, once initial access was established, the case
studies involved making contact with a particular manager, who,
after being interviewed, would arrange interviews to take place
with other managers and workers.
In the first instance, interviews with managers were used to
establish the background of the company - size, product, market,
sanagement structure, etc. - and to gain the "official" account
of the change process. Subsequent interviews and meetings would
then focus upon specific aspects of the process as they related
to the person involved. In this way, Important events within
the organisations came to light, and specific issues could then
be followed up in detail with the various Interested parties.
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This allowed a picture of events to be built up, showing what had
actually happened or was happening, as averse to the "official"
account.
In some cases, the researcher was given a free hand as to whom to
interview and when. In other cases, certain managers insisted
that they approve all arrangements for interviews. There were
some instances where workers expressed the view that future inter-
views should take place outside the company, because they felt
constrained by the proximity of managers and supervisors.
In some instances, difficulties were encountered, but in most cases
these were overcome. In one company, for example, it proved
difficult to obtain permission to interview one of the key people.
The Managing Director explained that the individual concerned was
"very busy and cannot be spared to speak to you". In the event,
this problem was overcome when it was discovered that the person
lived in the same street as the researcher, and that they had
been on "nodding terms" for some time! Therefore, the interview
was carried out at his home one evening.
One problem encountered in the medium-sized and large companies
was access to senior managers. There was a tendency for their
subordinates to "protect" them from the researcher. Nevertheless,
in the main, people were surprisingly open, and access to those
involved was not denied.
Observation also proved a useful method of gathering information.
Observing the working methods in each company was often the
easiest and most revealing method of coming to terms with the
specific nature of the work that people do. On paper, the
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difference between a machine cycle time of one minute and one of
three minutes may not seem significant; in practice, it can be
the difference between a gruelling and monotonous job and one
where the machinist is able to exert some control over what he
does and gains a degree of satisfaction from it. However, the
freedom to observe varied from company to company. In some cases,
the researcher was given a completely free hand, whereas in others,
his presence was regarded as a potential distraction to production
by management. Nevertheless, observation proved a valuable and
revealing research tool.
The examination of documents, on the other hand, proved less
helpful. Whilst in one or two instances, they were of interest,
in most cases they were notable for what they did not show
rather than for what they did. Written justifications for machine
purchase, for example, were often highly technical and lengthy
but omitted key factors. They would compare CNC with the existing
method of production, but gave no indication of why CNC was chosen
in place of any other alternative in existence. The documents
were prepared on the basis that CNC was the only option, but no
evidence for this was given. Neither did the documents compare
the benefits of different methods of using CNC. It was assumed
that the method specified was the best or only way, but once
again, there would be no justification for this.
In small companies, there tended to be no written justification
at all, and in some other companies, documents were "not available
to outsiders". In any case, as mentioned, little could be gained
from their contents.
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Observation of meetings also proved less useful than anticipated.
In most cases, key decisions were not taken in "formal" meetings
but in "informal" discussions that could take place at any time
and anywhere. In the large companies, it was sometimes impossible,
even for some of the managers involved, to know when, how, and by
whom a particular decision had been made. In the smaller companies
perhaps only one or two people might be involved in taking decisions
and even informal meetings might not tace pac. 	 ii'ist tSXis
information, or rather lack of it, is informative in revealing
how organisations operate, it is not so revealing in establishing
the basis on which particular decisions were taken.
On the other hand, discussions with parties outside the organisation
in question, when these were possible, did on one or two occasions
prove interesting. One technical consultant revealed that he was
puzzled as to why one organisation had bought CNC in the first
place; whilst in another instance, comments on the managerial and
organisational style of one company proved accurate and illuminating.
Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of some of the methods
used, together they did allow a picture of each organisation to
be built up, describing why CNC was bought and used and how the
process developed, which the researcher believes is both accurate
and a valuable contribution to the knowledge in this area.
THE PROBLEM OF EGRESS
Whilst access, as mentioned earlier, is a common problem for
researchers, egress - when to finish the research - can also
prove difficult.
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There is always the temptation, especially when something
interesting is happening, to do one more interview or make one
more visit. Yet a researcher has only a limited amount of time
in total and for each organisation, and even the most friendly
company can run out of patience. The ability to recognise when
a welcome has been exhausted is invaluable, even if in some
cases the knowledge must be ignored. The decision to spend more
time in one company than another is a matter of judgment and can
only be justified by the final results. Yet, in some cases,
either where the organisation is large and many people are
involved, or the events do not fall into the time allocated, more
time has to be set aside.
Therefore, inevitably in this type of research, some studies are
longer than others, but hopefully the nine case studies do
justify the time spent on them.
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CHAPTER SIX
COMPUTER NUMERICALLY CONTROLLED MACHINE TOOLS (CNC)
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe Computer Numerically Controlled
aachine tools (CNC), their function, their development and
their implications for job design and work organisation. It
will also examine five studies of CNC. It is argued that existing
studies of CNC usage have produced partial explanations of the
factors which influence their use, but which, whilst drawing
attention to important issues, ignore other significant factors.
The chapter will conclude that CNC is not a deterministic
technology and that there is significant scope for the exercise
of choice in how it is used.
THE ADVANTAGES OF CNC
CNC machine tools are computer-controlled devices for cutting
and shaping pieces of cast or rolled metal. The three most
common types of CNC are turning lathes - machines for producing
circular components; milling machines - for removing material
from flat surfaces; and machining centres - which are similar
to, but far more complex than, milling machines. In 1976, there
were 9,725 CNCs in Britain; by 1982, the figure was 25,802 and
sales were increasing rapidly (Metal Working Production, 1983).
CNC has become so popular because for the first time it allows
the automation of small batch production of engineering components.
This is significant because 75% of all machining operations
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involve small to medium batches, and 40% of those employed in
manufacturing are involved in their production (De Barr, 1978).
Traditionally, batch production has been carried out on two
types of machine tool:-
i) Conventional machine tools controlled manually by a skilled
or semi-skilled machinist. These machines have the advantage
that they are very flexible, but they are also slow, the
quality is variable, it is difficult to machine complex
shapes on them, and they often need expensive jigs, to guide
the tool, and fixtures, to hold the work. For these reasons,
they tend to be used on small batches.
ii) Automatic machine tools which are controlled by some form
of pre-set mechanical or electro-mechanical arrangements.
Their advantage is that they are fast and consistent, but
they are inflexible - limited to performing a narrow range
of machining operations, slow to set up, and only economic
on larger batches of components.
In the past, the cost advantage for small batches has been with
conventional machine tools and for larger batches with automatic
machines. The intermediate ranges have been done on either,
depending on the complexity of the products involved. With CNC,
this has changed; its proponents argue that batches between
5 and 300 - 400 are more economically produced on CNC; this is
especially the case where complex components are involved (De
Barr, 1978). This is because it combines the best of both types
of machine: it is flexible, fast, consistent in quality, faster
to set up than automatic machines, capable of machining complex
shapes, and rarely needing expensive jigs and fixtures. They
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are, however, considerably more expensive than most conventional
and many automatic machine tools; nevertheless, their flexibility
and productivity have accounted for the rapid growth in the
sales of these machines.
THE ORGANISATION OF WORK AROUND CNC
On a CNC machine tool, the cutting cycle, from the beginning of
the cutting process on each component to its completion, is
controlled by the computer - it is automatic. However, whilst
the CNC eliminates the need for human intervention whilst the
machine is cutting, it is required at five points during the
production process : -
i) Programming the machine: each batch of components has to
have a separate program. Therefore, someone has to decide
upon methods and tooling, select speeds and feeds, and
calculate and write the program. The program is then
usually encoded onto a punched-paper tape which allows it
to be fed into the CNC;
ii) Setting up the machine: this involves positioning the tools
and, if they are required, arranging jigs and fixtures;
lii) Proving out (editing) the program: programs are rarely
100% correct and they need to be checked out, and amended
if necessary, on the machine. This usually involves
producing the first component of a batch in order to
check its accuracy;
iv) Loading the raw material into the machine and removing
the finished component;
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v) Machine optirnisation: this involves inspecting the
finished components for accuracy and making adjustments
during a production run to compensate for tool wear or
material variability.
There is nothing inherent in the technology that determines who
does these tasks. One person could do them all, or they could
be split up amongst a number of people: all could be done by
shopfloor personnel or some could be done by staff specialists.
In practice, as Wall et al (1984) have pointed out, there are at
least five different methods of organising work around CNC:
1) A programmer, usually a member of staff such as a production/
methods engineer, will prepare the tape; a setter will set
up the machine and prove the tape; and an operator will
run the machine, basically loading and unloading it.
ii) A programmer can prepare and prove the tape, leaving the
operator a non-programming setting and operating role.
iii) A setter can prepare and prove the tape and set up the
machine, leaving the operator to load and unload.
iv) A programmer can prepare the tape and the operator will
prove it, set up and operate the machine.
v) An operator can prepare and prove the tape, set up the
machine and run it.
The first three methods have the potential to create boring and
monotonous jobs for operators which require little skill, the
main function being to load and unload the machine and to monitor
its performance. On the other hand, programmers and setters
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have more interesting and varied jobs. The fourth method would
eliminate the need for a setter and give these functions to the
operator, whose job would become more skilled and interesting.
The fifth method would be ideal from the operator's point of
view, in that it fulfils all the criteria of Job Design regarding
variety, skill, autonomy and task completeness.
Despite the potential of CNC to create good or bad jobs, there
has been a tendency to see CNC as a development which will transfer
skills and control from the machine operator on the shopfloor to
staff specialists (Flearn, 1978; Noble, 1979; Shaiken, 1980).
To see why this should be so, it is necessary to examine the
development of machine tools and especially the forerunner of
CNC, Numerical Control (NC), and the implication of these for
shopfloor jobs.
THE MACHINIST AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MACHINE TOOLS
The most common form of machine is still the general purpose
conventional machine tool operated by a skilled or semi-skilled
machinist. The machinist, using his knowledge, experience and
the machine, translates the information on a drawing or methods
sheet into a finished component. He transmits his purpose to
the machine by means of the cranks, levers and handles that
control the machine. Feedback is achieved through the hands,
ears and eyes of the machinist, which tell him if something is
wrong, and his knowledge and experience tell him how to correct
it. Traditionally, the machinist's skill is learnt on the job
over a period of years. It involves not only machining the
product, but also the planning involved in setting up the machine,
selecting tools, and deciding upon speeds and feeds.
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In addition to his skills on the machine, the machinist can also
play a role - usually unacknowledged - in the design process,
in that he can be consulted by designers about whether or not
their design can actually be manufactured, and if not, what
changes are necessary. Therefore, the skilled machinist plays
an important role in the production process.
The control that machinists have over the pace and quality of
production has always been a contentious issue with managers,
as was pointed out in Chapter 2. It should be remembered that
Frederick Taylor, the founder of Scientific Management, was
originally motivated by the desire to reduce the machinist's
ability to control production.
Even before Taylor, and certainly after him, there have been
attempts to reduce the importance of machinists. Changes in machine
tool design and the increasing division of labour have meant that
many machines and machinists have become restricted to a narrow
range of functions. This in turn has reduced the need for skilled
machinists and created a large body of semi-skilled machinists
instead. In the case of automatic machines, the operator has
been virtually eliminated altogether, though a skilled setter
is required to set up the machine.
Nevertheless, given that 75% of all machined components are in
the small to medium batch range, machinists, especially those
involved in the manufacture of complex or varied components,
still play an important role in the production process, and
still have the potential to control the pace and quality of
production (Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; Cooley, 1983; Noble, 1979;
Shaiken, 1980).
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However, the development of Numerical Control threatened once
and for all to eliminate the machinist as a significant figure
in the production process.
Numerical Control (NC)
Numerical Control, like CNC, is the control of a machine tool
by a punched-paper tape on which instructions are encoded in
alpha-numeric (hence numerical control) characters. However,
unlike CNC, the NC machines did not have computers built into
them, which, as will be explained below, was a significant
factor in inhibiting their usefulness and sales.
NC was invented after the Second World War and its development
was aided by two factors. The first was the developments in
control technology which had taken place during the War and which
made NC technically feasible. The second was the need by the
United States Air Force (USAF) for machines capable of manufacturing,
to high standards of quality, the complex parts required for the
production of their aircraft. If the former made NC technically
feasible, the latter made it financially feasible, because
between 1949 and 1959 the USAF invested $62 million in its
development. In addition to this, they paid for its installation
in the factories of their leading component suppliers and
specified that NC should be used in machining the components
they were being supplied with. This meant that those companies
involved in supplying parts to the USAF, and the machine tool
bui1der who supplied machines to these companies, had to adopt
NC or risk being excluded from the lucrative defence market
(Jones, 1983; Noble, 1979; Tipton, 1980).
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However, NC was by no means the only answer to the USAF's problems;
there was at least one other alternative - Record Playback. This
was a system whereby a machinist would make the first component
in a batch and, during this operation, the machine's movements
would be recorded on a magnetic tape. The rest of the batch
could then be manufactured without the machinist by playing back
the tape. Tape production for NC machines was, on the other hand,
more difficult. This was for two reasons:-
i) Tape production, even for simple components, was very slow
and difficult. For complex components, the aid of a
mainframe computer would be necessary for the complex
calculations involved;
ii) Even when the tape programs were made, they still needed
proving out on the machine. However, if there were any
faults with the tape, they could not be altered on the
machine; the tape had to be removed from the machine and
returned to the programmer. Therefore, proving the tape
could also be slow and difficult.
Record Playback, on the other hand, did not have these problems:
there was no need for complex calculations or for computers, the
machinist made the component as on a conventional machine and
by so doing an accurate tape was produced. Nevertheless, the
USAF opted for NC.
Noble (1979), who has studied NC development, argues that the
preference for NC rather than Record Playback was because it
dispensed with the need for skilled machinists. He points out
that this was a period when the aircraft industry was becoming
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increasingly unionised, especially amongst skilled machinists.
This led to some long and bitter industrial disputes and to the
consequent disruption of production and delivery. The tJSAF
believed that the only way to ensure that their supplies of
components were delivered on time and to specification was to
remove control of the production process from machinists and
place it in the hands of managers. The use of NC was seen to
do this, whilst Record Playback was believed actually to increase
the reliance on skilled machinists.
It is certainly the case that discussion of and publicity for NC
stressed the importance of management control:
with modern automatic controls the production pace
is set by the machine, not the operator. (Stickell,
1960, p6l)
The important decisions that affect unit cost, delivery
dates, and product quality are, with N/C, in the hands
of managers and professional employees, not the operator.
(Howick, 1965, plO5)
Therefore NC was chosen by the USAF, by their suppliers and
by the machine tool industry. However, the problems with tape
pcdactfon and proving, especially the need for access to a
mainframe computer, meant that the market for NC was limited,
and in the main was restricted to the aerospace industry.
Whilst this was not a problem for the USAF, it was for the
machine tool builders, who wanted a product that could be sold
to a wider market. They began, in the l960s, to experiment with
the use of computers linked to the NC machines to overcome some
of these problems, but the size and cost of computers made this
problematic.
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The birth of CNC
It was not until the advent of cheap microprocessors in the early
1970s that it became technically and economically feasible to
build computers into Numerically Controlled machine tools and
thus to create Computer Numerically Controlled machine tools.
However, once this was achieved, it overcame many of the problems
of NC:
i) It made programming much easier: the computer could automat-
ically perform many of the complex calculations that had
slowed the process down before;
ii) The computer also allowed errors in the program to be amended
on the machine, thus eliminating the need to take the tape
back to the progarnrner to be altered.
Indeed, some CNCs now have a Manual Data Input (MDI) facility
which allows the component specifications to be keyed straight
into the machine without having to encode the program onto a
tape first.
This meant that the potental market for CNC was much wider
than was the case with NC. From the mid-1970s onwards, sales of
CNC have grown rapidly whilst sales of conventional machines have
fallen. The aerospace industry is still the largest single user
of CNC, but the next largest users are small contract engineering
companies who find the speed and flexibility of CNC ideal for
their needs (De Barr, 1978; Metal Working Production, 1983;
Tipton, 1980).
However, the development of CNC has once again raised the issue
of operator control. For, if programming is easier and if both
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proving and programming can be carried out on the machine, then
why cannot these functions be carried out by machine operators?
The heritage of NC has given CNC a reputation as a device for
controlling and deskilling workers (Hearn, 1978; Noble, 1979;
Shaiken, 1979). Yet, as the next section, which reviews five
studies of CNC, will show, the organisation of work around CNC
is not dependent upon the characteristics of the technology 1 but
is dependent upon a range of other factors.
FIVE STUDIES OF CNC
In the last few years, CNC, like other forms of new technology,
has been the subject of much discussion. Of the academic studies
that have appeared, some are speculative, some are based on
secondary sources, and of those where first-hand accounts are
presented, the majority are based upon short visits to only one
organisation. However, there are a few cases where more detailed
studies have been carried out, but in only one instance, Sorge
etal (1983), does there appear to be a study that covers a
substantial number of different organisations.
This section will briefly look at a sample of five studies
that have examined CNC. The most detailed of these studies,
Sorge et al (1983), covers the use of CNC in Britain and West
Germany. Three others, Black (1983), Clegg et al (1984), and
Wilkinson (1983), cover Britain only, and the final one, Shaiken
(1979 and 1980), examines the American experience of CNC.
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Sorge et al (1983)
This is by far the most comprehensive of the studies, and covers
the use of CNC in 6 British and 6 West German companies. The
researchers, as in the present study, selected organisations on
the basis of company/plant size and batch size. They examined
the use of CNC within and between companies, and in particular
they were interested in the factors which affected how it was
used. The studies were not longitudinal and they were concerned
neither with factors such as individual values and attitudes nor
with power relations within the organisation.
The findings:
Their findings were that the use of CNC was dependent upon plant
size, batch size, and socio-technical traditions specific to
conpanies, branches of industry and nations. They argued that
these factors combine to determine the form of CNC use within
organisations.
Between Britain and West Germany, the main organisational diff-
erences that were found related to the degree of fragmentation,
or differentiation, of tasks and functions. In Britain, there
was a pronounced trend towards programming-related tasks being
carried out by staff specialists, and even amongst these specialists,
planning and programming was split between different groups. In
West German companies, on the other hand, these functions tended
to be integrated amongst groups of operators, planners, production
engineers and managers, and chargehands and foremen. This
resulted in a blurring of white collar and blue collar functions,
greater flexibility, and more shopfloor programming.
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With regard to plant size, it was found that in both countries,
as plant size increased, so did fragmentation of tasks and
functions. This trend was compounded by increasing batch size;
as production batches became longer, the trend was to employ
specialist operators, setters and programmers. In smaller
companies, with smaller production runs, the tendency was for
more integration of these functions and for more shopfloor
involvement in programming. However, as mentioned, in West
Germany, societal trends meant that even in large plants with
large production runs, the tendency was towards less fragmentation
and greater shopfloor involvement.
In Britain, the reverse was the case: fragmentation of tasks and
functions was observed even in small companies with small production
runs
Black (1983)
This study is unique amongst those being examined in that it
was carried out by a senior manager in the organisation concerned.
The study traces the history of NC and CNC introduction and
usage from 1966 through to 1980. The company, in 1980, employed
2,500 people and had 26 CNCs, some 6% of its total machine tool
stock, which produced a wide range of components. The main aim
of the research was to examine management objectives in introducing
CNC. Issues such as company size, batch size, individual and
group values, etc., are not examined.
The findings:
Black found that the main managerial objectives in introducing
CNC were to:-
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I) reduce human error and improve quality;
ii) respond more quickly to market conditions;
iii) reduce production costs;
iv) transfer control of production from machinists to managers;
v) replace obsolescent equipment.
That these objectives were, to a large extent, successful is
shown by the organisation of work around CNC. In terms of costs,
the 26 CNCs are said to do the same amount of work as 104 conven-
tional machines, and though machinists' pay is still the same,
they have to operate two machines at once instead of the previous
arrangement of one man to one machine.
rn terms of greater management control, this has been achieved by
creating a new staff department which is responsible for program-
ining-related functions. This not only guarantees management
control over the production rate, but has, in Black's view,
effectively deskilled the machine operators. Other objectives
with regard to increased quality and decreased human error have
also been met.
Clegg et al (1984)
this study examined the use of CNC in two British companies, both
of which manufacture small batches of complex components for the
aerospace industry. One of the companies employed 150 people,
and had over 40 CNCs, whilst the other had above 1,000 employees
and also had a large number of CNCs. The researchers spent
early 12 months, on and off, in the smaller of the companies,
but only paid a small number of visits to the other company.
hey were especially interested in the impact of structure and
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the organisation's guiding values, but other issues concerned
with societal values, individual and group self-interest, and
batch size were not examined.
The findings:
They found that the two companies used CNC in quite different
ways. The large company had a rigid division of labour around
CNC: the machine operators were in fact "machine minders"; the
setting functLons were carried out by a separate group of shopfloor
workers; and programming-related functions were the preserve of
a specialist programming department.
The smaller company, on the other hand, had a more integrated
and flexible approach: the operators were expected not only to
set up and monitor the machine, but also to prove tapes and in
some cases to program as well. There were also staff programmers,
but these worked in co-operation with the operators and tended
to concentrate on the longer, more complex, jobs.
The researchers believe that the difference in CNC usage reflected
the different nature of the two companies. The smaller is an
informally-managed company with a high level of trust and a
relatively unsophisticated management control system. The large
company is bureaucratically structured, with a tight control
system and a history of fragmentation and specialisation.
Clegg et al argue that the "techno-social logic" of each firm
determined the organisation of work around CNC. By this, they
mean that the organisation's guiding values, which reflect its
history and culture, and its structure are the key factors. These
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determine what sort of structures and relationships will succeed
in each organisation. In the smaller organisation, both its
structure and values would militate against fragmentation of
functions and rigid control, whilst in the larger company they
would favour such arrangements.
Wilkinson (1983)
This study examined CNC usage in a machine tool manufacturing
company. The company is owned by an American corporation but
has a high degree of internal autonomy; however, continuing
losses, which had brought about a large number of redundancies
in previous years, led the parent company to replace the senior
management team, and a new one had just taken over. At the time
of the study, the company employed 550 workers, and had 5 CNC
machines, which were used to produce a variety of parts in small
to medium batches. The study concentrates on the "politics" of
change, but does not examine factors such as plant and batch
size, organisational values, etc.
The findings:
The organisation of work around CNC is highly flexible, though not
uncontentious. On one CNC, the operator performs all the functions
from loading and unloading through to programming. On three of
the machines, the operators carry out some 60% of the programming,
and on the fifth machine, the operator rarely programmes but
often proves the programs. There is also a separate group of
staff programmers.
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The level of shopfloor programming appears to depend to a large
extent upon the preferences of individual operators, whose
programming skills are largely self-taught, as to how much
responsibility for programming they wish to have. However,
shopfloor involvement in programming was supported by supervisors,
foremen and middle management, who saw the system as efficient
and flexible and who sympathised with the desire of operators to
retain and increase their skills.
The staff programmers, on the other hand, believed that they should
program and prove for all the machines. They argued that CNC is
designed to be worked by cheap, semi-skilled, labour. This view
was also shared by the new senior management team, who were
considering further investment in CNC. They wished to see CNC
re-organised so that the programmers did all the programming,
the existing operators became setters who also proved out the
tapes, and the machines would be operated by unskilled or semi-
skilled workers.
Wilkinson argues from this that technical change in this case and
others is a political process in which various individuals and
groups seek to maintain or increase their power. They achieve
this by influencing technical change so that it favours them
rather than others in the organisation. This leads to clashes of
interest not only between managers and workers, but also within
irianagement and within the workforce. He sees technical change
extending over a long period of time, and at each stage in the
change process, a battle taking place over the outcome.
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Shaikeri (1979 and 1980)
These two papers by Shaiken are an attempt to present the American
experience of CNC. They are based largely on secondary sources,
though some interviews with managers and operators also appear
to have been carried out. Shaiken examines the rationale for CNC,
its current effect, and its future consequences. His main
interest is in the effect of economic systems upon technical
change, but he also examines the importance of batch size and
product complexity. However, issues such as organisational
culture, individual values and divisions within management and
workers are not examined.
The findings:
Shaiken argues that:-
i) CNC is part of a management system that centralises
authority over workers and leads to their deskilling;
ii) CNC weakens the individual and collective power of workers;
iii) Management are aware of this and consciously introduce CNC
in such a way that it will deskill workers and reduce their
bargaining power;
iv) This tendency is inevitable in a capitalist, profit-orientated,
society.
Nevertheless, Shaiken does show that CNC can, in some cases, be
used to maintain and increase workers' skill and power, especially
where small batches of complex components are concerned. This
is because, he argues, efficient production requires the active
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participation of skilled workers. He points out from this that
there is nothing inherent in CNC that leads to its being used to
deskill workers. However, he argues that, under a capitalist
system, technology will tend to be used to control and deskill
workers rather than the reverse, and that this can only be overcome
by a fundamental change of the economic system.
CONCLUS ION
In the first section of this chapter, it was argued that CNC was
not a deterministic technology - there are choices as to how
work is organised around it. This view has been borne out by
the five case studies, which have shown that CNC use varies from
organisation to organisation. Despite the fact that these
studies, with the exception of Sorge et al (1983), were based on
limited empirical evidence, they did draw attention to a number
of factors which are important in influencing how CNC is used.
Sorge et al (1983) pointed to the importance of plant and batch
size, but in addition also showed the importance of different
countries' socio-technical traditions. Black (1983) drew attention
to management objectives, especially cost-cutting and control.
Clegg et al (1984) argued that organisational values and structure
were influential. Wilkinson (1983) pointed to the political
nature of the change process. Shaiken (1979 and 1980) drew
attention to the influence of the prevailing economic system.
On the surface, the fact that five studies reach differing
conclusions on what influences CNC usage is confusing.
However, if these studies and their findings are seen in the
light of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4, this
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confusion can be resolved. Rather than considering the findings
from these studies as conflicting and confusing, they can be
seen as partial explanations. Sorge et al are right to point to
societal differences and plant and batch size; Black is right to
point to management objectives; Clegg et al are right to point to
organisational values; Wilkinson is right to point to the political
nature of the change process; and Shaiken is right to draw attention
to the nature of the economic system. However, the drawback of
these studies is that they limit their explanations to a few
factors rather than taking account of the multiplicity of pressures
and restraints that organisations face when adopting new technology.
The conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4 attempts to do
this; it is argued that the change process is influenced by a wide
range of factors, both external and internal to the organisation.
Some of these factors will be more important than others, but
these will vary from organisation to organisation and will also
change over time. The nine case studies presented in the next
four chapters will illustrate this, and show the need for a
conceptual framework that draws attention to the wide range of
organisational and societal factors that influence technical
change.
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PART TWO
PART TWO
INTRODUCTION
The next four chapters will present nine case studies of the
introduction and impact of CNC. Chapters 7 and 8 will deal with
its introduction into small companies; and Chapters 9 and 10
will deal with its introduction into medium-sized and large
companies respectively.
Each case study will be presented, as far as possible, in a
standard format - describing the company, the reasons for intro-
ducing CNC, its impact, and placing particular emphasis on the
decision-making process and the factors which affected this -
so as to allow comparisons to be made.
In order to aid this process, Tables 1 and 2 show, respectively,
the number of sets of visits made to each company and when these
took place; and the main people in each company who were inter-
viewed. It should be noted with regard to Table 1 that the
duration of a set of visits is not necessarily an indication of
the number of people interviewed. This is because in some com-
panies, it was possible to interview 3 or 4 people in one day,
whilst in others, due to availability, this took 2 to 3 weeks.
With regard to Table 2, this only covers the main people inter-
viewed and not the numerous other people in each company, such as
receptionists, secretaries, labourers, managers, with whom more
informal conversations took place. Nor does it cover interviews
with those outside of the company who were involved with CNC
introduction. This is partly because the latter did not neces-
sarily take place at the same time as company visits, and partly
because, in a number of cases, the people in question had been
involved with more than one of the companies.
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Tables 1 and 2 should, hopefully, give an overview of when visits
to each company took place and who was interviewed.
However, in the next four chapters, the companies will be presented
as individual cases, with particular aspects highlighted, and
comparisons between them will be made in Chapter 11 after all the
studies have been presented.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SMALL COMPANIES PRODUCING SMALL BATCHES
CASE STUDY ONE
The Company
The company is a small, family-owned business established in 1891.
It mainly manufactures high-quality components for the aerospace
and nuclear power industries, though in the last few years it
had become involved in more general sub-contract machining work.
The company was controlled by two members of the owning family,
who were joint Managing Directors; however, the day-to-day running
of the company was in the hands of the Technical Director and the
Works Director, who were not family members. The company had been
profitable up to 1981, but since then had "struggled to break even".
This had led to a significant fall in the numbers employed: in 1979
approximately 100 people were employed at the company, but by 1983
thishad fallen to below 50, due to the collapse of their main markets.
At the time of the first set of visits, 25 people were directly
involved in production and the rest were either members of staff
or ancillary shopfloor workers such as maintenance fitters or
labourers. The two main production departments were fabrication,
employing 12 people, and machining, also employing 12 people.
The machine shop was established in 1970 as a support function
to the fabrication department which, until recently, was seen
as the main profit generator for the company. However, with the
shortage of work, the machine shop had become more important in
terms of company profitability than the fabrication department.
This was because the machine shop had lost less work than the
fabrication department, and it had also been more successful in
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diversifying into new markets. The company had bought four CNC
machines in the last 10 years. The first was a lathe bought for
£60,000 in 1975. The second was also a lathe, bought for £40,000
in 1980, and in the same year the company bought a machining
centre for £70,000. The last was a second-hand CNC lathe purchased
for £12,000 in 1984.
The machines were used, in the main, to produce complex components
in small batches ranging from 10 to 50, though occasionally
larger batches of simpler components were also manufactured.
On the lathes, the machining times ranged from a few minutes to
over an hour, though the average was around 30 minutes. On the
machining centre, the cycle times were longer and could range from
an hour to half a day, though the average was around 14 hours.
The set-up times for the lathes ranged from 2 to 3 hours if the
job had been done before, to an entire day if a new tape needed
proving. On the machining centre, the respective times ranged
from half a day to 2 to 3 days. The time taken to write programs
was longer on the machining centre, taking one to two days as
averse to 3 to 4 hours for the lathes. In total, the company
had over 200 different programs for the CNCs, of which one third
were for the machining centre.
The visits to the company commenced in September 1983 and the
last visit was made in August 1984. Initial contact was made
with the Technical Director.
Relations between management and workers and within the company
in general were relatively friendly and informal; although the
constant trickle of redundancies obviously caused tension, overall
the atmosphere was one of informal friendliness and co-operation.
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As the Works Director put it:
This is not a company where you can have rigidly-defined
areas of responsibility. It's too small and too diverse
for that, so you've just got to muck in where it's needed.
The company was unionised, though not all workers were in a union,
but the unions only seemed active on the issue of pay, and in
the last few years they appeared to have accepted low wage rises
because of the company's lack of work. For the same reasons, they
had not opposed redundancies.
The orcanisation of work prior to CNC
Prior to the introduction of CNC, the machine shop was equipped
with some 30 or so conventional machines, and 5 or 6 automatic
machines. The former were used for small batches of complex
components and the latter for longer batches of simpler components.
The conventional machines were operated by skilled machinists
and the automatic machines, which were set up by a skilled setter,
were operated by semi- or unskilled labour. The machine shop
was controlled by a foreman who was directly responsible to the
Works Director. The Technical Director's input was through the
foreman and involved advice on machining methods and jig and
fixture design. All machinists were on an output bonus system,
but this was not extended to the setter-operators on CNC.
however, then as now, the emphasis was on quality rather than
quantity.
The reasons for introducinq CNC
At the time of the first set of visits, the company had 3 CNCs.
The first of these, a lathe, was bought in 1975. There were three
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reasons why the machine was bought:-
1) The Technical Director, who was responsible for the purchase
of new equipment, had worked with NC at his previous company
and believed that "CNC is the future for us".
ii) He believed that CNC would solve the problem of the shortage
and high cost of skilled labour. In 1975, 4 skilled turners
were retiring from the company and he anticipated that one
CNC machine would replace them all.
iii) The final reason was that there was a prospect of a large
contract which could be machined on the CNC and which would
pay for the cost of the machine.
Therefore, the machine was bought, though the large contract
failed to materialise.
The second and third CNCs were both bought in 1980. CNC 2, a
small lathe, was bought because, as the Technical Director stated:
we made a very good profit in 1980 and we didn't
want to pay tax on it. Therefore, we bought the CNC;
we didn't need it there and then, but we thought it
would fill a gap in our machining capacity.
CNC 3, a machining centre, was bought to overcome difficulties
that were being experienced in machining some very complex
components. In 1979, the company had bought a large, conventional
milling machine in order to expand their capacity and thereby
gain more orders. However, the machine could not cope with all
the new products, and in order to manufacture, and retain, the
new work, they purchased the machining centre.
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The organisation of work around CNC
With regard to CNC 1, it had been the intention of the Technical
Director, who was responsible for bringing it into production,
that a setter-operator who would prove, and possibly even programme,
would be employed. However, for the first four years that they
had the machine, they could not find such a person. Therefore,
the Technical Director took on the responsibility for writing
and proving the programs and sometimes also for setting up the
machine. The machine was operated by a succession of 5 or 6
machinists who were either fired or left. Then in 1979, a
machinist was hired who eventually took over responsibility for
both progranTning and operating the machine.
With regard to CNCs 2 and 3, the machinist on CNC 1 eventually
became the programmer for these machines as well, and a separate
setter-operator was employed to work CNC 3, whilst CNC 2 was
operated either by the programmer or by an unskilled female
operator who was employed on other duties as well. Consequently,
the setter-operator from CNC 1 became an almost full-time program-
mer and a new setter-operator was put on CNC 1.
The problems with CNC
The main problem with CNC 1 appears to have been training and
retaining operators. Between 1975 and 1979, some 5 or 6 operators
worked the machine and all were either fired or left, apart from
one apprentice who was tried for 6 weeks and then sent back to
work conventional machines. The main reason for this situation
appears to have been the expectations and attitudes of the
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Technical Director rather than the quality of operator. He
believed, and to an extent still did at the time of the study,
that once a program was written, everything else - proving,
setting up, operating - was straightforward. He also believed
that learning how to operate the CNC was relatively easy. The
following comments by the programmer and the foreman respectively
illustrate these points : -
I came as an operator. [The Technical Director] spent
some time with me but I really had to learn myself
I didn't get any training really. He's not a good
teacher. He thinks some things are so obvious that he
shouldn't even have to tell you them.
One of the main difficulties was that [the Technical
Director] was acting as programmer and setter and he's
not the best of teachers. He expects operators to pick
things up the first time rather than taking it slowly,
step by step. He always wants to get onto the next
job - he'll do things very fast, tell the bloke everything
is fine and then go away. The blokes on the machine
just didn't know what was happening. If a problem
arose on the CNC, [the Technical Director] would say,
'It was okay when I left it, what's the operator done
wrong?'
A related reason for the problems was that the CNC and the
Technical Director were on separate sites, some 5 - 10 minutes
from each other (although this changed in 1982 when the machines
were moved to the same site as the Technical Director).
Therefore, if a problem occurred, the Technical Director had to
be telephoned and usually had to go to the other site. Given
that this was not always easy or convenient, long delays could
occur which were frustrating for all concerned.
Eventually, in 1979, an operator with previous NC, though not CNC,
experience was hired. He virtually taught himself to operate
the machine, set it up, and prove tapes. Within a short space
of time, he began to programme the machine as well.
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A further problem was that the machine shop foreman never became
involved with the CNC. This was because (a) there was no-one to
teach him about the machine, and (b) he saw it as a problem area
and wished to avoid it.
When the second CNC was bought, the operator-programmer on CNC 1
was sent on a setting course for it, and the Technical Director
went on a programming course. However, the operator-programmer
for CNC 1 became responsible for programming and setting CNC 2,
and the Technical Director had little direct involvement in it.
This was for two reasons:-
i) The Technical Director found programming time-consuming
and irksome, and was only too glad to hand it over to
someone else.
ii) A strong bond of friendship had grown up between him and
the programmer, and he trusted him to be able to programme
CNC 2 as well as he programmed CNC 1.
The only problem that had arisen with CNC 2 was that it was
under-utilised; it could work for a few days and then stand idle
for a few weeks. This was why there was no permanent operator
for it. It tended to be used for medium batches, 100 - 200,
of simple components and could be operated by a semi/unskilled
machinist. For small batches, the operator-programmer from
CNC 1 operated it.
When CNC 3 was purchased, the Technical Director once again went
on a programming course and then, once again, handed over the
programming of it to the existing programmer. A separate setter-
operator was employed because the machine was in use full-time
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producing complex components. As far as CNC 3 was concerned,
there appeared to be two main problems. The first was that the
aachine was highly unreliable; it often suffered either mechanical
or electrical failure. The second problem was that the setter-
operator on the machine was also considered unreliable, and in
part was blamed for the problems of the machine. However, for
three reasons, this seemed somewhat unfair:-
i) His training was inadequate. He received 2 weeks' training
from the Technical Director, who, though he had been on a
course for the machine, was perhaps not the best person
to carry out training. The rest of his training was carried
out by the programmer, who himself had received no training.
Therefore, overall, the setter-operator's training for the
machine left a lot to be desired.
ii) CNC 3 was a far more complex machine to operate than any
of the other CNCs, and this obviously contributed to the
problems that arose.
iii)It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an operator
error and an electronic fault. On these occasions, it
appeared that there was a tendency to blame the operator
rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt.
Nevertheless, the machine had become crucial to the company in
that it was the only one capable of machining some of the complex
products they made, and, therefore, any breakdown of the machine
could be costly.
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The situation at the first set of visits
The first visits began in September 1983, and at that time, the
company had 3 CNC machines. CNC 1 was operating full-time on a
one-shift system, and the company was very pleased with its
performance and that of the setter-operator. CNC 2, on the other
hand, worked infrequently, though when it did, there were few
complaints. However, CNC 3 and its setter-operator were still
seen as a problem area.
There were also other problems. The first concerned the lines of
authority and responsibility within the company. Before CNC, the
machine shop was the responsibility of the foreman, who reported
to the Works Director. Theoretically, this was still the case;
however, in practice, because the foreman knew very little about
CNC, the CNC machines formed a separate section where the program-
mer acted as an unofficial supervisor and was responsible to the
Technical Director. Therefore, the lines of authority and respon-
sibility for CNC were somewhat confused.
The second problem related to the division of functions between
the programmer and the setter-operators. The Technical Director
decided that the setter-operators should do no programming or
proving of programs, and that these functions should be left to
the person who had originally been employed as operator on CNC 1.
This was because he did not believe that most machinists were
capable of carrying out these functions, and because if they did,
they might, like the programmer, have to be paid more money.
However, in practice, the split of functions could vary on a
day-to-day basis depending upon the availability of the programmer.
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This was not only because he could be occupied operating on
CNC 2 or proving on another machine, but also because sometimes
CNC 1 or CNC 3 could be operated on two shifts, and in that case
he acted as the setter-operator on one shift.
This had brought about situations where the setter-operators had
been left to prove out new programs and even, in the case of
CNC 1, to write them. Nevertheless, this was an unacknowledged
part of their job, and the programmer insisted that it was his
responsibility to programme and prove on al]. occasions. He argued
this for two reasons:-
i) The programmer was paid more and had a higher status because
he was the sole programmer/prover, even though he was still
classed as a shopfloor employee. He felt that if some of
these functions were given to setter-operators, his
indispensability" would be reduced and so might his pay
and status. He also enjoyed programming and proving. As
he said himself:-
if they [setter-operators] programmed or even
proved out, there would not be enough for me to do
doing difficult programming jobs is a challenge,
it makes the job better - more interesting.
ii) By proving as well as programming, he was also able to learn
the best method to use for each job. This was because,
particularly with complex components, there is usually
more than one method of machining components. When proving
out a program, it is possible to learn what works and what
does not work by experimenting with different methods.
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The setter-operators used similar arguments in support of their
demand to prove and occasionally programme. These were that it
would make their jobs more interesting and also, as they were
on the machines all the time, they knew the best methods to use.
In addition, they pointed out that it was a waste of money for
them to do nothing while the programmer was proving out a tape
on their machine.
The situation at the second set of visits
The second set of visits began in June 1984. The main change
was that another CNC had been bought. It was the same model of
ifiachine and of a similar age to CNC 1. It was bought, in the
words of the Technical Director, because "it was too good a
bargain to miss". It was being sold second-hand for £12,000,
and whilst the company was not seeking another CNC lathe, it was
felt that the price made it attractive and, in any case, it could
be used to relieve the workload on CNC 1, though in the short run
at least there was not enough work to keep it occupied full-time.
It had been used for only one spell of three weeks, but the
intention was that it would have its own setter-operator who, when
not working CNC, would operate conventional machines.
However, on the occasion that the machine had been used so far,
it had not been possible to give the setter-operator designate
much training on the machine, and it appeared that training would
once again be a problem.
The programmer was responsible for training and he was aware that
it was a problem; as he put it himself:-
196
The trouble is they [management] won't let me train him.
They wouldn't give me the time, so he's not had a lot
of training. He can operate okay, but as far as setting
up is concerned, he's had no training.
The problem of not providing time for training appeared to reflect
the uncertainty of the Technical Director and the Works Director
as to how CNC would develop within the company. By the second
visits, it was clear that they saw CNC as the key to the company's
future, but they were not sure how it should be used. On the
one hand, they had talked of creating a separate CNC section with
a supervisor/programmer, one or more setters and operators, who
would mainly load and unload for each machine. On the other hand,
they had also talked of training people to work as both setter-
operators on CNC and skilled machinists on conventional machines.
Their main problem appeared to be that the uncertainty caused by
the continuing decline in their market, which had brought further
redundancies since the first set of visits, made forward planning
difficult. As the Works Director said:-
There is no forward look at anything . . . because we
are too busy dealing with other things - putting our
fingers in the dyke and dealing with day-to-day problems
as they come up.
This inability to plan ahead was reflected in other aspects of
CNC. The Technical Director suggested to the Board of Directors
that a second CNC machining centre be bought. This was vetoed by
the Works Director, who argued that until the problems - now
perceived to imply the setter-operator - of the first machining
centre had been resolved, they should not buy another. Therefore,
a new CNC was not bought but neither had there been an attempt to
replace or re-train the setter-operator on the existing machining
centre.
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At the end of the second, and last, series of visits, the company
were convinced that CNC was their future, but were not sure - after
9 years of CNC experience - how to obtain the best results from it.
Conclusion
A number of points arise from this case study. The first point is
that after 9 years of CNC experience, the company was still not
sure what form of CNC organisation it wanted. This was due to
two factors: firstly, that the company's management tended to react
to events and deal with them on a piecemeal basis rather than
planning for the future; secondly, that the uncertainty of their
future order book made planning very difficult in any case.
The second point to note is that CNC development had, by and large,
been the province of one person: the Technical Director. He had
been responsible for the machines that were purchased and how they
had. been used. Yet he appeared to have evaded any real criticism
from his fellow directors for the many problems that had arisen.
This appears to be a prime example of how a senior manager,
because of his ability to control the flow of information to his
colleagues, managed to shift the blame for problems to those with
less influence than himself.
The third point is that the formal organisation of the machine
shop and the actual organisation of it were quite different.
The most glaring example of this was the role of the foreman.
Formally, he controlled the entire machine shop and was responsible
to the Works Director. Informally, the main element of the machine
shop, the CNC section, was controlled by the programmer, who,
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whilst formally responsible to the foreman, was actually responsible
to the Technical Director.
The last point to note is the performance of the CNCs in technical,
financial and human terms.
In technical terms, only CNC 3 could be said to be deficient in
that it was mechanically and electronically unreliable. Whether
or not this could have been avoided is uncertain, though in none
of the cases of CNC purchase were there any extensive investigations
into the machines' performance and reliability. In the main, the
ifiachines were observed at exhibitions and bought after discussion
with the machine suppliers.
In financial terms, there were doubts about the machines: CNC 1
in its first four years with the company had not been a very
productive machine, though it had been since 1979; CNC 2 had only
worked infrequently; CNC 3 was often broken down; and it was not
envisaged that CNC 4 would, in the near future, work full-time.
The question is not whether CNC was the appropriate technology
for the company, as - given the company's products - it obviously
was, but whether or not the company had received value for money.
Whilst this cannot be answered definitively without a financial
examination of the company's accounts, it is possible to say that
the financial returns could and should have been better.
In human terms, in terms of the quality of jobs that had been
provided, the results were mixed. The programmer, on his own
admission, had a very challenging and interesting job. The
setter-operator on CNC 1 could also claim to have an interesting
and varied job, but believed that this would be enhanced if he
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carried out more proving and programming, though this would in
turn affect the programmer's job. The woman who occasionally
operated CNC 2 found the job of loading and unloading the CNC
boring, but because she only did it for short periods, she did
not appear to mind this. The setter-operator on CNC 3 should have
had a very interesting job, because of the complexity of the
machine. However, the fact that the machine was unreliable and
that he was often blamed for this made his job frustrating and
unsatisfying. The quality of the operator's job on CNC 4 would
depend on whether that person was trained to set the machine and
sort out problems, or was merely expected to load and unload it.
In terms of the foreman's job, the advent of CNC had obviously
affected it for the worse, in that it had resulted in his status
and authority being undermined. It had also led to some redun-
dancies, because work had been switched from conventional machines
to the CNCs. Despite all this, the attitude of people in the
company towards CNC was very positive; the main reason for this
appeared to be that they considered CNC to be "the future", and
that if they dId not adopt it as a company, they would go out
of business.
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CASE STUDY TWO
The Company
The company was established in 1705 and is involved in making
cutting tools for the mining industry - 80% of its production
s bought by the National Coal Board. Up to 1981, it was a
family-owned company, but then it, and a subsidiary making a
complementary range of products, were sold to an investment
trust based in the South of England.
Before the sale, the company had been profitable, and this
continued up to 1983, when there was a sharp decline in their
market. This resulted in the workforce being reduced from 80
to 60, which was the number employed when the first set of
visits began. The 60 were split evenly between office and
shopfloor. The main shopfloor departments were welding, where
8 people were employed, and the machine shop, which employed 12.
The other shopfloor workers performed various ancillary tasks.
The company was controlled by 3 directors, who were also the
directors of the subsidiary. The day-to-day control of production
was in the hands of the Works Director, who had been with the
company for 10 years. Beneath him was a Works Manager, who
was assisted in the machine shop by a supervisor who was also
responsible for setting up a number of automatic machines.
The company had one CNC lathe which it purchased for £20,000 in
March 1983. It also had two NC drilling machines which had
been bought second-hand in 1980. The CNC was bought, and
originally used, to produce a small range of components which
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were produced in batches of 25 and 50. Production time for each
component was 14 hours, but this was because they were large
rather than particularly complex. The programming time for these
jobs was 3 to 4 hours, and proving and setting up the machine
took 1 to 2 hours. However, in 1984, the machine also began to
be used to produce longer runs of simpler components. The total
number of programs produced for the machine was 12.
The first visit to the company was in January 1984 and the last
was in September 1984. Initial contact was made with the Works
Director. Management-worker relations within the company were
friendly, though they appeared to have been soured somewhat by
the redundancies. Most shopfloor workers were in a trade union,
but the union was not active either over pay or redundancies.
The organisation of work prior to CNC
Before the CNC was introduced, there were some 20 people employed
in the machine shop. These were split into those who operated
automatic or semi-automatic machines, and those who worked
conventional machines. The latter were more skilled than the
former, but the company's management considered their workforce,
in general, to be low-skilled. This appeared to be due to the
simple nature of the products made and the fact that operators
tended to be allocated to the same machines and the same narrow
range of products all the time.
The company operated a piecework bonus system which was extended
to the CNC machine when it was installed. Supervision was provided
partly by the setter on the automatic machines, but mainly by
the Works Manager. The Works Director also spent a significant
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amount of time on the shopfloor, and the general impression was
one of close supervision.
The two NC drilling machines were infrequently used, and when
they were, the Works Manager would operate them.
The reasons for introducing CNC
The main person responsible for the purchase of the CNC machine
was the Works Director. He was responsible for all equipment
purchases, but, according to his colleagues, he tended to buy
cheap, second-hand machines which, in most cases, proved not to
be good buys.
His reasons for buying CNC were that:-
i) He believed that CNC was the future technology for the
industry and that the company would be left behind if
they did not, as he put it, "jump on the CNC bandwagon".
ii) Their main customer, the National Coal Board, had tightened
up its quality control procedures and he believed that the
company r s existing machines and machinists were not good
enough to produce the quality required consistently.
iii) He was offered a CNC lathe at £20,000, some 50% of its
normal price. This was because it was an exhibition model.
It was this offer of a "cheap" machine that finally made
the company buy a CNC though in fact they had been looking
for one for some time.
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The orcanisation of work around CNC
The programming of the CNC was done by a work study engineer who
was also responsible for programming the NC machines. However,
his main job was work study, and programming was not seen as
constituting the major part of his work. The machine was worked
on a one-shift system by two setter-operators who, in theory,
alternated between operating the CNC lathe and the NC drilling
machines. As well as setting and operating the machine, they
also, in conjunction with the programmer, proved out new programs.
The problems with CNC
The main problem was getting the CNC into full production.
This was for three reasons:-
i) The machine was delivered in March 1983 but it was not
until three months later that the supplier's staff arrived
to install the machine and give training. (Given the
importance the company attached to CNC, this delay seems
strange).
ii) Lack of training for the programmer: the company, in
anticipation of buying a CNC, had hired a CNC setter-
operator in January 1983. He was hired to work the NC
machines and told he would be put on CNC when one was
bought. However, when the machine arrived in March, the
company hired another setter-operator. These two employees
were supposed to alternate between the CNC and the NC5,
but in practice the second CNC setter-operator spent most
time on the machine. This appeared to be because his
204
colleague's work had not impressed the Works Director or
the Works Manager.
Therefore, the company had ensured that the skills were
available to set up and operate the machine. However, it
was less successful in ensuring that the programming skills
were available. The work study engineer received two days'
training in programming from the supplier's training staff
and, not surprisingly, he found this inadequate:-
The [supplier's] engineer just stood at a
blackboard and taught me. It was all new to
me, I didn't realise what was happening. It
took 8 months before it started to slip into
place.
His experience in programming the NC machines proved of
little help because, as he said:-
You can't compare the NCs to the CNC. The NC
drillers are child's play compared with the CNC.
Therefore, the production of programs proved problematic
and slowed down the introduction process. In fact, for
some months, he had to rely on the programming knowledge of
the setter-operators, which they had gained prior to coming
to the company. As one of them commented:-
When we [the two setter-operators] first started
with the CNC, the programmer was completely
fresh to all this type of work. So we had to
more or less show him how to programme - he
admitted we knew more than he did. He made
mistakes like I did when I first started to
programme and we spent a lot of time putting
them right . .
The main reason for the lack of training for the programmer
was that the Works Director assumed that programming
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would not be a problem. He thought that writing tapes
for CNC was the same as for the NC drilling machines.
Indeed, as he admitted himself, he was somewhat naive
about CNC and had believed that tapes were simple to
produce and could be put straight into the CNC, and that
it would start producing straight away.
tli) There was a lack of work for the CNC. It was bought unde1
the assumption that it would produce a range of 3 or 4
components, all basically the same, and that CNC would
allow the company to attract new orders which would keep
it occupied for the rest of the time. However, when they
bought the machine, their market went into decline, and
there was less "old" work and certainly no new work.
They could have switched more work from the conventional
machines, but it was felt that this might have caused
problems. As the Works Manager said:-
CNC was new to us and we've had a bit of a
struggle adapting to it, and with work being
short as well, that's made it a bit more
awkward because Ethe conventional operators]
have wanted work on their machines rather than
CNC, so we've had to keep them happy and that's
meant work's been short on the CNC.
refore, for a variety of reasons, the process of introducing
CNC was slow and, either because of lack of work or problems
the programs, the machine was idle as often as it was
ng.
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he situation at the first set of visits
When the first set of visits began in January 1984, the management
of the company felt that the early problems that had slowed down
the introduction of CNC had been overcome - apart, that is, from
lack of work. The programmer, for his part, felt that the lack
of work had allowed him the time he needed to learn CNC and was
relatively confident with it. However, four problems connected
with the setter-operators were beginning to emerge:-
i) The first setter-operator was.becoming increasingly frustrated
that he spent so little time on the CNC, and that even when
he was on it, he tended only to load and unload it because
it had already been set up by the other setter-operator.
ii) The second setter-operator was also unhappy. When he first
started at the company, he found himself closely involved
in programming and proving. However, as time went on and
the programmer became more proficient and new programs
became fewer, he spent more time simply operating the CNC.
He had enjoyed being involved in programming, but found
operating boring.
1]1) They were both unhappy about their pay. When they were
working the CNC, they were paid according to the same
bonus system as everyone else. However, the CNC program
rather than the operator controls the rate of production.
Under the standard bonus system, this would have prevented
them from earning any bonus. To overcome this, their
production targets were "fixed" to allow them to earn £15
per week bonus. To an extent, this was acceptable whilst
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the machine was working, but if, as often happened, it
was not, then the operators lost their bonus. In addition,
on the conventional machines, some operators, though by no
means all, could earn £30 bonus. This upset the setter-
operators, who felt that they should be paid no less than
the highest-paid conventional operator.
iv) The quality of work from the CNC was decreasing. One of
the main selling points for CNC is its repeatability: its
consistent quality; yet the machine was producing components
that did vary. This appeared to be the fault of the second
setter-operator, who was not inspecting his work properly.
Therefore, at the time of the first set of visits, there were
still problems with the organisation of work around CNC.
The situation at the second set of visits
When the second set of visits began in August 1984, the company's
financial position had drastically deteriorated owing to the
dispute within the coal mining industry, which had then been
runiiinq for six months. As an example, the company should have
had a monthly output of £80,000; in July 1984, it had been
14,O00 - and half of that had been cancelled. The situation was
the same for the company's subsidiary. The company's owners
decided to take drastic action; they proposed to amalgamate the
company and its subsidiary on one site. They had also made half
the workforce from the combined companies redundant, including
the Works Director.
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However, other than the Works Director, all the staff who had
previously been associated with CNC were retained. Nevertheless,
the changes did have an impact upon CNC, the main change being
that the majority of turning work was being done on CNC.
This was because all except one of the conventional turners had
been made redundant. The CNC was therefore producing a different
type of work: simple components in batches of 250 to 500.
This change appeared to have eliminated one problem, but to have
exacerbated others. The problem of the need to keep the conven-
tional operators "happy" by keeping work on their machines had
been eliminated, as there was now only one such operator. The
problems which had been exacerbated were related to the nature of
the setter-operators' jobs and the quality of work.
When the first visits were made, there was already evidence that
the setter-operators had become dissatisfied with their job.
This had now intensified, for four reasons:-
i) They were now producing larger batches of simpler components,
with shorter cycle times, which they found boring, monotonous
and physically more demanding.
ii) All the programs for the jobs they were doing had been
proved - they had not required a new program for some
3 - 4 months - and therefore the satisfaction to be gained
from helping with programming was gone. In addition,
the simpler jobs proved less of a problem to programme in
any case and the programmer did not need to call upon the
advice of the setter-operators.
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iii)They were still dissatisfied with their pay.
iv) The general uncertainty regarding the company's future also
added to their general feeling of dissatisfaction.
This dissatisfaction had two consequences. Firstly, the first CNC
setter-operator was actively seeking another job. The second
setter-operator was not looking for another job, mainly because
the new site that the company was movinq to was appreciably
nearer his home and therefore suited his travel arrangements
better.
The second consequence of their dissatisfaction was that the
quality of work from the CNC continued to decline. The setter-
opperators, mainly the second one who worked the machine most
often, were not checking their work properly, or even in some
cases checking it at all. They said they were not paid to check
their work, and that in any case, the machine should produce
the work accurately without the need for frequent checks.
There was one final problem which had arisen since the first
visit: the CNC machine had broken down, and had had to be
repaired at a cost of £1,000. The breakdown was caused by the
fact that the original components that the machine was bought
to manufacture, and still manufactured, were too heavy for the
machine. This was a problem which, apparently, would re-occur
as long as the machine was used to manufacture this type of
work.
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anclus ion
Inumber of points arise from this case study. The first is that
the decisions to buy CNC and how to use it were, by and large,
taken by one person: the Works Director. He was given a free
hand by his fellow directors with regard to machine purchase
and the organisation of work around CNC.
he second point to note is the difference between the formal and
actual organisation of work, especially the role of the programmer.
In theory, the setter-operators were responsible to the Works
Menager, who had received some CNC training, but in practice
they were responsible to the programmer. Nevertheless, this had
not always been the case. Originally, the setter-operators,
because of their greater knowledge of programming, had more
influence over the programmer's work than he had over theirs.
However, as the programmer became more experienced, he took on
!nore of the responsibility for programming and proving, and the
setter-operators became less involved in this aspect of CNC.
This resulted in the programmer taking the main responsibility
for CNC.
The final point relates to the performance of the machine in
technical, financial and human terms.
In technical terms, it may be that the wrong machine was bought.
Certainly, the type of components the machine was originally
bought to produce appeared unsuited to it in that they were too
heavy.
Financially, the machine, when there was work for it, appeared
to be justified by the speed with which it produced work, but
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if it continued to break down and to be expensive to repair,
then repair costs would swallow up the financial benefits.
In terms of the quality of jobs that were produced, the results
were mixed. The programmer, now that he had gained experience
and confidence, enjoyed programming, but he was only called upon
infrequently to do so, and his occupation was still work study.
The setter-operators did not enjoy their jobs and were dissatisfied.
The first setter-operator, who spent most time working the NC
drilling machines, found his job monotonous and boring. The
second setter-operator had found that his reduced involvement in
programming and proving, coupled with the lack of variety in
the work he did, had also made his job boring and tedious.
There was evidence in both cases that this had affected their
performance in terms of the quality of their work.
In terms of the Works Manager's job, CNC appeared to have made
few differences. Some of the problems that he would deal with
on conventional machines were dealt with by the programmer, but,
especially since the departure of the Works Director, the Works
Manager had a very heavy workload and was happy to see some of
his normal duties done by others in any case.
As a final comment, it must be pointed out that, in this company,
CNC introduction and use had been overshadowed by the company's
financial situation. If the company had had a full order book,
then the programmer would have had less time to devote to pro-
ramining, which would have necessitated greater involvement by
the setter-operators; however, that was not the case.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SMALL COMPANIES PRODUCING LARGE BATCHES
CASE STUDY THREE
The Company
This is a small privately-owned company established in 1967 by
the present owner, who is also the Managing Director. The
company is exclusively involved in high-quality sub-contract
machining activities for a wide variety of customers and industries.
Employment at the company fluctuated between 20 and 30 people,
all but four of whom were supervisory or shopfloor employees.
The owner was the sole working director, and he took respons-
ibility for the day-to-day control of production. He was assisted
in the office by a production engineer/programmer, and on the
shopfloor by two supervisors, one of whom was responsible for
CNC machines and the other for conventional machines. The rest
of the workforce, excluding two or three ancillary workers, were
employed as machinists and operated either conventional or CNC
machines. At the time of the first visit, there were 14 CNC
machinists and approximately 5 conventional ones. The former
operated 9 CNC machines, some on two shifts, which were bought
for some £600,000 between 1978 and 1982.
The company was profitable and, according to the Managing Director,
had weathered the recession better than their competitors; he
attributed this to the acquisition of CNC.
Seven of the CNC machines were lathes and two were machining
centres. They were used to produce a wide variety of high-quality
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components in batches ranging from 50 to 2000, though the norm
was around 300. Machining times on the lathes varied between
two and ten minutes, and on the machining centres from 30 minutes
to two hours. The set-up times for the lathes ranged from one
to three hours and on the machining centres from one to three
days. These times could be doubled or trebled when a new program
had to be proved. The time to write programs for the lathes was
two to three hours, and for the machining centres it was two to
three days. The company had some 2,000 different programs, 90%
of which were for the lathes, which were continually being added
to.
The visits to the company commenced in December 1982 and finished
in August 1984, and the initial contact was with the Managing
Director. Management-worker relations, which in this instance
meant the relationship between the Managing Director and everyone
else, were highly hostile. The main reason for this appeared to
be the Managing Director's authoritarian, not to say bullying,
style of management. Consequently, there was a high labour
turnover, due to people either leaving or being sacked. Indeed,
of the 9 CNC machinists spoken to on the first set of visits,
only one was still working at the company when the final visit
took place, and many more - one person put the figure at 20 -
had come and gone in this period. This led one CNC machinist to
remark:
I don't think of this place as a factory, more as a
social centre - you're always meeting somebody new.
The company was not unionised when first visited, but attempts
were later made by the workers to join a union. The result of
this was that those actively involved in the union either were
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sacked, made "redundant", or found life so unpleasant that they
left of their own volition.
The orcianisation of work orior to CNC
Before the introduction of CNC, the machine shop was equipped with
a variety of conventional, automatic and semi-automatic machines.
In the main, the level of skill was high; this reflected the need
for workers who could cope with a high variety of complex work.
The company did not operate a bonus system then, and still did
not at the time of the study. There were two supervisors on the
shopfloor and also a Works Manager, who was responsible for
day-to-day production. At this time, the Managing Director spent
very little of his time involved in the control of production.
According to employees there at the time, the company was a
reasonably friendly one to work for.
The reasons for introducing CNC
The Managing Director first began to consider buying CNC in 1976.
This was for two reasons:-
1) The company's market was shrinking and competition was
increasing; if the company was to survive, it needed to
become more competitive by cutting its costs.
i-i) He believed that CNC was not only more productive but would
also allow greater control of labour and reduce the need
for skilled workers, and thus reduce wage costs.
As the Managing Director put it:-
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My main emphasis in developing CNC is to try to become
independent of the need for skilled shopfloor workers
who have control over output and quality and who use
this to bargain over wages.
These were the reasons why the company bought its first CNC in
1978, and then went on to buy another 8 between then and 1982.
The organisation of work around CNC
The Managing Director decided that his production engineer would
be responsible for writing and proving out programs. Setter-
operators were to be employed to load and unload the machines and
to set them up, but they were not to have any involvement in
proving or programming. A supervisor, with CNC experience, was
appointed to look after the CNC section and to deal with problems.
However, the Managing Director assumed that programs would be
right the first time, and that there would be few problems. He
also assumed that, once the machines were set up, all the setter-
operators would have to do would be to load and unload, and that
the speed of the machine and, therefore, their pace of work would
be controlled by the program. As will be described in the next
section, this view was somewhat naive; many problems arose and
the setter-operators became involved not only in proving tapes
but also, in some cases, in actually writing programs.
The problems with CNC
There were two major problems:-
i) Management-worker relations rapidly worsened, and labour
turnover increased. This appeared to be because the
Managing Director sacked his Works Manager and took over
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his responsibilities for production. He felt that in order
to get the best out of CNC, he needed to take personal
control over its introduction and use. However, his constant
presence on the shopfloor, as one machinist said:
• • . puts excessive pressure on shopfloor workers.
People are afraid of him. When he's down on the
shopfloor they do literally become apprehensive
and afraid . • . If he changed his attitude he'd
get a lot more out of his men; he'd get them
willing to work rather than working because they
were afraid of him.
He was quite ready, as one person put it, "to sack you at
the drop of a hat if your face doesn't fit". There was
also, not surprisingly, a high incidence of workers leaving
of their own accord.
ii) The organisation of work proved far more problematic than
the Managing Director had anticipated. It had been his
original intention, as mentioned earlier, that the company's
production engineer would be responsible for writing and
proving programs, and that each machine would have a setter-
operator, who would be responsible for setting up the CNC
and operating it, but not for any programming or proving
functions. However, this did not come about, for the
following reasons : -
a) The programmer (production engineer) had to deal with
far more work than he could cope with and this led to
programming errors. In any case, it is very unusual
for tapes to be correct first time, and they nearly
always need proving on the machine. Because of his
workload, proving, which on complex tapes could be very
time-consuming, tended to be left to the operators.
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b) Part of the programmer's problem was the number and
variety of machines: there were nine machines, which
between them had five different types of control language.
This reduced the programmer's chance of becoming proficient
in any one language.
c) The programmer lacked a machinist's background, and
because of this, had to seek advice from operators
regarding the machining of more complex components.
This lack of experience also led to simple, but costly,
programming errors.
d) The working hours of the programmer did not coincide
with those of the operators, who worked a combination of
shifts, overtime and weekend working. Therefore, there
was a considerable part of the working week when the
operators were left to their own devices to sort out
problems.
e) The pressure of work, and the Managing Director's
general attitude, caused programmers to leave: at the
time of the first visit, the company had its third in
four years. This had prevented any one programmer
remaining long enough to become fully conversant with
programming.
The result of this was that a series of ad hoc arrangements grew
up. Sometimes, the programmer would prove a tape, but mostly the
setter-operators would do it; mostly the programmer would write
tapes, but sometimes setter-operators would do it, and in
the case of two setter-operators, this became a fairly regular
Occurrence; also, the Managing Director would, very occasionally,
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programme. This caused a greater need for the involvement of
skilled setter-operators. However, the involvement of so many
different people in programming resulted in a confused situation
whereby, when jobs which had existing programs were made again,
the programmer or setter-operator might re-write the program
because they did not like the way it had been done previously.
The Managing Director saw no need to standardise the programming
procedure because, in his view, only the programmer should pro-
grarnme; if anyone else wrote programs, it should, he believed,
be merely an isolated occurrence that should not be repeated.
This confusion was compounded by the high labour turnover; each
new person had their own approach.
This was the situation when visits to the company commenced.
The situation at the first set of visits
The first set of visits began in December 1982. The situation
was very much as described in the previous section, and this
left the Managing Director with two problems:-
i) He had just appointed a new programmer, his third in four
years, but, whilst the person had previous programming
experience, the Managing Director did not believe he had
the ability to do the job.
ii) The new programmer would obviously take time to learn how
to programme all the machines, and in the interim greater
setter-operator involvement would be required. However,
the high rate of labour turnover meant that many of these
people had little CNC experience. They received minimal
aining at the company; if they had no previous CNC experience,
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they were shown how to load and unload the machine, and
were expected to pick the rest up from other machinists.
The Managing Director responded to these problems in two ways:-
i) He decided to buy a computer, costing £10,000, to produce
CNC programs, because:-
a) he hoped that programs could be quickly written and
proved out on the computer, thus eliminating the need
for shopfloor programming and proving.
b) the computer used just one language and then converted
the program into the language of the particular CNC
machine. It also did all the necessary calculations
to produce a tape and, therefore, could be operated,
the owner hoped, by a less skilled person than a
production engineer.
Therefore, he hoped the computer would, in the long term,
reduce the need for shopfloor and office programming skills.
ii) To cope with his problems in the interim, he was trying
to recruit workers with CNC experience, and was also
examining the possibility of sending some of his own
workers on a CNC training course. However, he was worried
that if he upgraded their skills, they would then leave
for better jobs elsewhere.
This was the situation at the end of the first set of visits.
The situation at the second set of visits
The next set of visits commenced in April 1983. There had been
two developments since the previous visits.
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The first was that four setter-operators were attending a
four-week, full-time, CNC training course. This was for two
reasons : -
i) Other attempts to attract skilled CNC workers had not proved
particularly successful. In addition, 3 experienced setter-
operators had left. Neither occurrence was surprising,
given the Managing Director's attitude to his workforce:
he openly told them that if he found someone better than
them, he would fire them and hire the new person.
ii) The training course, including wages, was paid for by the
Manpower Services Commission, and, therefore, there was no
financial cost to the company.
The second development was that the computer to produce CNC
programs had been installed. However this was not proving to be
as useful as the Managing Director had hoped, for three reasons:-
1) There had been problems with the computer's software which
had only recently been resolved.
ii) The computer was much more difficult to operate than he had
anticipated and appeared to be no quicker than manual
programming.
iii) It transpired that the computer was only compatible with
four of the nine CNC machines, and therefore the tapes for
the other five machines were having to be produced manually.
However, the Managing Director attributed this to "teething
trouble".
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The programmer who had been appointed at the time of the first
set of visits was still with the company, but the Managing
Director was actively seeking to replace him and he, for his part,
was intending to leave.
The situation with CNC at the third set of visits
The third set of visits began in November 1983. Since the previous
visits, there had been a number of further developments within
the company.
The first was that most of the workers had joined a trade union.
Given the situation at the company, this hardly came as a surprise.
The Managing Director's response was not surprising either; after
soroe weeks of bitterness, he made the shop steward redundant.
The workers then elected another shop steward who, within a few
weeks, was sacked, as was another union activist.
	 This time,
the workforce threatened to go on strike unless their two colleagues
were reinstated, but the sacked shop steward said that he and the
other person wanted to leave. He commented:-
We were glad to go and he [the Managing Director] was
glad to get rid of us . . . I couldn't have stuck it
much longer anyway; I was dreading going to work.
it was his [the Managing Director's] attitude . . . he
wants to really dominate his workers.
This had happened just before the third set of visits began, and
it appeared to have ended the attempt to unionise the company.
s one of the remaining workers remarked:-
He [the Managing Director] never gave in; it's just been
a systematic attempt to smash the union. He's achieved
it.
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The second development was that, of the four people sent for
CNC training, two had been fired, one was working a conventional
machine, and only one was actually working on a CNC machine.
Therefore, the training had not really helped to meet the need
for skilled setter-operators.
The third development was that the old programmer was no longer
with the company and a new programmer had been appointed who had
previous experience of using computers to make programs. However,
this did not solve the programming/proving problems of the company
because: -
i) It was now apparent that the computer was only capable of
producing programs for four of the nine CNCs.
ii) Even for machines that the computer was compatible with, it
was sometimes easier to produce the programs manually.
iii)The computer was not any faster, even in the hands of an
experienced user, than the manual method. It was more
accurate, but programs still needed to be proved out,
because programming mistakes could still be made. It
was also the case that such factors as the speeds, feeds
and methods were still specified by the programmer, and
were subject to error and needed to be checked.
Therefore, the computer was not the solution to the programming/
proving problems that the Managing Director had hoped.
The fourth development was that the company was selling some of
its CNC machines. One was in the process of being sold, and
there were plans to sell two more. There were two reasons for
this:-
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1) The machines were old and maintenance costs were increasing.
ii) They were machines that were not compatible with the computer.
The latter seemed to be the main reason as far as the Managing
Director was concerned:-
I shall never ever get the benefits I expected from the
[computer] until I'm equipped with machines that are
totally suited to it. With hindsight, the addition of
the [computer] is likely to complicate matters rather
than simplify them . . . until we've got rid of the old
machines which are not compatible to it.
The situation at the fourth set of visits
The last set of visits took place in August 1984. Since the
previous visits, there had again been a number of notable develop-
aents.
The first was that management-worker relations had improved.
The cause of this appeared to be that the Managing Director was
spending far less time on the shopfloor and was leaving staff
mnagement to the programmer and the supervisors. A contributory
factor was that wages had also been increased. It appeared that
the Managing Director had found his problems with the trade union,
which was no longer active, a chastening experience and, as the
programmer put it : -
He's finally realised that he needs a stable workforce
and that high labour turnover was counter-productive.
It'd reached the stage where blokes were using the
company as a training ground for CNC and then getting
jobs elsewhere.
The second development was that the company now had only five
CNCmachines, and no immediate plans to increase this number.
There were two reasons for this:-
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j.) The Managing Director only wanted machines that were compatible
with the programming computer.
ii) He believed that many of the labour and organisational
problems that had arisen were caused by acquiring so many
CNCs too quickly. He saw the reduction in the number of
machines as a way of reducing these problems.
The third development was that the programmer was attempting to
standardise the production of programs; he was highly critical of
many of the existing programs, and was changing them when they
were repeated. He was doing all the programming, and the setter-
operators were proving out. He had also adopted the practice of
consulting them regarding production methods. He was using the
computer as an aid to tape preparation, but its main benefit
appeared to be that it simplified some of the complex calculations
involved in programming, rather than simplifying or speeding up
the entire process.
Conclusion
A number of points arise from this case study. The first is that
only after 6 years of CNC experience did the company appear to
be moving to a stable organisation of work around CNC. The
problems that arose, in the main, revolved around the personality
of the Managing Director, whose manner and actions caused bad
labour relations and a high turnover of labour, which was counter-
productive in terms of the efficient working of the organisation.
The second point to note is the difference between the formal
organisation of work and the actual organisation. 	 Formally, the
programmer wrote the programs and proved them; informally, many
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I hoc arrangements involving setter-operators were utilised to
perform these functions. Formally, the supervisors were respon-
sible for shopfloor workers and for sorting out any problems
that arose; in practice, the Managing Director often took direct
responsibility for these tasks. The Managing Director was aware
of the many problems that existed, but just as he originally
turned to CNC as the answer to his labour control problems, he
turned to a programming computer to solve them. However, it did
appear by the final visits that he might have come to grips with
the root cause of the company's problems - his managerial style -
and it may well be that by reducing his role in staff management,
by reducing the prograrirner's workload and by acknowledging the
importance of setter-operators in proving tapes, the formal and
informal organisations would be brought into line.
The last point to note is the performance of the CNC5 in technical,
financial and human terms.
Technically, the machines appeared to have been reasonably reliable;
however, the fact that the nine machines had five different
programming languages between them caused obvious problems for
those involved in programming.
In financial terms, there could be no doubt that CNC was ideally
suited to the wide variety of work that the company performed.
However, the high labour turnover and other problems meant that
the financial performance of the machines was less than it should
have been.
In human terms, the CNCs offered both the programmer and setter-
operators varied and challenging jobs, but the benefits from this
were overshadowed by the poor labour relations in the company.
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The same comment could apply to the supervisor's job; a variety
of people occupied this post, but most had CNC experience and
should have found their jobs interesting, given the type of product
the company made; but because of the attitude of the Managing
Director, they did not.
In summary, it appears that the introduction and use of CNC in
this company was shaped, and marred, by the personality of the
Managing Director.
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CASE STUDY FOUR
The Company
This is a small family-owned company originally established in
1841. Its main products are a variety of manually-operated
pumps, and ancillary equipment for dispensing oil and other
liquids. Its main market was the oil industry, but this had
been declining since the mid-1970s and this appeared to be the
main reason why the numbers employed in the company had fallen
from 260 in 1973 to 100 in 1983.
The day-to-day control of production lay with the Production
Director, but financial control and the buying of new equipment
was the responsibility of the Managing Director, who was a member
of the owning family.
Despite the decline in their market, the company had continued to
be profitable, though, according to the Managing Director, at a
lower level than they would like. The majority of the workforce,
some 70 to 80 people, were either shopfloor employees or super-
visory staff. These were split between four main departments:
the foundry, the press shop, the machine shop and the assembly
department. The machine shop employed some 20 people at the time
of the first visit, and was controlled by a manager who was also
responsible for setting up a number of automatic machines.
The company had two CNC lathes, costing approximately £50,000
each. The first was bought at the beginning of 1982, and the
second 12 months later. The machines produced a variety of
simple components. The normal batch size was 1,000, but this
could be as high as 3,000 or as low as 200 on occasions, though
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500 was the smallest batch they would normally produce on the CNC.
The cycle time per component was between l and 2 minutes, and
the components were quite simple. The programming time per
component was approximately 2 hours and the setting-up time
for the machines was around 1 hour. Proving-out time for new
tapes took about 1 hour, but could be longer. There were 130
programs for the CNCs, and this figure was unlikely to increase
appreciably in the future.
The first visit to the company was in October 1983 and the last
visit was in August 1984. The initial contact was made through
the Managing Director.
Management-worker relations in the company were very good, and the
atmosphere was very friendly indeed. There were complaints of
low pay and of fear of redundancies, but none of the blame for
these was directed against management.
The company was trade union-organised and the shop steward in
the machine shop was very complimentary about the company's
management. The union were consulted over pay, redundancies and
the introduction of new equipment, but viewed the first two as
out of the company's control, given the market situation, and
the latter was seen as "progress" which had to be accepted.
The organisation of work prior to CNC
Both before and after the introduction of CNC, the machine shop
operated as an almost independent unit. The manager received
a weekly list of work to be produced and when it was required,
and was then expected to work with little or no interference
from senior managers.
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There appeared to be three reasons for this:-
i) There was a high degree of friendliness and trust within
the company, and it was expected that people would get on
with the work in hand without constant supervision.
ii) Almost all those in the machine shop, including the manager,
were on either an individual or collective bonus that was
related to output. Therefore, it was in their financial
interest to ensure that output targets were met.
iii)The company is located in a four-storey building with
the machine shop on the top floor, and senior managers are
located on the ground floor. This appeared to act as a
disincentive for managers to visit the machine shop.
Before the CNC machines were purchased, work was produced on a
variety of automatic and semi-automatic machines. There were
5 setters, including the machine shop manager, and some 15 - 20
operators. The setters were classed as skilled but the operators,
mainly women, were classed as semi-skilled. Operators tended to
be restricted to working one or two machines, on which they
carried out one or two operations on a small range of simple
components. There was also a quality inspector and one or two
ancillary staff.
Supervision in the shop was the responsibility of the manager
and his assistant, also a setter, but in practice the other
setters and the inspector also, as one of the setters said,
'keep an eye on things".
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The reasons for introducin g CNC
The company had a general policy of modernising its plant and
equipment on a regular basis. As the Managing Director put it:-
We pride ourselves on being well up in equipment
innovation. We really have put new equipment in at
a very early stage . . . We saw CNC as the next
generation of equipment.
Apart from this, there were three specific reasons for introducing
CNC.
i) The company wished to introduce cheaper production methods
in the machine shop. Their existing machines had been
bought to produce components in batches of 10,000, but
since then their average batch size had fallen to 1,000,
and sometimes a lot less. Therefore, they were looking for
a machine that could produce smaller batches at a more
economical rate; they believed that CNC would do this.
ii) They believed that CNC would increase quality, though
this had not really been a problem in the past.
iii) The Managing Director believed that there would be a labour
shortage if the market revived; he saw CNC as a way of
eliminating this problem due to its greater productivity.
These were also the reasons why, 12 months after buying the first
CNC, they bought a second one.
The organisation of work around CNC
The programming and proving out of tapes for the CNC was done by
a draughtsman, whose main responsibility was to programme the
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CNC but who also carried out some draughting functions. The
non-programming setting of the machine was done by any one of
three setters, one of whom was the machine shop manager. One
of the CNCs had an operator whose job was to load and unload the
CNC and to "mind" it whilst it was running. However, if anything
should go wrong or need adjusting, he was instructed to stop the
machine and call a setter or the programmer.
The other machine was loaded automatically by means of a mechanical
feed mechanism. Therefore, it did not need an operator as such,
but did need someone to put new bars in and to monitor the machine.
The person who did this also had responsibility for "minding"
several automatic machines. As with the first CNC, if anything
went wrong, he called a setter or the programmer.
Problems with CNC
The company's Managing Director had anticipated that problems
might occur with programming and with setting the machine, and
had carefully planned to avoid these. He envisaged that program-
ming would be the main problem. He believed that the setters had
neither the time nor the ability to programme, and that, therefore,
a separate programmer with a good knowledge of mathematics was
needed. He therefore made a draughtsman responsible for program-
ming and proving. He was sent on a two-week course, and in
addition the company spent £4,000 on a computer terminal, linked
to a computer bureau, to assist with programming. In the event,
this was not needed, because the programmer found that he could
cope with the programming without the aid of a computer.
Two setters, the manager and assistant manager, were sent on a
one-week setting course. They were chosen instead of other
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setters in order to ensure that those responsible for supervision
knew as much as other shopfloor workers about CNC. At a later
date the assistant manager, along with another setters, were sent
on a two-week programming and setting course. In addition to
this training, when the first CNC came into the factory, the
supplier's engineer spent 8 weeks in the company giving additional
training and advice.
Therefore, programming and setting were not, as such, a problem;
however, finding an operator did prove difficult. When the first
machine was installed, it alternated between bar work and manual
loading and unloading of castings. It was envisaged that when an
operator was required to load and unload, whichever woman operator
was free would do it. However, the women operators did not like
working the CNC. This was for two reasons:-
i) The women found working the CNC boring. As one of the setters
put it:-
All the women are used to working hard with their
hands: loading, unloading, using their hands to
work the machines. On the CNC, it's different;
you just press a button.
ii) They were unhappy about pay for working the CNC. It was
decided that, as the CNCs worked on a fixed cycle, it was
impractical to put the operator on a bonus. This resulted
in the operator of a CNC earning less than someone on
piecework.
When the second machine was installed, it was decided that one
would be dedicated to bar work and one to work that needed an
operator. The machine-minding jobs were given to two male
workers who had performed similar work on the automatic machines.
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The one who worked the bar machine was paid an extra £3 on top
of his basic pay, but the operator on the other was not. The
na1e workers were chosen because the women workers would not do
the jobs.
The situation with CNC at the first set of visits
At the time of the first set of vists, the two CNCs had been
installed and working for 18 months and 6 months respectively.
In the main, the machines were performing as well as the Managing
Director could have wished - indeed, he declared that they were
"peforming better than I anticipated".
There were, however, three problems with the CNCs:-
i) There was a dispute over the division of tasks between the
programmer and the setters. It was the programmer's job
to write the programs and to prove them out. This was a
job he enjoyed; he saw it as a challenge, and together
with his draughting functions, it gave him a varied and
interesting job.
The setters, especially the assistant manager, on the other
hand, pointed out that before CNC, they had been totally
responsible for setting up machines and deciding on methods,
and that they had greater machining experience than the
programmer. For these reasons, they felt they should
prove out programs, if not also, on occasions, actually
programme. This caused friction between the programmer
and the setters, as did the fact that they had previously
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, but now the programmer,
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who had been given an office in the machine shop, in their
opinion, interfered in their work and tried to tell them
what to do.
The result of this was that if the programmer went to
one of the CNCs, he was immediately joined by one or more
setters and vice versa. Also, when the CNCs were being
set up and a program proved out, it was not unusual to
see the programmer and three setters all "working" on the
machine at the same time.
ii) There was also some concern over job losses. The order
situation had not improved since the introduction of CNC;
indeed, it may have worsened. However, the introduction
of CNC had meant that work was transferred to them from the
existing machines. This left those machines and their
operators idle, and the operators were subsequently made
redundant. This had led the programmer and the setters to
argue that the CNCs should not be used to machine existing
components but that the company should instead seek sub-
contract machining work from other companies. They saw
this as a way of keeping jobs and keeping the CNCs busy
whilst not threatening existing workers' jobs.
iii) There was some doubt about the suitability of the CNCs for
the work they were doing. A number of those connected
with the CNC5 had questioned the wisdom of using them for
very large batches of simple components; they argued that
newer types of traditional automatic machines would be
more appropriate. The Plant Manager also argued that, in
future, more of their products would be made from plastic
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and that this would reduce, if not eliminate, the need for
machining.
Therefore, whilst the CNCs were performing well and whilst most
people - both managers and workers - thought they were "fantastic",
there were problems with them.
The situation at the second set of visits
When the final set of visits began in July 1984, a number of
changes had taken place. Some had lessened the tension between
the setters and the programmer, whilst others had cast further
doubts upon the suitability of CNC.
The lessening of tension between the setters and the programmer
was brought about by two events : -
i) The programmer spent less time with the CNCs because, by
and large, he had programmed and proved out all the jobs
that were likely to be produced on the CNCs. Therefore,
there was less contact between him and the setters and less
chance of friction, because the setters no longer felt he
was watching them or trying to tell them what to do.
ii) The friction had mainly occurred between the assistant
manager and the programmer, but the former, along with
three operators, had been made redundant, and this appeared
to have reduced some of the tension.
The changes that cast further doubts upon the advisability of CNC
were twofold:-
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j ) The company had begun manufacturing a new pump which was
made entirely from plastic. It did not need any CNC
machining, and in addition was likely to reduce the demand
for metal pumps.
jj) The company redesigned some existing metal pumps in order
to reduce costs and simplify assembly, in the process of
which the need for machining was further reduced.
Conclusion
A number of points arise out of this case study. The first is
that, by and large, one person, the Managing Director, was
responsible for the decisions to buy CNC and how it would be
operated. However, in planning for its use, he appeared to have
anticipated and overcome many of the problems regarding programming
and involvement by supervisory staff that had arisen elsewhere.
This leads on to the second point, which concerns the formal and
informal structure of the organisation, which, in this instance,
appear to be almost the same. This is because if a problem
arose with CNC, the machine shop foreman was trained to deal
with it in the same way that he dealt with problems on conven-
tional machines. This avoided the problem of his being bypassed
and his authority undermined if operators continually had to seek
someone else's advice. There had, nevertheless, been friction
between the setters and the programmer, but at the time of the
last ViSit, it seemed to be diminishing, and in any case did not
appear to affect the structure of work.
The last point relates to the performance of the machines in
technical, financial and human terms.
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In technical terms, the machines were reliable but there was some
doubt as to whether, given the large batches involved, CNC was
appropriate. It may also be the case, given the company's move
to plastic products, that investment in plastic injection moulding
machinery, which they did not possess, would have been a better
technical option.
The financial arguments are related to the technical ones. The
management of the company was satsfiec3 	 tXi t'cie CICS' otp3t.,
but it may be that they would have been better rewarded financially
with an alternative to CNC.
In human terms, in terms of the quality of jobs that were produced,
the results were mixed. The programmer's job was varied, inter-
esting, and had a high degree of autonomy. The setters, on the
other hand, whilst liking CNC, felt that they had lost some of
their traditional autonomy and technical superiority. The two
"machine minders" both complained of the boredom and monotony
involved in their jobs, but also pointed out that this was little
different from their previous jobs minding automatic machines.
The machine shop manager's job seemed little affected by the
changes; he knew as much about the technology as the other setters,
and did not appear to have suffered any reduction in his status
or authority.
As a final comment, it appears that the introduction of CNC was
well-planned and had achieved its objectives. However, it may
be that the company would have been better served by investing
in a different technology to CNC.
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CHAPTER NINE
MEDIUM—SIZED COMPANIES
CASE STUDY FIVE
The Company
This is a medium-sized company which was founded in 1850 and
remained independent until its take-over by a larger group of
companies in 1958. Its main products are fluid control valves,
which it supplies to a wide range Of customers. Whilst the
market for these products had diminished during the recession,
the company managed to maintain its production levels and
profitability by diversifying into new markets and by the intro-
duction of new production methods. The latter were mainly
responsible for the reduction of employee numbers from 300 in
1980 to 220 in 1984.
The firm's parent company exercises a high level of control over
financial and marketing developments, but, with some exceptions,
does not interfere in the day-to-day organisation and running
of production.
Of the 220 employed, 80 were white collar and supervisory staff,
and the remainder were ancillary and production workers. The
main production departments were the foundry, the machine shop,
and the assembly and testing department. The largest of these
was the machine shop which, at the time of the first visit,
employed 40 - 50 people.
239
This department, due to limitations of space, was located in two
separate areas of the factory. Each had its own foreman who
reported directly to the Production Manager, who was responsible
for all aspects of production and assembly. At the time of the
first visit, there was a machine shop superintendent who had the
main day-to-day responsibi1ity for this area 1 but he was subsequently
promoted and his functions divided between the two foremen. There
was also a Production Engineering Department which, amongst other
things, was responsible for the programming of the CNC machines.
The company had 10 CNC machines, three of which were acquired
after the first visits, which cost approximately £500,000. They
were used to machine a wide variety of valves of moderate complexity
in batches that could range from 10 to 1,000, but which tended to
be between 100 and 300. Machining times averaged 5 minutes, though
they could be as short as 2 and as long as 45. Set-up times
were between 1 and 2 hours normally, but these times could be
doubled when proving out a new program. There were some 2,000
programs for the CNCs, and this figure was constantly being added
to. It took approximately 3 hours to write each program.
The first set of visits to the company began in April 1984, and
the last visit took place in January 1985. Initial contact was
oade with the machine shop superintendent.
1anagement-worker relations within the company at the time of
the first visit appeared friendly, especially in the machine shop,
but, for reasons explained below, these deteriorated later.
Most of the shopfloor workers belonged to a trade union, but the
anions did not appear to be active or even well-regarded by their
mrembers, and had certainly taken no interest in the introduction
of CNC.	
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1he organisation of work before CNC
Before CNC was introduced, the company employed 90 to 100 people
inrnachining activities, some of whom were on a separate site
altogether. The workers were split into three groups: setters
who set up automatic machines and who were considered the most
skilled; operators, mainly female, for the automatic machines,
who were the most numerous and least skilled group; and a small
number of conventional machinists who were nearer the setters
than the operators in terms of skill. The setters were each
responsible for setting a group of 3 or 4 similar machines.
The operators invariably worked the same machine all the time,
producing the same narrow range of work; this was also the case
for the conventional machinists.
Supervision was organised on the same lines as at the time of
the study, with each section having its own foreman. All the
shopfloor workers were on a piecework bonus system, with the
setters beix
	
ai5 i.v telation to the output of the operators on
the machines they set up.
She reasons for introducing CNC
ttthe time of the first visit, the company had 7 CNCs, the first
two of which were installed in 1976 at a total cost of £125,000.
She decision to buy the first two CNCs was taken, without consul-
tstjon, by the parent company, and it is still not clear why the
chines were bought. The generally-accepted view was that the
Prent company were buying two CNC5 for another firm within the
S roup and found that they got a much better deal for four than
two.
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Whether this was the real reason or not, the outcome was that
they were told to expect two CNCs for which they were totally
unprepared, given that they had previously not considered using
them.
Despite this, and despite severe problems getting the machines
fully into production, the company gradually became convinced
that CNC was vital to their future, and between 1980 and 1983
bought another 5 CNCs. The Production Engineering Manager and
the machine shop superintendent became jointly responsible for
assessing and justifying the need for further CNCs. They had to
prepare a detailed report of the reasons for each new purchase,
which had to be approved by the parent company.
The main justifications for the additional CNCs were:-
1) The existing automatic machines were only economical when
producing batches over 1,000; some were only economical
on batches of 5,000 or more. However, batch sizes on many
products had fallen far below these figures. The advantage
of CNC was that whilst their production rate was no faster
than automatic machines, they were faster to set up. An
automatic machine could take 4 or 5 days to set up, whilst
a CNC could be set up in 3 or 4 hours at the most.
ii) Some products required machining on 5 or 6 different machines,
with 5 or 6 different set-ups. It was found that many of
these could be done at one set-up on a CNC. In many instances,
this not only cut setting times but also cut production
times.
The result of this was that both those involved in production and
production engineering became firm advocates of CNC. However,
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CNC introduction did have one drawback: the same amount of work
could be produced with far fewer people. In the main, it was the
female operators who lost their jobs, with the male setters
becoming setter-operators on the CNCs. Whilst most regretted the
loss of jobs, the general view was that it was necessary if the
company was to stay in business.
The organisation of work around CNC
For a variety of reasons, it took the company a year after the
introduction of the first two CNCs to arrive at a settled form
of work organisation. The form finally adopted was that a
programmer, a former work study engineer, would write the programs
and prove them out in conjunction with a setter-operator who did
the rest. As more machines were purchased, the programmer had
less time to spend proving out, and gradually, apart from rare
occasions, the setter-operators came to perform this function
alone.
However, as more machines were purchased, not all had their
own setter-operators. Three machines were set up by one setter,
who was assisted in operating the machines by one person classed
as an operator. This was done for three reasons:-
i) Only one of the machines required loading by hand; the other
two were bar feed machines. This meant that whilst one
machine needed a full-time person to load and unload, the
other two could be watched by one person.
ii) The machines were very similar and it was possible for one
setter-operator to become conversant with them all.
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iii) The machines tended to be used to produce larger batches
than the other CNCs, and therefore did not require setting
up as often. This allowed one setter to be able to cope
with setting three machines.
Therefore, by 1983 when the company had 7 CNC machines being
operated on two shifts, the situation was that there were ten
setter-operators and two operators.
Supervision of the CN was provided by a foreman, who had spent
three months learning programming with the programmer, and the
superintendent, who was also familiar with CNC. They were
responsible for all matters concerning CNC, though if programming
problems occurred which neither they nor the setter-operators
could solve, then the programmer would be called upon.
The problems with CNC
The main problems that the company experienced with CNC occurred
within the first 12 months, and revolved around the role and
payment of those responsible for setting and operating the machines.
There were two other lesser problems; one being the resentment
of the Production Engineering Manager that he had not been
consulted about the purchase of the machines, and the other being
that whilst one machine was installed in the company's main
building, the other was located in an annexe to the main factory
some a mile away.
The latter caused delays and problems on both sites with the
programmer, at least at the beginning, having to make 5 or 6 trips
between the sites each day. This was not resolved until the
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annexe was transferred onto the main site in 1979/80. It is more
difficult to assess the impact of the former problem; however,
it was significant that, even four years later, the Production
Engineering Manager, to whom the programmer was responsible,
was still highly critical of the decision to buy the first two
CNCs without consulting his, or anyone else's, department.
Nevertheless, the main problem revolved around the setting and
operating of the CNCs. The company decided that both machines
would be run by setter-operators and that the programmer would
prove out new programs. However, on the main site, the setter-
operator, who had been an existing setter with some CNC experience,
left - or was fired - after only one month. The company then
made one of the setters for the automatic machines responsible
for setting the CNC as well, with a separate operator being
employed to load and unload it. This also proved problematic,
in that there were a number of accidents on the CNC, and to avoid
these, the setter was faced with spending more time on the CNC,
and leaving the automatic machines standing idle because he did
not have time to set them up, or leaving the CNC idle for the
same reason. This affected the earnings of the setter and the
operators on the automatic machines and the CNC, whose pay was
linked to output. Eventually, the CNC operator left and the
company made the setter into a setter-operator.
The situation was worse on the other site where, to quote the
Production Engineering Manager, "we went through 6 setter-operators
in 6 months because we couldn't get the right people".
The difficulties on both sites appeared to be caused by two
main factors:-
245
i) There was a dispute, between some - if not all - of the
setter-operators on the one hand and the programmer and the
Production Engineering Manager on the other, as to who
should do what. The latter wished to prescribe methods of
production and keep the input of the setter-operators to a
minimum, whilst some of the setter-operators felt they should
have a greater involvement. As the foreman put it:-
We had one chap who'd worked CC at aroti paca
and he just held the company to ransom. He
wanted the methods and set-ups done his way.
ii) The setter-operators felt they should be paid more for working
CNC. This was compounded by the fact that it is difficult
on a fixed cycle machine such as a CNC to earn bonus, and
also, if a problem arises and the machine is stopped, bonus
is lost. Therefore, rather than being paid more, the setter-
operators could actually earn less, in which case their
demands for higher pay were not surprising. However, the
company's management saw the request for more money as a
threat. To quote the Production Engineering Manager:-
We had to dig our heels in when they said "pay us
more or we leave". Until we did that we were on a
hiding to nothing; we couldn't get co-operation,
we couldn't get respect, because all they could
think about was how they could screw us for more
money.
It took the company 12 months from the installation of the
machines before a settled pattern of work organisation emerged
and the various problems were resolved. Four changes contributed
to the improvement of the situation:-
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i) The setter-operators whom the company saw as troublesome
either left or were fired, leaving the way clear for others
to take their place.
ii) The company trained more setter-operators than it had
machines for in order to protect themselves from being
"held to ransom" by people whose skill could not easily be
replaced.
iii) The output bonus for setter-operators was replaced by a
fixed bonus which ensured that they did not lose money by
working CNC.
iv) The programmer came, gradually, to involve the setter-operators
more and they eventually were given full responsibility for
proving programs and were consulted on production methods.
After this, it became policy when buying new CNCs to ensure that
setter-operators were fully trained and conversant with them.
Indeed, not only did setter-operators receive training in setting
and operating the machine, but many of them also spent 2 or 3
months working with the programmer to learn how to programme the
CNCs as well.
The result was that, after a somewhat disastrous first 12 months,
those involved with CNC came to see themselves as a team who
worked well together. To quote the foreman:-
I've a lot of time for these chaps who work on CNC and
I hope it would be reciprocated, because from the
programmer, through the superintendent, through me,
and to the setter-operators, we have tried to make the
section into a team . . . and if you ask anybody on
this section, they'd say they were reasonably happy
with this set-up.
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The situation at the first set of visits
The first set of visits began in April 1984, and the situation
was as described at the end of the last section. The setter-
operators and the two operators liked working for the company
and enjoyed working on CNC. There was also a strong impression
of teamwork. However, not all were happy with the organisation
of work.
The Production Engineering Manager wished to move away from the
setter-operator system:
We now have three machines worked by one setter-
operator and one operator. That's the way I see
it progressing.
He felt that this method would be cheaper and utilise the setter-
operators' skills more. The machine shop superintendent took
a similar view:
We train them [setter-operators] and pay them for
a skill they use only 15% of the time.
He wanted to see the setter-operators formed into a pool of setters
who could be called upon to set any CNC whilst the actual operating
of the machines would be done by other people. He had not been
able to move to this system because of the "low number of CNCs".
However, he said that this situation would change:-
No one here [on the shopfloor] knows this, but we shall
be bringing in approximately 5 more CNCs. I've got the
overall responsibility for transferring products and
equipment from one of our Scottish factories [which was
being closed down] to here. I've looked at our manning
levels and I'm determined that we shall remove the
setters from operating the CNC5 and they will work in
what we call a setting pool. All the CNCs will be put
into the pool and the setters will set them up and
then hand them over to an operator.
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An added advantage of this system, from the superintendent's
point of view, was that the operators could be put on an output
bonus system which, he believed, would motivate them to work
harder and thus increase output.
The transfer of machines was due to take place the following
October, when the new system would be introduced. Therefore,
arrangements were made to re-visit the company at that time.
The situation at the second set of visits
Due to the pressure of work involved in transferring the plant
and equipment into the existing factory, the second set of
visits could not be accommodated by the company until January
1985, and by this time a number of changes had already taken
place.
One change was that the machine shop superintendent had been
promoted to Production Control Manager, and had no responsibility
for the machine shop. Rather than replace him, the company had
upqraded the two eistitx foreiven, who took on his functions and
were left to carry out his re-organisation plans. In addition,
two working charge hands were appointed for the CNC section, one
for each shift.
Rowever, the main change, as anticipated, was the re-organisation
of the setting and operating functions on the CNC section. The
transfer of equipment had brought 3, not 5, extra CNC machines
into the company, thus making a total of 10 in all. For these
10 machines there were, on each shift, 5 setters, who also did
some operating, and 4 people who were purely operators. It had
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been the ex-superintendent's plan that the setters would operate
as a pool and would be called upon to set, but not operate, any
of the 10 machines. However, this did not occur, and instead the
CNCs were split into 3 groups: there was one group of 4 machines
that were set up jointly by 2 setter-operators who also, along with
2 operators, operated the machines; a group of 3 machines which
were set up by 2 setter-operators who also, along with a further
operator, operated them; and another group of 3 machines which
were set up by one setter-operator who also, along with another
operator, operated the machines. This last group was the one that
was in existence at the time of the first visits. In terms of
pay, the setter-operators were paid as before, but the operators'
pay was related to output.
This form of organIsatlori, as opposed to that previously envisaged,
emerged for three reasons:-
1) It had been anticipated that there would be 12 CNC machines
and that these would provide enough work to keep 5 setters
fully occupied without also having to operate the machines.
'V1th only 3 addItional macbines being introduced, this was
no longer the case, and if the setters had no longer been
involved in operating the machines, there would have been
periods when they had nothing to do.
ii) The setter-operators objected to being asked to set up all
of the 10 machines. They felt that it was not practical
to ask them to set up more than 3 or 4 different machines
efficiently. As one setter-operator put it:-
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You can actually learn to set up all the machiens,
but you can't spend enough time on them to get
fully conversant. If they keep flitting you from
machine to machine, you're never going to learn
them properly, and that means you go on them and
make mistakes every time.
lii) The company wanted the new machines in operation, and the
new products being produced, in a matter of weeks. This
meant that there was little time to train setter-operators
on machines that they were not familiar with.
Consequently, the company had to settle for a modified system of
CNC organisation. However, even this was not without its problems.
1) Whilst the setter-operators, in the main, preferred setting
to operating, they were not happy that they had not been
consulted about the changes. In addition, they believed
that they should receive more pay because they were doing
more setting. To quote one setter-operator:-
They called us into the office and said, "That's
what's happening", and of course it backfired on
them because we all kicked up against it. We
finally agreed to work the modified system on a
trial basis, but it [pay] is still to be sorted
out. If they don't come up with some more money
then we might go back to the old system.
ii) Setting times and the time that machines were standing idle
had increased. This was for three reasons:-
a) On occasions, all the machines in one group might need
setting at the same time. This meant that some machines
had to wait whilst others were set up.
b) The setters were not all fully conversant with the
machines they had to set and, therefore, took longer
than they otherwise would.
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c) The setters could be called away from a setting job
to deal with an operator's problem.
iii) production times had also increased, for similar reasons:-
a) If an operator had a problem, he had to fetch a setter,
whereas before, the setter-operator would have dealt
with it immediately.
b) When a setter was actually operating a machine, he could
be called away and the job he was doing could be left
waiting.
iv) The operators were also upset about their pay. They were
paid in relation to output, but, for the reasons mentioned
above, they could often not be producing because they were
waiting for a setter. In addition, as mentioned earlier,
it is difficult to earn bonus on CNC.
In addition to these problems, there was some disquiet by those
who initiated and supported the changes about the way they were
working in practice.
The ex-supervisor still believed that a full pooi system should
have been introduced rather than the modified one, and that if
this had been the case, there would have been fewer problems.
On the other hand, the Production Engineering Manager, after
seeing the system in practice, no longer supported the idea of
separate setters and operators. He believed now that it was too
much to ask setters to set up ten different machines, and he
was worried about the longer setting and production times.
Therefore, almost no one was happy about the changes that had taken
place, but now that they had taken place, no one appeared to be
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in a position to alter the situation. This meant that it was
left to the setter-operators, the operators, and the two foremen
to make the best of a system that they had had no say in intro-
ducing.
nclusion
A number of points arise from this case study. The first point
is that the company's early problems with CNC were caused by
two factors:-
i) The general lack of readiness of the company for CNC;
Li The clash between the Production Engineering Manager/
programmer and the setters/setter-operators over allocation
of work and levels of pay. This may have been exacerbated
by the resentment felt by the Production Engineering Manager
about not being consulted regarding the purchase of the
CNCs.
The second point is that the re-organisation of work that took
place prior to the second set of visits once again met opposition
from the setter-operators and once again raised issues of who
should do what and how much they should be paid.
The third point is that the re-organisation of work was brought
about, mainly, by one person, the Machine Shop Superintendent,
and was justified on the grounds that it would reduce costs,
by allowing lower-paid workers to operate the machines, and
increase productivity, by linking pay to output.
The fourth point is that, up to the second set of visits at
least, the formal organisation of work and the actual organisation
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were the same. This was brought about by fully involving and
training supervisory staff in CNC.
The final point concerns an assessment of the performance of CNC
in technical, economic and human terms.
In technical terms, there appeared to have been few problems with
the machines.
In economic terms, after the initial problems and up to the second
set of visits at least, the CNCs appeared to have more than
justified their purchase. This was confirmed by the fact that
the parent company carried out post-installation assessments on
all new machines, and these showed the CNCs as being economical.
However, after the first set of visits, the situation changed;
production and setting times increased due to the organisational
changes.
In human terms, excluding the first year of CNC, the situation
up to the second round of visits appeared to have been very good
for the setter-operators. They received full training and were
expected to carry out a wide range of activities up to and
including proving programs, and they all expressed the view that
they enjoyed their jobs. However, this was not so for the
operators of the automatic machines, who were mostly made
redundant. The setter-operators' position changed with the
re-organisation of work at the time of the later visits. They
became dissatisfied with the lack of consultation, with being
expected to set up a wide variety of machines, and with their
pay. The new operators were also unhappy, in that their job
was both boring, in that they were only loading and unloading,
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and frustrating, in that they had to fetch a setter every time
any adjustment was required. They were also dissatisfied with
their pay.
The changes also affected the foreman in that he found himself
having to cope with the problems of a re-organisation that was
not of his making. Nevertheless, he enjoyed his job and found
it was made easier due to the programming training he had
received. The programmer also enjoyed his job, and whilst many
of the CNC5 had different programming languages, he appeared to
cope with this well, rather thanfinding it a source of frustration.
However, he was concerned about the problems brought about by the
re-organisation.
Therefore, whilst the organisation of work up to the second set
of visits was satisfactory in economic and human terms, the
situation deteriorated from then on. This could be a temporary
phenomenon that would disappear over time, as people became
accustomed to the new system; on the other hand, the situation
could deteriorate further, as all concerned became more frustrated
with the problems that had arisen. At the time of writing, it
was impossible to say which would be the case,
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CASE STUDY SIX
The Company
This is a medium-sized company, which is a subsidiary of an
American firm and was established in 1963. Its main product
is steel and plastic strapping which is used for holding together
anything from small parcels to very large crates. It also
manufactures the machines for applying the strapping; the company's
CNCs are used to manufacture parts for these machines.
The company employed approximately 250 people at the time of the
study, of whom 50 were in the Machinery Division. Day-to-day
control of production was the responsibility of the Production
Manager, who was assisted by a foreman. The Engineering Department,
which was responsible for programming CNC, was run by a separate
manager.
The company had been badly hit by the recession; its market had
shrunk by 40%, which had led to a commensurate level of redundancies,
and for the past 3 years it had only managed to break even
financially. In order to cut costs, the Machinery Division,
originally located in London, was moved in 1981 to South Yorkshire,
to the same site as the rest of the company.
The Division was split into two sections: the machine shop, which
employed 24 shopfloor workers; and the assembly shop, which
employed 8. The machine shop had two CNC machining centres bought
in 1978 and 1981, before the move, and costing approximately
£60,000 each. They were used to manufacture a wide range of
high-precision machine parts in batches ranging from 30 to 200,
with the average being approximately 100. Machining times ranged
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from 10 to 50 minutes, with the latter tending to be the norm.
It took 8 to 10 hours to set up each machine and an additional
4 to 6 hours to prove new programs. Preparing new programs could
take 5 hours to 3 days; there were 130 existing programs, and new
ones were constantly being made.
Only one set of visits was made to the company, and these were
in July and August 1984. The initial contact was made with the
Engineering Manager.
Management-worker relations within the Machinery Division, whilst
not being hostile, were not friendly either. The main reason for
this appeared to be the uncertainty caused by the redundancies and
the company's financial situation. This was probably compounded
by the fact that most of the employees were new to the company;
all except 5 or 6 of those employed in London had chosen not to
move.
Most of the workforce were unionised, but the union was not
particularly active and appeared to view such matters as redund-
andes and wage increases as out of its control.
The organisation of work prior to CNC
The components now manufactured on CNC were previously made on a
variety of milling and drilling machines. In addition, there were
a number of conventional and automatic lathes, which were still
present at the time of the visits. The machine shop was under
the supervision of a foreman, assisted by a supervisor; the latter
was also responsible for setting certain automatic machines. There
were at least 5 different skill levels on the shopfloor: setters
257
for automatic machines; different setters for semi-automatic
machines; setter-operators for semi-automatic machines; operators
for automatic and semi-automatic machines; and conventional
machinists. The tendency was for them to be limited to a small
number of machines or types of work.
The company operated an individual bonus system based on output,
which applied to all shopfloor workers. When CNC was introduced,
the system was applied to those machines as well.
The reasons for introducing CNC
The Engineering Manager was responsible for recommending the purchase
of new equipment. He had to prepare a rigorous justification for
each purchase, whch had to be approved by both the British and
Airterican Boards of Directors. He recommended CNC for 3 reasons:-
i) Many of the components required 20 to 40 separate machining
operations, which could involve a different set-up for
each operation. On CNC, all these operations could be
done at one set-up, and thus achieve a great saving in
set-up time.
ii) CNC is quicker, and therefore the same work could be done
by fewer people.
iii) On the previous machine, expensive jigs and fixtures were
required. This was not the case with CNC.
These were the main reasons for buying the first CNC and, when
this had proved itself, the second CNC as well.
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The organisation of work around CNC
When the Machinery Division was located in London, a production
engineer in the Engineering Department was given the responsibility
for programming the CNCs and for setting them up; in this latter
respect, he was assisted by the machine shop supervisor. Each
machine had a separate operator who was responsible for loading
and unloading the machine, but if any problems arose, they would
call the supervisor, who in turn might call the programmer. This
method of operation appeared to have been chosen because it
resembled the organisation of work on the existing automatic
machines.
However, when the Machinery Division moved to South Yorkshire, this
changed. A new programmer was appointed who did not set up the
machines, and the supervisor, who was promoted to foreman, also
ceased to perform this function. Gradually the company moved to
a system of having a setter-operator for each machine who, along
with the programmer, proved out.
The problems with CNC
It was not clear what problems, if any, there were with the CNCs
when they were located in London, but a number arose when they
were moved.
The first was that most of the employees, including the programmer
and the CNC operators, did not move from London. Therefore, the
company had to recruit new people for these and many other posts.
However, they could not find a suitable programmer in South
Yorkshire, but eventually, with some difficulty, they managed to
recruit a very experienced one from the West Midlands.
259
It was the intention that the new programmer, along with the
supervisor who had now become foreman, would set up the machines
as before, but a variety of problems prevented this. These were:-
1) The foreman and the programmer disagreed about programming
and setting methods; indeed, the programmer began to
re-write all the existing programs. Eventually, the foreman,
who in any case had more calls on his time than was previously
the case, ceased to be involved with the CNCs.
ii) When the company moved, the number of production engineers
was reduced from 4 to 2, which meant that the programmer
had less time to devote to the CNCs.
iii) The programmer believed that a system of setter-operators
was the most economic and effective way of running CNCs.
This was because they could sort out most problems immediately
without having to call other people.
iv) The programmer felt that if he set up the machines, it
would lower his status.
These problems were eventually resolved when the programmer
persuaded his superior, not without some resistance, that a
setter-operator should be trained to set up both, and operate
one, of the CNCs. The other would be operated by whichever
automatic machine operator happened to be free when the CNC needed
an operator.
This suited the programmer, who spent less time on the shopfloor
as a result. It also meant that problems were sorted out much
quicker. However, two further problems did arise: there was not
260
always a spare operator free to work the other CNC, which could
sometimes be standing idle until one became free; and when the
setter-operator was setting up one machine, the other was standing
idle, which effectively doubled the setting time on both machines.
Therefore, the programmer persuaded his superior that a second
setter-operator should be trained.
The result of this was that each machine had its own setter-operator
who, together with the programmer, also proved out new programs.
The setter-operators were still on a bonus system, but it appeared
to have been modified to the extent that their bonus was almost
guaranteed. The foreman, however, was no longer involved in CNC,
and to all intents and purposes the setter-operators were respon-
sible to the programmer.
The situation at the time of the visits to the coman
The only change from the situation outlined above was that the
first setter-operator had left, to take up a better job, and a
new one was being trained. Nevertheless, the programmer was so
pleased with the setter-operator system that in future he intended
to let them prove the programs by themselves and perhaps even to
do some programming as well.
The only other development was that the company were examining the
feasibility of buying more CNCs, especially lathes. However,
this was seen as being some time away, given not only the company's
financial position but also the lengthy process required to obtain
approval for expenditure on new machinery.
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Conclusion
A number of points arise from the case study. The first is that
whatever the merits and demerits of how CNC was organised in
London, the move to South Yorkshire, and especially the change
of personnel, brought about significant changes. These were
closely associated with the new programmer, who believed that it
was in the company's - and his own - best interests to move to a
system of setter-operators. He was eventually successful in
bringing about change, but in the process he had to gain the
support of his superior, the Engineering Manager, and overcome
the resistance of the foreman. In the case of the latter, this
resulted in his withdrawal from CNC involvement altogether.
The second point follows on from this. In London, the formal
organisation of work and the actual organisation were the same.
This was because the then supervisor was fully involved with CNC.
However, the situation at the time of the study was that whilst
he was formally still in charge of CNC, in practice the programmer
was now responsible for all aspects of CNC. Therefore, the formal
and actual organisation of work had diverged.
The final point concerns the performance of the CNCs in technical,
financial and human terms. In technical and financial terms,
there appeared to be few problems with the CNCs, and the company's
management appeared sufficiently satisfied to contemplate buying
more CNCs.
In human terms also, the CNCs had now proved satisfactory. The
setter-operators had a responsible and varied job, which was being
improved by the addition of responsibility for proving, and in
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the future, perhaps, even writing new programs. The programmer
had improved his job by relieving himself of the setting function,
which had allowed him to become more involved with the other
activities of the Engineering Department. Even the supervisor
had not lost out, in that he now had more time to devote to his
new role as foreman.
Therefore, this is a case where a change of personnel resulted in
a significant change, and in human terms at least improvement, in
the way CNC was organised.
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CASE STUDY SEVEN
The Company
This is a medium-sized company which was established in Britain
by its American parent company in 1935. The company has two main
product ranges: drill chucks, and engineers' tools such as drill
sleeves and revolving lathe-centres.
The company employed 150 at the time of the study, which was
600 less than were employed in 1981. The fall in numbers was
entirely due to the recession, which had obviously affected the
company particularly badly. Of those currently employed, some
40 were staff and the remainder were shopfloor workers who were
evenly split between the section producing drill chucks and the
section producing engineers' tools.
Each section had its own supervisor who was responsible to the
Production Director, who was in day-to-day control of production.
Both sections were located in the same building, side by side.
There was also a small Production Engineering Department which,
as well as being responsible for production methods, quality and
work study, was also responsible for CNC programming.
The company had one CNC lathe which was installed in October 1984
at a cost of £55,000. It was used to produce medium-precision
engineers' tools in batches ranging from 50 to 500, though the
average batch was approximately 200. The machining time per
component was between 2 and 6 minutes, and set-up times could
range from one to 4 hours. In addition, proving out new programs
could take 2 to 3 hours, whilst writing them took 3 to 4 hours.
At the time of the last visit, there were some 50 different
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programs, and it was envisaged that this figure would eventually
rise to 200.
The first visit to the company was in July 1983, some 3 months
before the CNC was installed, and the last visit was in February
1985. The initial contact was made with the Production Engineering
Manager.
Management-worker relations within the company were very friendly,
though this had not always been the case. When the company
employed 750 people, there were, apparently, frequent industrial
disputes and much unrest. With the fall in numbers, relations
had significantly improved; managers connected this with the
fact that the trade unions, whilst still being officially recognised
and formally consulted, did not appear to be particularly active.
The situation at the first visit
The first visit to the company took place in July 1984. Therefore,
what follows is a description of the organisation of work and the
company's view of CNC before the machine was installed.
The organisation of work prior to CNC
The majority of machines in the workshop were automatic or
semi-automatic machines. In the main, there were two types:
purpose-built automatic machines designed to produce a small
range of components in batches ranging from 6,000 to 60,000;
and standard automatic and semi-automatic machines that were used
to produce batches ranging from 1,000 to 6,000. The latter
tended to be used for producing engineers' tools, whilst the
former were used exclusively for drill chucks.
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There were two basic shopfloor jobs, namely setting and operating.
These were graded, using a very elaborate job evaluation method,
from Grade 1, the most skilled setter, to Grade 6, the least
skilled operator. Each person had a detailed job description
which specified their exact duties. All operators, and those
setters on Grade 3 or below, were on an output bonus system.
The reasons for introducing CNC
The Production Engineering Manager, in consultation with the
Production Director, had primary responsibility for assessing the
potential of and recommending CNC. The original proposal, backed
by a very detailed financial justification, was agreed by the
British Board of Directors in 1980. However, owing to the company's
financial position, it was not until 1984 that the American Board
gave permission for the purchase.
There were three main reasons why the company wished to purchase
CNC:-
i) Due to the recession, batch sizes on many engineers' tools
had fallen to below 1,000, some to as low as 50, which meant
that it was uneconomic to produce them on their existing
automatic machines. A detailed study showed that substantial
savings, especially in set-up times, could be made by
manufacturing them on CNC.
li) Most of the existing machines were over 10 years old and
the cost of maintenance for them was very high. A new CNC
would allow some of these machines to be scrapped and
thus reduce overall maintenance costs.
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iii) The company felt that it needed to acquire new technology
or it would be left behind. To quote the Production
Engineering Manager:
- . . we need to get into new technology
which I think is the way we've got to go.
We've got to get into the learning process.
These were the reasons why the company had ordered a CNC, which
was due to be installed in October 1984.
The proposed organisation of work around CNC
It was the Production Engineering Manager's intention that a
production engineer would be responsible for programming and setting
the machine, and that an operator would be employed to load and
unload the machine and to monitor, and perhaps adjust, the machine
during production. In fact, two operators were to be trained so
that it would eventually be possible to work the CNC on two
shifts. However, this could not take place until other machines
were also on two shifts, which was considered unlikely in the
near future. This form of organisation was favoured for three
reasons : -
I) Existing automatics had separate setters and operators
and it was felt that this would work equally well on CNC.
ii) A production engineer was to be given the programming and
setting tasks because it was felt that these were best
carried out together, and that a shopfloor worker would
not have the necessary ability to programme.
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jjj ) The Production Engineering Manager wished to have a personal
involvement in, and supervision over, programming and felt
that this would be best achieved if it was done by someone
directly responsible to him. There were two production
engineers and it was envisaged that both would eventually
be trained to programme and set.
This, therefore, was the position before CNC was installed.
The situation at the second set of visits
The next set of visits commenced in November 1984, some three
weeks after the machine had been installed. The CNC was in
production, but only on a trial basis whilst those involved got
used to the machine. The organisation of work was not as had
originally been envisaged. Instead, a production engineer was
programming the machine, but two setter-operators were actually
setting it up and operating it. In addition, with the programmer,
they were proving out the new programs. The production engineer
felt that the setter-operators would eventually prove out by
themselves and might even come to do some programming as well.
This change from what had previously been envisaged was for two
reasons : -
i) The machine suppliers had advised the company that having
a production engineer to programme and set up the machine
would be inefficient. This was because the production
engineer, who had many other duties, might not always be
available to set up the machine or sort out problems, which
would lead to it standing idle when It should be producing.
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ii) The production engineer felt that he had neither the time
nor the experience to set up the machine. He also viewed
setting as a shopfloor function and felt that his status
would be lowered if he did this.
Therefore, two existing setters were selected as setter-operators
for the CNC. After the trial period, it was intended that they
would work alternate weeks on it until such time as the machine
was put onto two shifts. They were to be classed as CNC Technicians
and paid at Grade 1 rate; for one of them, this was an increase
as he had been on Grade 3, but the other was already on Grade 1.
The introductory process was going smoothly and all concerned were
pleased with it; however, there were some problems, which were as
follows:-
ii The production engineer, who was responsible for CNC
introduction, and the Production Engineering Manager had
both been on a one-week training course for programmers, of
which they were highly critical. They were also critical
of the training given to the setter-operators by the
installation engineer, though the setter-operators themselves
were not.
ii) The Production Engineering Manager had decided to pay the
setter-operators at Grade 1; however, this would eventually
have to be confirmed, or not, by a full job evaluation.
He was worried that the evaluation method might not be
able to accommodate CNC and would recommend a lower grade,
which would obviously lead to problems with the setter-
operators. If this should be the case, the Production
Engineering Manager, who was a member of the Job Evaluation
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Committee, felt he could get the decision overturned, but
was unhappy at the prospect of having to do so. He was also
worried about another pay-related problem: bonus. He, and
the production engineer, believed that they would only get
full output from CNC if the setter-oeprators were put on a
bonus scheme, but there was no provision for Grade 1 workers
to be on bonus, and it was not clear how this would be
achieved.
iii) The production engineer did not like using the tape preparation
machine, a device similar to a typewriter, and chose to
input the programs manually into the CNC. Whereas to feed
a paper tape into the CNC would take approximately 1 minute,
it would take some 20 - 30 minutes to input the same inform-
ation by hand. Therefore, the CNC was standing idle for
longer than would have been necessary if the tape preparation
machine were used.
iv) It was intended that the supervisor would receive CNC
training, but during the introductory period, he was not
being involved at all, and no-one was sure when he would
receive his training and become involved.
However, despite these problems, everyone was pleased with the
progress that had so far been made in Introducing CNC.
The situation at the third set of visits
The last set of visits commenced In February 1985, and by this
time the ClC was in full production. To a large extent, there
Was general satisfaction with the progress made; the company
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were already beginning to think of buying a second CNC, but there
were some problems, which were:-
ii Whilst the CNC was now producing at the anticipated rate,
the production engineer and the manager felt that this could
be increased by 20% - 30% if the setter-operators were put
on bonus. They felt that unless their pay was linked to
output, the setter-operators would not voluntarily produce
more. However, the company had still not devised a bonus
scheme for Grade 1 workers, nor had time studies been carried
out. The former was the responsibility of the Production
Director, who had stated that it would be done when the
time studies were completed. The latter were the respon-
sibility of the Production Engineering Manager, who could
not see the point in doing time studies until a bonus system
had been devised. Therefore, whilst he wanted a bonus
system to be introduced, he was also partly responsible for
blocking its introduction. It was also the case that before
a bonus system could be introduced, a full job evaluation,
with its potential problems, would have to be carried out.
ii)The supervisor had still not been given any CNC training
and was therefore still not involved with CNC. In the
interim, his supervisory functions were being carried out
by the programmer.
iii)The setter-operators felt that, in retrospect, they had
not received enough training on the programming aspects of
CNC, and that this was slowing down their participation in
proving out programs and sorting out problems.
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1V) The system of the setter-operators alternating on a weekly
basis between CNC work and other work had broken down.
This was because one of the setter-operators had to take
the place of a colleague who was ill, and did not work on
CNC for 5 weeks. When he finally got back on CNC, he had
to re-learn much of what he had been taught. It appeared
that this could happen frequently with both operators, and
would not be resolved until both were required to work on
CNC full-time.
v) The production engineer was still continuing to input prog-
rams manually, and had abandoned all pretence of using the
tape-preparation machine.
Despite these problems, there appeared to be no doubt that the
company saw CNC as a good investment and that those involved with
CNC preferred it to the previous arrangements.
Conclusion
A number of points arise from this case study. The first is that
the Production Engineering Manager, who was responsible for CNC
introduction, had to change his original intention for CNC
organisation in the face of advice from the CNC supplier and
opposition from the production engineer. This indicates that
whilst he appeared to have fully investigated the technical and
economic aspects of CNC, the organisational ones had received
less attention.
The second point relates to the formal and actual organisation
around the CNC. Formally, the supervisor was in charge of
production from the CNC, but in practice this role was being
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carried out by the production engineer, and, at the time of the
last visit, there was no indication of whether, and if so when,
this would change.
The third point relates to the performance of the CNC in technical,
economic and human terms.
In technical terms, there appeared to be few, if any, probtems
with the machine.
In economic terms, the machine had measured up to its promise;
indeed, the Production Engineering Manager felt that this could
be substantially improved when a bonus system was introduced.
In human terms, the outcome appeared to please the production
engineer, who enjoyed programming and the added prestige of working
with new technology. The setter-operators, despite one or two
problems, preferred CNC to their former jobs and welcomed the
chance to be involved with new technology. Whether this would
change if a bonus system were introduced remained to be seen,
but both would welcome one because they felt that they would
earn more money. The only person who might lose out by the
introduction of CNC was the supervisor, if he did not become
involved in this or future CNCs.
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CHAPTER TEN
LARGE COMPANIES, LARGE BATCHES
CASE STUDY EIGHT
The Company
This is a large company, comprising four separate factories,
which is the biggest overseas division of an American multi-
national corporation. It was established in Sheffield in 1936
and is market leader in the production of high quality hand tools
such as woodplanes, screwdrivers and hammers.
The factory where the CNCs have been introduced employed 800
people at the time of the study, and was also the headquarters
for the other three factories. In 1979, the company's four
factories employed 2,000 people, but because of a decline in its
market - turnover dropped from £30 million in 1979 to £20 million
in 1981 - by 1983, it only employed 1,200. Despite this, the
company has never made a loss and in 1984 made £3.8 million
profit.
The recession led the American parent company to rationalise
its American and European operations, which resulted in a
reduction of the operating independence the British company had
previously enjoyed. Though this did not, as such, affect
day-to-day control of production, it did lead to a transfer of
some products from Sheffield to factories in other countries
and vice versa.
The four factories were run by a production controller, responsible
to the British Board of Directors, and each had it own Factory
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Manager, who was responsible for production on a day-to-day
basis. At the factory where CNC was introduced, the manager is
responsible for the shopfloor and supervisory staff as well as
various ancillary technical functions.
The CNCs were installed in the Plane Department of the main
factory, which had 90 employees and was split into 3 sections,
each with its own supervisor. The supervisors were responsible
to a departmental foreman, who in turn reported to the Works
Manager. There was also an Engineering Department, responsible
to the Works Manager, which, amongst other functions, was in
overall charge of CNC programming.
At the time of the first visit, the factory had 2 CNCs; it later
acquired a third. The two CNC5 were both milling machines,
bought for approximately £20,000 each in 1979 and 1981 respectively.
They were used to perform simple milling operations on a small
range of woodplanes which ranged in batch size from 700 to
10,000, though the normal batch size was 1,000. Machining time
per plane was between 30 and 60 seconds, and set-up time ranged
from one hour on the second CNC to 4 hours on the first, which
performed slightly more complex operations than the other
machine. There was also a difference in the time to write and
prove programs: four hours on the second machine and one to two
days on the first. However, the machines only had 12 programs
each and new ones, at the time of the first visit, were quite
rare.
The first visit took place in January 1983 and the last one in
October 1984. Initial contact was made with the Engineering
Manager.
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Management-worker relations in the company appeared very friendly,
and a high proportion of the workforce, especially the men, had
been with the company since they left school.
The company was unionised and the unions were active in a wide
range of joint management-union committees. They did not have
a record of militancy; they accepted the redundancies as inevitable,
and their interest with regard to the introduction of new equipment
revolved around payment rather than job content.
The organisation of work prior to CNC
The operations carried out in the Plane Department were the
milling, drilling and tapping of woodplane bodies. These had
been, and still were to a large extent, performed on a range of
semi-automatic and conventional machines which were limited to
carrying out a small range of similar operations. There were
three basic machine-related jobs: setting semi-automatic and
conventional machines; setting and operating conventional machines;
and operating semi-automatic and conventional machines. The
setters were classed as skilled workers; the setter-operators
as semi-skilled; and the operators, some 2/3 of the Department,
were also classed as semi-skilled, but were paid at a lower rate
than setter-operators. Pay was determined by a job evaluation
system and each worker had his/her own written job description:
there were 46 different grades of shopfloor worker. All the
operators and setter-operators were on an individual bonus system;
this continued to be the case with CNC personnel as well.
Supervision, which was close, was provided by three supervisors
who were responsible to the departmental foreman.
276
The reasons for the introduction of CNC
Part of the parent company's rationalisation plan involved the
introduction of newer production methods and equipment in order
to reduce costs and maintain/increase quality. Between 1979 and
1982, the British company spent £3 million on new equipment,
the vast majority of which was not micro-electronically based.
However, in 1979 they did buy one CNC milling machine for use in
the Plane Department. This was for two reasons:-
i) A quality problem, which was bringing criticism from customers,
had arisen on one particular range of wood planes. To prevent
this required an additional milling operation which, the
production engineers argued, could only be carried out on
a CNC machine.
ii) A CNC machine, because of its higher productivity, would be
capable of carrying out all the finish milling operations
on the range of woodplanes involved and this would allow
one person to perform the work previously carried out by
six.
Therefore, for quality and economic reasons, the company bought
its first CNC milling machine.
For similar reasons, a second CNC milling machine was bought in
1981.
The orcranisation of work around CNC
The first CNC had a female operator whose only task was to load
and unload the machine. Everything else - programming, setting,
inspection - was done by a programmer-setter.
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This was decided upon by the Factory Manager for two reasons:-
i) It appeared the most economic method of operation: it
allowed 6 setter-operators to be replaced by one operator
and one programmer-setter. The latter was an existing setter,
whose workload was re-organised to allow him time to programme
and set the CNC as well as other machines.
ii) The Factory Manager wished to allay union fears that new
technology would replace skilled shopfloor workers by
showing that an existing setter could programme CNC.
Normally, the organisation of work around new machines would have
been decided upon by a production engineer, a work study engineer
and the supervisor of the section where the new machine would be
located. The Factory Manager took on the task in this instance
partly because he felt that the introduction of new technology
could lead to industrial relations problems if not handled
properly, and partly because he disagreed with the proposals of
the supervisors and production engineers, who wished to see the
latter do the programming. However, as recognition of this, he
put a production engineer in overall charge of programming, but
in practice he was never consulted by the programmer-setter.
Ihe organisation of work for the second CNC was decided upon by
a production engineer, work study engineer and supervisor, who
on this occasion got their way. A production engineer was made
responsible f or all programming-related functions and a setter-
operator carried out the other tasks.
Is will be explained below, this was because the supervisory
orid production engineering staff, and the Factory Manager, had
become increasingly worried about the control that the programmer-
Setter exercised over the first CNC.
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The problems with the CNCs
CNC1: In terms of reliability, output and quality, the first CNC
performed very well. However, there were problems relating to
the operator's and programmer-setter's jobs:-
i) The operator found her job exceedingly boring and monotonous.
All she did was load and unload the machine all day; the
machine cycle, which was one minute, was fixed and in loading
and unloading she was paced by the machine.
ii) With the machine cycle being fixed, the operator found it
very difficult to earn bonus. This was exacerbated by
the fact that operators and setter-operators on other
machines, who did earn a relatively high bonus, could vary
the pace of their work to allow them to take longer tea
breaks or to finish earlier, whereas she could not.
iii) The supervisors in the Plane Department felt that they had
lost control over the programmer-setter. This was because,
despite the fact that one of the supervisors had received
CNC training, no one else on the shopfloor was conversant
with CNC programming and setting, and, therefore, did not
know if the prograrnnier-setter should take four hours or
four days to set up the CNC. This was further compounded
by the fact that he was shop steward for the Plane Department,
and after he became programmer-setter, he negotiated a
wage increase for himself.
iv) The production engineers continued to object to shopfloor
programming; partly because, as one commented: "it's bad
practice to let shopfloor workers decide upon production
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methods and speeds", but mainly because "it's job erosion
letting a setter do our [production engineers'] job".
CNC2: The worries over the control that the programmer-setter
had of CNC1 persuaded the Factory Manager that a different system
should be adopted for the second CNC. This time, as mentioned,
a production engineer actually performed all the progranirning
functions. This pleased the production engineers, because they
felt that the threat to their status had been halted. It also
pleased the supervisors, who felt that with CNC2 they, and not
a setter, would control the machine and its setter-operator;
though in practice it was the production engineer who programmed
the CNC who was in charge rather than the supervisors.
However, there were a number of problems with CNC2:-
i) The machine proved to be unreliable and kept breaking down.
Ironically, when this happened, work had to be transferred
from CNC2 to CNC1, which, because CNC1 used a different
programming language, meant that the CNC1 programmer-setter
had to write a new program. This would not have happened
if CNC2 had been the same make of CNC as CNC1, but a different
machine was bought partly because it was felt that it would
thereby be easier to convince the unions that a different
form of organisation was applicable.
ii) The problems of boredom and bonus which afflicted the
operator on CNC1 also affected the setter-operator on CNC2.
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iii) If a problem arose with CNC2, as happened once or twice
a week, the production engineer had to be called. However,
he was not always able to come immediately; indeed, his
duties sometimes took him out of the factory altogether.
Therefore, the machine could be standing idle for some
hours until he was available. This did not happen on
CNC1, because the programmer-setter was paid to give
priority to that machine and was always within shouting
distance.
There was one final problem which affected both machines: this
was that some production engineers, as well as an outside
consultant who had been involved in the CNC introduction,
questioned the suitability of using CNC to manufacture the
type, and quantity, of components for which the company were
using them.
The situation at the first set of visits
The first set of visits began in January 1983, and the situation
was very much as described in the last two sections. However,
there were attempts to improve bonus earnings on the two
machines. This was done in two ways:-
i) The Engineering Manager, who was also responsible for
work study, had altered the bonus system for the CNC
machines to allow the operators to earn more bonus for
producing the same amount of work.
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ii) The programmer-setter on CNC1 "fiddled" setting times to
allow the operator to produce work, and so earn bonus,
when the machine was officially classed as not operating.
The setter-operator on CNC2 also used a similar arrangement
to increase his bonus.
Both these arrangements, especially the latter, were against
company rules, but everyone - including the Factory Manager -
appeared to know of and condone them.
There were also attempts to alleviate the monotony of the operator's
job on CNC1 by training someone else to alternate with her on the
machine. However, the first person who was trained refused to
go back on the machine after trying it for a week, because of
the problems of boredom and bonus.
The other CNC problems still continued:-
U The production engineers and the supervisors would have
liked to remove the programming functions from the
programmer-setter on CNC1, but did not attempt this
because: "he'd kick up a fuss and the union would object
to the job being downgraded".
ii) CNC2 still kept breaking down, and it appeared that this
would continue to be the case, given the machine's general
unreliability.
iii) CNC2 also continued to be idle on occasions because of the
non-availability of the production engineer.
Despite the problems that arose, the Engineering Manager, who was
responsible for initiating the purchase of new equipment, remained
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convinced that "CNC is the future for us if we're to remain in
business".
These visits finished in April 1983, and the next set of visits
were arranged for the following October.
The situation at the second set of visits
Since the first visits, the company's output had increased
enormously owing to a number of product lines being transferred
from America to Britain. This resulted, amongst other things,
in the second set of visits being delayed until January 1984.
Since the first visits, there had been a number of changes
which had affected the CNCs; these were:-
1) The new product lines were mainly woodplanes, and this
increased the workload on the CNC5 to the extent that
they were put on two shifts.
ii) The original operator for CNC1 had left and two new operators
were being trained.
iii) The supervisor responsible for CNC2 was promoted to
production engineer; the programmer-setter was given his
job and was no longer connected with CNC1. A new
programmer-setter was being trained to take his place.
iv) The programmer for CNC2 was also made programmer for
CNC1, with a view to these functions being removed from
the new programmer-setter's job description. The latter
would then be responsible for setting the CNC and sorting
out problems as they arose.
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v) A further CNC was being transferred from America to cope
with the increased workload.
Despite these changes, there were continuing problems with the
CNCs : -
1) The union was resisting attempts to downgrade the
programmer-setter's job.
ii) The production engineer was so busy with the additional
work generated by the transfer of products from America
that he had to leave the programming of the new work on
CNC1 to the new programmer-setter.
iii) The two-shift system on the CNC2 meant that for 8 out of
the 16 hours that the machines were working per day,
neither the production engineer nor the programmer-setter
were available if a problem were to arise.
Therefore, the company still had two different methods of organising
work around the two CNCs, and there was an increased number of
occasions when both machines were idle because no-one was there
to sort out programming-related problems.
A return visit was arranged to coincide with the arrival of the
American CNC.
The situation at the third set of visits
The third set of visits began in September 1984, shortly after
the arrival of the third CNC. The machine was not in production
and, because of the workload of the Engineering Department, was
not likely to be for some months.
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However, there was a recognition that, with 3 CNCs, a more
unified system of organisation was necessary. This was to be
achieved, according to a production engineer, by:-
i) Making the production engineer, who was currently responsible
for programming CNC1 and 2, responsible for all CNCs.
ii) Training other production engineers to programme in order
to assist him and to provide cover in his absence.
iii) Putting all three CNCs under the supervision of the person
who had been the original programmer-setter on CNC1. This
meant that the machines would be supervised by someone who
was familiar with CNC and could sort out programming
problems if necessary.
iv) Training all the setters to sort out CNC problems, especially
on the afternoon shift when the production engineers were
not there.
v) Putting a setter-operator on CNC3, like CNC2, though CNC1
was to continue with only an operator.
It was felt that, over time, this would provide an adequate and
efficient CNC organisation. Nevertheless, there were still
obstacles in the way of this:-
i) The ex-programmer-setter for CNC1 was reluctant to become
involved in sorting out programming problems, because he
had been annoyed by the way that the production engineers
had tried to take over programming. As he commented:-
"They [the production engineers] wanted to programme, let
them sort out the problems".
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ii) The new programmer-setter, and the union, still maintained
that he was responsible for programming CNC1 and not the
production engineers.
iii) If other setters were to be trained to sort out CNC problems,
they would have to be paid extra money for these new duties.
The union might also claim that they should be trained to
programme as well.
iv) There was the possibility that the setter-operator on CNC2
would object to other setters being given responsibility
for his machine, on the grounds that it would downgrade
his status. This was not, however, the case if production
engineers were to be responsible.
In addition to the above problems, the issues of boredom and
bonus still remained for the CNC operators and setter-operators.
Conclusion
number of points arise from this case study. The first is that
after 5 years, the company had still not achieved a stable form
of CNC organisation. The reason for this appeared to stem from
the opposition of the Engineering Department and the Plane Dep-
artment supervisors to the organisation originally chosen for
CNC. Instead, they wished to see a system more favourable to
their own interests. Normally, this sort of problem would not
occur because these two groups would determine how new machinery
would be used. However, in this instance, the Factory Manager
chose the organisation of work but, whilst it had advantages,
when the second CNC was introduced, the production engineers and
Supervisors convinced him that their way was better in terms of
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control of shopfloor personnel, and a new form of organisation
was decided upon for the second CNC. Nevertheless, the organisation
of work around CNC1 proved difficult to change, despite attempts
by production engineers and supervisors to move it more into
line with CNC2.
The second point to note is the disparity between the formal
and actual organisation of work. On CNC1, formally a supervisor
and a production engineer oversaw the work; in practice, the
programmer-setter was in charge. On CNC2, a supervisor and a
production engineer were formally in control, but in practice
it was the production engineer, and not the supervisor, who
was in charge.
There was also a disparity between what should in theory happen
and what actually happened with regard to bonus. All involved
appeared to help bend the rules so that those operating CNC could
earn more bonus than would otherwise be the case.
The third point to note relates to the performance of the CNCs
in technical, economic and human terms.
In technical terms, the first CNC appeared to function perfectly
well, whilst the second CNC appeared to be plagued with mechan-
ical and electrical faults.
In economic terms, there appeared to be few problems with CNC1,
but once again CNC2, because of its technical unreliability and
the unavailability, on occasions, of the production engineer,
left something to be desired. However, with regard to both
machines, there was also the general question of whether CNC was
the best technology to manufacture the products required economically.
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In human terms, CNC1 had provided a very good job for the
programmer-setter, whose work was more skilled and varied, and
better rewarded, than that of other setters. The same cannot be
said for the operator's job, which was both boring and monotonous.
On CNC2, the situation was similar. The production engineer
found that his programming-related functions added variety to his
job and enhanced his status; whilst the setter-operator's job,
which involved very little setting, was equally boring and
monotonous to the operator's job on CNC1.
The supervisory staff, owing to their general lack of understanding
of CNC, appeared to have less control over CNCs than over other
machines, which obviously diminished their role.
Finally, there was obviously an awareness of all these problems,
and the company was gradually trying to solve some of them;
however, at the time of the last visit, there were still question
marks over how successful they would be.
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CASE STUDY NINE
The Company
This is a large company which was established in 1913 and was still
controlled by the founding family until its take-over by a Swedish
multi-national corporation in 1975. It is the leading European
manufacturer of cutting tools such as drills and reamers. Its
operations are located in four factories, the biggest of which,
employing 1,100 people, is in Sheffield. The other three, employing
400 people between them, are located in Nottingham, Birmingham
and Worksop.
The company had employed 2,400 people in 1975, but this had fallen,
especially since 1979, to its present level of 1,500, due mainly
to the shrinking of its market by one-third. Despite this, the
company continued to be profitable, but at a much reduced rate.
The Swedish parent company had gradually increased its control
over the company and, since 1979, it had completely replaced the
former top management. The Sheffield factory, which was the one
being studied, was the headquarters for the other three factories
and was also the largest production unit.
The factory is located on two sides of a road, in old multi-
storeyed buildings. For these reasons, its manufacturing
operations are split into a multitude of small departments.
The CNC5 were introduced into the drill turning section, which
used to employ 44 people, but this had been reduced to 15 by the
time of the first visit. The section had one supervisor who was
responsible to the departmental foreman, who in turn reported to
the Works Manager. The production departments were supported by
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a number of separate technical departments, such as Engineering,
esponsible for the introduction of new equipment; Production
iethods, responsible for the introduction of new products; and
Work Study, responsible for job evaluation and bonus.
The Sheffield factory introduced four CNC turning lathes during
the period covered by the study. The first two were installed in
March 1983 at a cost of £141,000, the third was transferred from
the Worksop factory in September 1983, and the last, costing
£90,000, was installed in November 1984.
They were used to turn very simple products such as drill blanks,
in batches ranging from 50 to 1,000, though the standard batch
size was approximately 400. Machining times per product ranged
from 30 seconds to 2 minutes, although occasionally this could
be up to 5 minutes. Setting-up times for the machines ranged
from 15 minutes to l hours, and new programs took 30 to 40
minutes to write. Each CNC had some 10 to 15 different programs,
each of which covered 30 to 40 different sizes of the same product.
The first visit to the company was made in January 1983, two
months before the first CNCs were installed, and the last visit
was made in February 1985. Initial contact was made with the
Engineering Manager, whose department was responsible for
urchasing and installing the CNCs.
Management-worker relations appeared to have worsened in the
past 5 or 6 years, which was said to be partly due to the loss
of jobs and partly due to the change of top management. However,
the unions were very active on a range of management-union
committees, but were criticised, by their own members, for lack
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of communication. They did attempt, with the introduction of the
first CNCs, to negotiate a New Technology Agreement which would
have guaranteed shopfloor involvement in programming and redeploy-
ment of displaced workers. However, management rejected the
concept of such an agreement, and from that point, the unions
appeared to have lost interest in the issue.
The situation at the first set of visits
The first visits to the company took place in January 1983, and
therefore what follows is a description of the organisation of
)rk and plans for CNC before the machines were installed.
The organisation of work on the Drill Turning Section
There were approximately 40 machines on the section, most of which
were either automatic or semi-automatic. A number of the
iachines had either been purpose-built, or specially adapted,
or drill production by the company itself at its Worksop factory.
lost of the machines, with one or two exceptions, were each used
to perform simple turning operations on a narrow range of drills.
There were three basic machine-related jobs on the section:
setting; setting and operating; and purely operating. All three
jobs were classed as semi-skilled and graded, like all machine-
related jobs in the factory, on a scale of 1, least skilled, to
11, the most skilled. The setters and setter-operators were,
in the main, on Grade 7, whilst the operators were on Grade 5.
The exact grade was determined by the Work Study Department, who
carried out an evaluation of each job, and who also wrote a
detailed job description.
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Jobs in the factory were designed, as one engineer put it, on
the principle of "minimum job content", in order to keep wages
down and to reduce training time to a minimum. The supervisor
on the Drill Turning Section commented that:
Things are organised here so that a milkman, say, could
drive in, get off his float, and, within a few weeks,
be setting and operating a machine as well as the next
bloke.
It was company policy for all shopfloor workers, where practical,
to be on a bonus system, and this was extended to the CNCs when
they were introduced.
The reasons for the introduction of CNC
The parent company, as a response to the recession, had instigated
a programme to modernise and re-organise production in the four
English factories in order to cut costs and increase quality.
The turning section was seen as being particularly inefficient,
mainly because most of the machines were old, inaccurate and
limited in the type of operations they could perform. The
specific reasons for the decision to buy the first two CNCs were:-
i) The two CNC5 would replace 10 existing machines.
ii) One person would operate both machines at once, because
each CNC was loaded and unloaded by a robot.
iii) The machines the CNCs replaced were so inaccurate that after
the drill blanks were turned, they had to be ground to size
before going on to the next operation. The CNCs would
eliminate the need for grinding.
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iv) The number of people involved in turning and grinding
would be reduced.
Therefore, in order to increase quality and reduce costs, the
company decided to buy two CNC5 with two robots. However, it was
not clear whether or not alternatives to CNC had been considered,
but it was clear that the Engineering Manager saw his department's
involvement with new technology as a way of enhancing its status
within the company.
The proposed organisation of work around CNC
It was the Engineering Manager's intention that two of his staff,
one from Sheffield and one, who had previous CNC experience, from
Worksop, would spend several months with the machines in order to
write and prove tapes and sort out any teething troubles. The
machines were then to be handed over to the production staff and
would be operated, on two shifts, by two setter-operators. Their
job would be to set up the CNC5 and position the robots and,
when the machines were in operation, to monitor them. It was not
envisaged that they would need any programming knowledge because
all they would have to do would be to feed in a master program,
which they would then amend, using a written edit sheet provided
by the engineers, to produce the required size of drill. In
addition, the machines had a mechanism for automatically checking
and adjusting the size of the drills being produced, to ensure
that they were within the permitted tolerances. The section
supervisor, like the setter-operators, was to be involved from
the start, but he was not expected to be involved in sorting out
either setting or programming problems.
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This organisation was chosen for three reasons:-
i) It allowed increased managerial control over the pace and
quality of production.
ii) It kept the input of the setter-operators to a minimum,
and thus kept their wages down.
iii) It ensured that the Engineering Department would keep
control of the programming of the CNC5.
The situation at the second set of visits
The second set of visits commenced in March 1983 with the arrival
of the CNC5. The two engineers believed it would take them three
to four months to prepare the machines for full production; the
majority of this time was to be devoted to writing and proving
the programs for the CNCs.
The engineers, along with the supervisor, who was eager to learn
s much as he could about the CNCs, had already completed a one-
reek programming course, and one of the supplier's installation
ngineers was to spend two or three months helping them to bring
:he CNCs into production. The two setter-operators were also to
e present during the installation period, in order to receive
training for the machines.
At this time, the introduction appeared to be going as planned,
though there were some potential problems:-
i) The engineers were worried that even after all the programs
had been proved, minor programming problems might still
arise. In order to deal with this eventuality, the supervisor,
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mainly at his own insistence, was to be trained to deal
with these.
ii) The CNCs, whilst being located in the turning section, were
put in a separate enclosure to prevent anyone tampering
with them or the robots. The engineers were concerned
that lack of contact with other workers, coupled with long
periods of machine-minding, might lead to boredom and lack
of motivation for the setter-operators.
iii) There was also the worry, given the fixed production rate
of the CNCs, that it would be difficult for the setter-
operators to earn the same level of bonus as other workers.
Nevertheless, these were seen as minor problems which would
eventually be resolved.
The situation at the third set of visits
The next set of visits began in August 1983, when it had been
expected that the CNCs would be in full production. However, the
introduction process had proved more complicated than had been
envisaged, and was now not expected to be completed before October.
Nevertheless, the Engineering Manager expressed himself pleased
with the progress that had been made. The outstanding problems
were as follows:-
1) There was a general acceptance that there would be a
greater need for setter-operator intervention than had
originally been intended. This was partly due to problems
with the automatic sizing mechanism, partly due to the
fact that there would need to be the occasional new program
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for the machines, but mainly because, as the supervisor
commented:
We had a simplistic view of CNC: we thought all
you did was put the tape in, press a few buttons,
and away you go. It's not like that at all.
ii) The engineers and the supervisor had spent so much time on
the machines that the setter-operators had been pushed into
the background and had received less training than was
originally intended.
iii) The CNCs were to be worked on two shifts: 6 am to 2 pm and
2 pm to 10 pm. However, the supervisor and the engineers
only worked from 8 am to 4.30 pm, and it was not clear
what would happen if a problem occurred, which the setter-
operators could not deal with, outside these hours.
iv) The setter-operators resented being kept in the background,
and saw this as an indication that the management did not
want them to learn about programming, because the company
might then have to pay them more money. They saw this as
Ieing confirmed by the fact that they were not to be allowed
to take time off to attend an evening programming course,
which would have required them to miss part of an afternoon
shift, at a local college.
v) The setter-operators felt that the majority of their time
on the CNCs would be spent monitoring the machines for
faults, but that when something did go wrong, they would
not be able to deal with it. Therefore, they saw their
job as both boring and frustrating.
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'lowever, this system did not appear to fit in with the practice
that was developing in the Sheffield factory. Therefore, it
remained to be seen what the setter-operator's role would be once
this new CNC was in operation.
The situation at the fourth set of visits
The fourth set of visits began in February 1984. By this time,
the first two CNCs had been in full production on two shifts for
three months, and a third setter-operator was being trained with
a view to the machines being worked on three shifts. Despite the
fact that the machines were in production, the company's Sheffield-
based engineer was still making regular visits to the machines
because of continuing problems with the sizing mechanism and with
the robots. However, the main problems that had arisen were
related to the setter-operators. These were:-
i) The setter-operators had been led to believe that they
would be regraded to Grade 9 or 10. However, their jobs
had been assessed by the work study engineers and they had
been put on Grade 8. Not unnaturally, they were upset
by this, and it had a severe effect upon their performance.
Indeed, such was the change that the supervisor, who
sympathised with them and had told them to appeal against
their grading, had disciplined them for lack of co-operation.
ii) It was apparent that the setter-operators' training in
relation to programming had been insufficient, and that
this was causing delays and in some cases costly accidents.
However, they were no longer prepared to learn to deal with
these problems; as one of them said, "I'm gradually losing
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interest, there's no incentive for us". Therefore, the
supervisor, who along with the engineers was writing new
programs, was dealing with programming problems, even to
the extent that if something went wrong on the evening
shift, he would be rung at home; though on occasions this
merely resulted in the machine being turned off until the
next day.
iii) The quality of work from the machines was lower than expected.
This was partly because the setter-operators, especially
between 4 pm and 10 pm on the afternoon shift when the
supervisor was not present, increased speeds in order to
produce more work and earn more bonus. However, as speeds
increased, quality decreased.
iv) These problems were exacerbated by the supervisor and the
engineers believing that any new or modified programs they
produced were correct and did not need proving. Therefore,
when problems did occur, the tendency was to blame the
setter-operators, even though in some instances the fault
lay with the program.
was not clear how these problems would be resolved, though
there was a tendency for managers to ignore them or blame someone
ise. The Engineering Manager commented that he had tried to
ke his counterparts in Production understand the problems, but
hat:-
• . . there's a terrible tendency amongst management in
production to think that they don't need to have operators
with any real skill; that all you need to do is push the
buttons and the machine will take care of everything else.
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The Works Manager for his part denied that there were any signif i-
cant problems, but pointed out that:-
If there are problems with the training, that's not my
department; it's Engineering who are responsible for
that
There were also problems with the CNC that had been transferred
from Worksop. The job of the setter-operator, who was continuing,
in co-operation with the supervisor, to do some programming, had
also been assessed by Work Study. He was put on Grade 9, but
this was less than he was earning at Worksop, and, therefore, he
was not pleased with the situation. However, he had not yet been
put onto bonus; in the interim he was being paid a fixed bonus.
The quality of his work and the level of co-operation, though not
the output, was greater than with the other two CNCs.
One further development was that the company had decided to buy
another CNC, which was due to be installed in June 1984.
The situation at the fifth set of visits
These commenced in December 1984, which was later than expected,
owing to the late arrival of the fourth CNC.
The situation with the first two CNCs had not improved; indeed,
it had probably deteriorated, given that both setter-operators
were seeking new jobs. This was despite that fact that they
had won their grading appeal and were now on Grade 9. Nevertheless,
the quality of work from the machines had not improved; the
setter-operators' work was now having to be inspected by someone
else in an attempt to remedy this. They had also been warned
that their bonus earnings were, to use the supervisor's phrase,
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"ridiculously high", and that all their work would be retimed
if they did not earn less. Needless to say, this did not increase
their level of co-operation.
They were, however, pleased by the fact that the idea of working
three shifts had been abandoned and that they were working alternate
day and night shifts. This meant not only that they received an
increased shift allowance, but that every other week, when they
were working nights, they were entirely free from supervision.
The situation with the third CNC had also deteriorated. The
setter-operator had also appealed against his pay and had been
regraded to Grade 10. However, he had been warned that his
production rate was too low and that if it did not improve he
would be put on an output bonus, rather than a fixed bonus. His
output did not improve and, therefore, he was put on bonus. This
resulted in an increase in output, a decrease in quality, and the
setter-operator looking for another job.
With regard to the fourth CNC, which was installed in November,
it was too early to tell whether or not the problems that had
occurred on the other CNCs would occur with this machine. The
setter-operator was the one who had been trained to operate the
first two CNC5 when it was planned that they would be working
on three shifts. He had spent a week being trained by the
installation engineer and felt that the training had been very
good. The engineers for their part believed that he would have
to be trained to a higher level than the setter-operators on
the first two CNCs, especially as this CNC, and the products it
was making, were more complex. However, the Worksop engineer
felt that his Sheffield counterpart, who was in control of the
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introduction, did not fully appreciate this. On the other hand,
the supervisor, who was spending more and more time dealing with
CNC problems, believed that "the time might come when we have to
have a specialist setter to trouble-shoot on the CNCs; someone who
could act as a back-up to the setter-operators."
Therefore, it was not clear how CNC would develop, but the company
were firmly committed to CNC and were expecting to introduce
another CNC lathe in April 1985.
Conclusion
A number of points arise from this case study. The first is that
he decision to buy CNC and the method of its introduction were
.he responsibility of the Engineering Department, especially its
Manager. The manager and the Sheffield engineer, though perhaps
not the one from Worksop, wished to see their own role bolstered
and that of the setter-operators kept to a minimum. In the latter
respect, this accorded with established views of shopfloor jobs
within the company. Nevertheless, the experience of CNC convinced
those involved that there was a greater need for setter-operator
intervention than had originally been envisaged. However, their
failure to take appropriate action, or to convince others such as
the production management and the work study engineers quickly
enough of this necessity, had resulted in many problems.
The second point to note relates to the disparity between the
formal organisation of work and the actual organisation. Formally,
the engineers wrote the programs, which were then handed over to
the setter-operators, who dealt with them after that. However,
in practice, the supervisor also wrote programs and, on CNC1 and
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CNC2, he also became involved in sorting out any subsequent
problems. On CNC3, the setter-operator also wrote programs, In
conjunction with the supervisor. Therefore, the supervisor spent
much of his time performing work which, in theory, should be
carried out by the engineers and the setter-operators.
Thirdly, the performance of the CNCs is to be assessed in technical,
economic and human terms.
In technical terms, there were some problems with both CNC1 and
CNC2, the main one concerning the mechanism for measuring and
adjusting the size of the parts being machined. The effect of
this latter was to require greater setter-operator intervention.
In economic terms, the quality problems that arose on CNC1 and
CNC2, and possibly also CNC3, obviously reduced the expected
financial benefits. There was also the issue raised by one of
the engineers of the suitability of CNC for the production of
simple components in such quantities.
In human terms, what could have been good jobs for the setter-operators
on CNC1 and CNC2 were marred by the failure to recognise early
enough the need for them to have a wider role. This was compounded
by the failure to evaluate and grade their jobs properly in the
first instance. Taken together, these two mistakes acted to
reduce their willingness to learn arid co-operate, whilst increasing
their pursuit of bonus payments.
CNC3.
A similar result occurred with
The role of the supervisor, on the other hand, was expanded, and
his job status and satisfaction were increased by his contact
with CNC. Whether he would be able to carry out his normal
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supervisory duties and cope with his CNC role as more and more
CNCs were introduced remained to be seen.
With regard to the engineers, they certainly enjoyed their contact
with CNC. They believed that it enhanced not only their indiv-
idual status but also that of the Engineering Department as a
whole.
In summary, there was obviously a potential for creating satis-
ying jobs and for achieving the company's production requirements.
lowever, in the case of the setter-operators, it was the failure
o achieve the former which led to the problems in achieving the
latter.
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PART	 THREE
CHAPTER ELEVEN
UNDERSTANDING TECHNICAL CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
This, the concluding chapter in the Thesis, will compare the
case studies presented in the last four chapters. It will show
why the organisations adopted CNC, how they decided how to use
it and what the impact was, especially in human terms. It will
also examine what alternative, methods of use were considered.
The conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4 will then be
examined in the light of the case studies. In particular, the
case studies will be used to demonstrate the relevance of the
internal organisational factors to the change process. It will
also be shown how those factors relate to and are influenced by
the external factors.
The chapter will conclude by arguing that the research has
supported the conceptual framework and by presenting guidelines
for the introduction of new technology.
Nevertheless, it will be pointed out that the main stumbling
block to the successful adoption of new technology is the
continuing influence upon managers of the philosophy and precepts
of Scientific Management.
THE CASE STUDIES
This section will compare the case studies with each other and
in relation to the main issues under discussion, as described
in Chapter 5, namely:-
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1 Why do organisations adopt CNC?
2 How do they decide how to use it?
3 What is the outcome in terms of the organisation's technical
and financial objectives, and in terms of work organisation
and job design?
What alternative forms of use were considered/were available?
Why CNC?
Not surprisingly, all of the companies studied mentioned the
need to increase productivity/competitiveness or to reduce
costs/labour as reasons for buying or continuing to buy CNC.
Four companies, cases 2, 4, 8 and 9, also adopted CNC because
they wished to improve/maintain product quality; whilst three
companies, cases 1, 3 and 4, saw CNC as reducing the present
or future need for skilled labour or as a means of avoiding
a future labour/skill shortage. Only in one instance, case 3,
was CNC introduced specifically as a method of increasing
the management's control over the production process.
These are all, perhaps with the exclusion of the last,
reasonably obvious and understandable reasons for buying new
technology. However, as well as these, one other reason
was also given by seven companies, the exceptions being cases
6 and 8, which was that, in their opinion, new technology was
"the future"; they believed that if their companies did not
adopt CNC, they would eventually go out of business. What
is surprising is that, although this emerged as a major reason
for the purchase and continued usage of CNC, none of the
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companies appeared to have investigated or questioned this
assumption. This is shown by an examination of the assess-
ments, or lack of them, that the companies prepared in order
to justify the purchase of CNC: out of the 9 companies, there
was no instance of any alternative to CNC being seriously
considered prior to purchase. Those in each company who were
responsible for initiating the purchase of new equipment
appeared to have decided that CNC was required and then to
have justified it in terms of its superiority over existing
equipment rather than in comparison to other alternatives.
Indeed, in four companies, cases 1, 2, 3 and 5, no financial
assessment appeared to have been carried out at all. The
assessment carried out in three of the companies, cases 4, 8
and 9, can at best be described as brief, and only in two
companies, cases 6 and 7, were extensive financial justifi-
cations put forward.
Therefore, the most surprising, and perhaps the most significant,
reason why these companies bought CNC was an unquestioned
belief that CNC, because it was new technology, was "the
future", rather than any firm evidence that it was the best
option available.
2 Factors which influenced the use of CNC
In examining the factors that influenced how CNC was used,
it should be noted that, generally, only one person, usually
the person responsible for initiating the purchase, decided
upon the original organisation of work around CNC. The
person may have consulted, or been influenced by, others but
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the initial decision was theirs alone. A variety of reasons
were given to explain why a particular choice was made, but
in practice three factors appear most influential:-
1) To accommodate CNC within the existing structure,
practices and personnel of the organisation with the
minimum disruption. (Cases 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)
ii) To maintain or increase management control. (Cases 3,
5, 6, 7 and 9)
iii) A belief that CNC was relatively simple to use. (Cases
1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9)
Nevertheless, despite having decided upon a particular form of
work organisation, once the CNC5 had been introduced, problems
arose which, in most cases, required changes to how the
machines were used or what particular individuals did. This
was for four reasons:-
i) Poor planning of the introduction process, especially
lack of training for those involved, which in some
cases almost amounted to incompetence. (Cases 1, 2, 3,
5 and 9)
ii) A realisation that CNC required greater skill/involvement
from operators, setters and even programmers than had
been envisaged. (Cases 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9)
iii) Opposition to, or lack of co-operation with, the
original plans from individuals or groups within the
organisation.	 (Cases 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9)
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iv) A desire to increase management control over CNC.
(Cases 3, 5, and 8)
Nor was it the case that these were "teething troubles" which
gave way to a relatively stable and efficient form of work
organisation. Indeed, in at least one of the companies,
case 3, stability was never achieved, whilst in others changes
either happened incrementally or took place after some years
of stability. These were caused by:-
i) The acquisition of further CNC5.	 (Cases 1, 3, 5, 8 and 9)
ii) The departure of existing employees and/or the arrival
of new employees. (Cases 1, 3, 6 and 9)
iii) The industrial relations climate/the relations between
groups and individuals. (Cases 2, 3, 8 and 9)
Therefore, in the nine cases studied, it can be seen that a
variety of factors were present which influenced the choices
that were made or which brought about the need for change.
This meant that in some companies a stable form of organisation
was never achieved, or that changes took place after a number
of years of stability, or that change occurred gradually over
a period of years.
The decision process and the change process were influenced
by elements such as the type of products, the existing
structure of work, the need to accommodate additional CNC
machines, etc. However, more powerful influences appeared
to come from the individuals and groups involved, and revolved
around such factors as values, attitudes, self-interest,
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power, and competence. These latter factors will be returned
to in the section dealing with the conceptual framework, but
it should be pointed out here that they were influential in
making the decision-making and change processes less rational,
less stable, and less efficient than might have been expected.
3 The outcome
In examining the consequences of technical change, there
are three elements that need to be considered. These are
the organisation's technical objectives; its economic object-
ives; and the human aspect of change in terms of the resultant
work organisation and job design.
In technical terms, a significant proportion of the companies
concerned experienced technical problems with the machines
they bought and/or there were doubts about the appropriateness
of CNC in their particular situation.
In the instance of case 1, the company found that their
machining centre was prone to faults. Whether this could have
been avoided if tests of the machine had taken place before
its purchase is uncertain. However, common sense would
indicate that such tests should in any case be carried out.
Case 2 is another example where machinery failure occurred.
The problem was caused by the products being too heavy for
the machine, rather than any intrinsic fault in the machine
itself. In this instance, it should have been possible to
predict that this would happen before the machine was purchased.
In cases 4, 8 and 9, there were doubts about whether CNC was
the most appropriate technology for these companies. In case 4,
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this was because the company were moving away from metal
products to plastic ones; whilst in cases 8 and 9, given
the simple nature, and large quantities, of their products,
less sophisticated - and less costly - equipment than CNC
might have been more appropriate. The company in case 8
also experienced reliability problems with one of the CNC5
they bought.
In case 3, there was some doubt about whether in programming
terms the number of different CNC systems and languages was
counter-productive. However, the company in case 5 had a
similar variety of systems but experienced none of the attendant
programming problems. Therefore, in case 3, the problems
xperienced may have been related more to the turnover, and
ack of training, of programmers than the number of different
systems.
Therefore, out of the 9 companies studied, 5 experienced
either technical problems or doubts about the appropriateness
of the technology. This would once again, as mentioned
earlier, indicate that the companies may have benefitted
by carrying out more rigorous assessments of their needs and
the equipment available prior to the decision to purchase.
Given the number of companies who experienced technical
problems, it is not surprising that a significant proportion
also had economic problems with CNC. However, not all those
who had technical problems also had economic ones with the
CNC as such, and vice versa.
In case 1, the company's economic problems in the first few
years revolved around their failure to train and retain
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staff; whilst later, with the second and fourth CNC, the
problem was one of insufficient work; similar problems
were experienced by the firm in case 2.
In case 3, the company's problems were not technical at all,
but revolved around poor industrial relations and the
attendant high labour turnover.
In the instance of case 5, the company experienced training
and labour turnover problems in the first year of CNC. After
that time, the situation was stable until 1984, when the
company's attempt to re-organise the CNC section resulted
in a decline in its efficiency.
In case 8, the company not only experienced technical problems
with its second CNC, but it also experienced organisational
ones which caused it to stand idle when it could have been
producing.
In case 9, apart from the general question of the appropriate-
ness of CNC, there were problems with training and the roles
of the setter-operators, which led to quality and output
difficulties.
Therefore, as can be seen, technical and/or organisational
problems brought about economic problems for a number of the
companies. The issue is not whether companies benefitted
financially from CNC as such, but whether, in the absence
of technical or organisational problems, some could have
benefitted more. The answer has to be that a better financial
return on their investment could have been achieved in a
number of cases.
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In human terms, as in technical and economic ones, the
outcome was mixed; some of the jobs created were good, some
bad, and some indifferent. In Chapter 6, it was argued that
in Job Design terms, the best form of work organisation would
be where one person was involved in programming, setting
and operating; and that the worst would be if these jobs were
fragmented, leaving a few people, such as programmers, with
good jobs and the majority, such as operators, with bad ones.
In practice, this proved to be the case: in case 1, the
programmer, who also occasionally set and operated the CNCs,
had a very good job; whilst the operator in case 8 had a very
bad job. This is not to say that those solely involved in
programming did not have satisfying jobs - most obviously did -
but that the price of their good jobs was that others, such as
-	 operators, were solely involved in the less skilled and more
monotonous aspects of CNC.
However, it was not job content alone that brought, or reduced,
job satisfaction. Other elements, such as pay and bonus,
status, industrial relations, and personal relations, also
played a role in increasing or decreasing job satisfaction.
How these factors interrelate with job content can be seen by
a brief examination of each case study.
In case 1, much of the early difficulty in training and
retaining staff was caused by the attitude and expectations
of the Technical Director; labour turnover decreased and
satisfaction increased as his CNC involvement decreased.
In case 2, the dissatisfaction of the setter-operators related
o job content, the decline in their programming role, and
o the bonus system.
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The problems of the company in case 3 appeared not to be
related to job content at all; the flexibility and involvement
in progranming of the setter-operators should have led to
job satisfaction. Instead, the poor industrial relations
climate, caused in the main by the attitude of the Managing
Director, led to dissatisfaction and high labour turnover.
In case 4, the machine-minders complained of boredom, but it
appeared that it was the setters who were most dissatisfied,
due partly to a perceived loss of autonomy and partly to
personal friction between them and the programmer.
The setter-operators in case 5 moved from a position where
they were relatively satisfied with their jobs to one where
they were dissatisfied. This was caused by a re-organisation
of their jobs which increased the skilled component of their
work and decreased the more boring elements. It might have
been expected that this would increase their satisfaction,
but it had the reverse effect; this was partly because the
change was imposed on them without consultation, and partly
because there was insufficient time to provide the necessary
additional training.
In case 6, it was the arrival of a new programmer who wished
to discard the setting aspects of his job that led to the
upgrading of the CNC operators' jobs. A similar wish by the
programmer in case 7 led to the CNC in that company being
worked by setter-operators rather than operators. In both
cases, this change appears to have created the conditions
for increased job satisfaction.
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In case 8, the dissatisfaction of the operator and the
setter-operator caused by the monotony of their jobs was
exacerbated by the bonus system that was in operation.
In case 9, the conditions emerged for the various setter-
operators to take on programming and proving functions which
should have given them interesting jobs. However, the pay
and bonus system, together with the attitudes of the engineers
involved, proved counter-productive in terms of satisfaction
and motivation.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the jobs that were created
were of mixed quality, owing not only to the content of the
jobs but also to other factors as well.
Two other developments should also be mentioned. The first is
that in some companies, the supervisory staff either received
no training, or very little training, for CNC. This resulted
in some instances, such as case 1, where supervisory staff
had very little involvement with CNC and other people such as
programmers, informally, took on their supervisory role.
Indeed, in case 8, the supervisors felt so threatened by
this situation that they actively sought to have the work
organisation around CNC changed in order to have a production
engineer put in charge of CNC rather than a setter. This did
not alter their own position, but it did mean that control
rested with office rather than shopfloor personnel.
This leads into the second development to be noted, which
is the tendency for programming, and thus decisions regarding
methods and speeds and feeds, to be carried out by office
rather than shopfloor personnel. As noted in chapters 2 and 6,
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there has been a long-run tendency, stretching back to the
19th century, towards reducing the decision-making scope of
machine operators. However, the prime method of achieving
this in the past, the separation of setting from operating
functions, did at least leave skill and decision-making with
shopfloor staff. Now, with CNC, these decision functions and
skills are moving from the shopfloor and into the office, or,
as Howick (1965) - previously quoted in Chapter 6 - put it:-
The important decisions that affect unit cost,
delivery dates, and product quality are, with N/C,
in the hands of managers and professional employees,
not the operator. (p 105)
Howick exaggerates this picture somewhat: quality, output,
etc., can still be influenced considerably by shopfloor
workers; and the interests of "managers and professional
employees" cannot be completely linked. Nevertheless, the
tendency towards the removal of shopfloor decision-making
does exist and, in most of the cases examined, appeared to
grow over time. The result of this is not only that important
skills are denied to shopfloor workers, but also that their
ability to control their work - an important component in
good job design - is much reduced, both of which can have an
adverse effect on performance.
The alternatives
One very noticeable feature of the case studies is that,
willingly or unwillingly, all the companies either considered
or experimented with alternative methods of work organisation.
These ranged from situations where one person programmed, set
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and operated a CNC, to others where these functions were split
amongst three different groups. In some companies, such as
case 4, this amounted to no more than a brief, early, attempt
to rotate CNC operators. In other companies, such as cases
1 and 3, a variety of arrangements from programmer-operators
to separate programming, setting and operating personnel were
tried, and existed side by side, over a number of years. Yet
again, in cases 5 and 6, a form of work organisation which had
existed for some years was changed in important respects. In
the former case, the company moved from setter-operators towards
setters and operators; in the latter, the reverse took place.
Four significant points emerge from the way in which alternatives
were considered or tried:-
I) Whilst in some cases the changes were willingly initiated
and consciously planned by the companies' managers, in
other cases, the majority, they were initiated by, or
informally organised between, those technical, supervisory
or production staff involved with CNC.
ii) Economic and technical considerations were not always
the main reason why changes were made, nor was it the
case that the alternatives tried always resulted in
improved performance from the CNC5. Indeed, it is not
too much to say that issues such as management control,
the wish to improve individual/group status, and the
need to fit in with existing structures and practices
proved of more importance in practice than economic or
technical considerations.
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iii) The divisions between programming, setting and operating
functions are not clear-cut and they can, and do, shift
over time as circumstances change. Given this, the
attempts made by some of the companies to make clear-cut
divisions between these functions were neither practicable
nor productive. Rather it would appear to make more sense,
if tasks are to be divided, that those involved in one
function have an appreciation of the other functions.
iv) Despite the deeply-held belief by personnel in some of
the companies that an output-related bonus system was
the most efficient and productive method of motivating
workers, it should be noted that, as far as CNC is
concerned, it appears to be counter-productive. Not
only were there practical problems for those companies
which tried to apply an existing bonus system to CNC
(in some cases they had no choice but to bend the rules),
but also it appeared to have a detrimental impact upon
quality and motivation. Neither was it the case that
those companies which did not operate a bonus system
had output problems. It would appear, therefore, that
in the case of CNC, a bonus system creates more problems
than it cures.
Therefore, in considerinq what alternative forms of work
organisation and job design are feasible with CNC, it would
appear that practical and economic factors do not appear to
prevent Job Design criteria being applied; however, as shown,
many other factors do.
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HE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In Chapter 4, a conceptual framework was presented which saw four
groups of factors affecting the introduction and use of new
technology. These were general and specific external factors and
general and specific internal factors. These will now be examined
in the light of the nine case studies. However, as mentioned
earlier,	 the case studies were concerned with internal rather
than external factors. These will therefore be considered firstly
and in more detail than the external factors.
Internal general factors
The internal general factors which were put forward as influential
are as follows:-
Manaqement-worker relations: There was no example in the nine case
studies where this factor, at an organisation-wide level, appeared
to influence the introduction of CNC. However, in case 3, where
the organisation and the sub-unit were virtually the same, poor
management-worker relations brought about a need for a variety of
ad hoc arrangements to cope with the problems that emerged,
especially the high labour turnover. However, in general, manage-
inent-worker relations at the organisation level appeared to have
little impact upon the introduction and use of CNC, though this
may be related to the lack of bargaining power faced by the
workers in these companies, which in turn was the result of the
high levels of redundancies and the precarious market position
experienced by the companies. If this is the case, then an
economic upturn and a growth in employment might make this a more
important factor than it appears at the moment.
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Profits and performance/goals and strategy: These two sets of
Factors could not, at least in the cases studied, be separated
ecause it was the organisations' financial position which
predisposed them to change their production techniques in order
to achieve the goal of cutting costs and/or improving output.
CNC was seen as the method or strategy which would achieve this
in the particular areas concerned. In the two large companies,
the goal of cost-cutting/performance improvement was accompanied
by detailed plans and finance to re-organise and modernise
production methods. However, in the medium-sized and smaller
companies, with the exception of case 3, the arrangements and
plans were more ad hoc. Indeed, in all sizes of companies, there
was a tendency to seek one-off, short-term, solutions to implement-
ation problems rather than consistently pursuing a general
strategy. This lack of consistency and deliberate planning was
also seen in the selection of the particular technology, in that
CNC appeared to be chosen because it was a "New Technology"
rather than because of any concrete evidence that it was the most
appropriate technology.
It was also the case that, in the large and medium-sized companies,
those managers who set the general goals were different from
those who developed and implemented the particular strategy of
introducing CNC.
Therefore, whilst in all these cases a definite link can be seen
between profits and performance, and goals, the link between
goals and effective strategies is less clear, and the strategies
themselves were often based on incorrect, or unsubstantiated,
assumptions, and were carried out in an ad hoc and inconsistent
manner.
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Existing technology and products: There is no evidence in the
case studies that the existing technology acted as a constraint
on how CNC was used, although it obviously influenced the decision
to buy this particular type of new technology in the first place.
However, the type of product being manufactured is a different
matter. It can be seen, in the two large companies which manu-
factured simple products in large batches, that there was a
predisposition amongst engineers and supervisory staff to reduce
the skill involved in shopfloor jobs. In the two small companies,
especially case 1 where small batches were manufactured, an
opposite tendency can be discerned. In practice, looking at all
the cases, it can be seen that where the more complex products
were being manufactured, there was a greater need for operator/
setter-operator skill and intervention than in the instances
where simple components were being made. Nevertheless, in all
instances it appeared that product complexity, whilst being a
constraint, was neither the only nor the most decisive factor
in influencing job design and work organisation around CNC.
Size and structure: The relationship between these two factors
was as expected: that is that increasing size was accompanied
by increasing fragmentation, formalisation and specialisation.
This was especially the case with regard to supervisory, management
and support functions. In case 3, these functions were carried
out basically by two people, but in case 5 they were carried out
by two different departments working closely together, and in case
9, by numerous departments which had difficulty communicating
and co-operating.
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With regard to shopfloor jobs, the degree of fragmentation was
less pronounced; that is to say, there was not a great deal of
difference between the level of fragmentation between, say, case
4 and case 9. However, the level of formalisation and specialis-
ation was greater in terms of such features as job evaluation
procedures; written and rigid job descriptions; and written rules
and practices covering the organisation and recording of work.
This in turn meant that it was more difficult to change the
organisation of production in the larger companies, once a system
had been adopted, and the flexibility that existed in the smaller
companies for experimenting with and modifying work arrangements
was reduced.
Philosophy/culture: As stated in Chapter 4, it was envisaged
that these would work to produce a set of organisational norms
and values which would influence how those in the organisation
would behave or were expected to behave, especially, in this
instance, with regard to change.
Whilst it was never envisaged that a rigorous examination of each
organisation's philosophy/culture could be undertaken, it was
possible, by examining the practices and values, especially of
managers, to gain valuable insight into this. In the larger,
and even in the small and medium-sized companies, an emphasis on
control, a belief in monetary motivation, and, as expressed in
case 9, a tendency towards "minimum job content" could be
clearly seen. Not surprisingly, these tended to be more formalised
and difficult to alter in the larger companies, whilst in the
medium-sized and smaller ones they tended to emerge more in the
attitudes and values of the managers and could, as in cases 6 and
7, be more easily overcome.
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Nevertheless, it can be seen that the underlying philosophy of
Scientific Management was actively present and influenced the
use of CNC in all the companies, with the possible exception of
case 1, but that its more formal and structured elements only
emerged, as might be expected, as company size increased.
The history and development of the organisations: As with the
above, it was not envisaged that a thorough examination of these
factors could be made. However, a study of the nine companies'
recent history and development shows the importance of these
factors.
Perhaps the most important development in all the companies was
the decline in their financial position. Not only did this cause
them to seek ways of cutting costs/increasing performance, but the
attendant redundancies also reduced the ability of their workforces
to resist/influence the change process. However, other develop-
ments also impacted upon the companies and the way they operated.
In case 9, the change of ownership and top management was, partly,
responsible for plans to re-organise production. In case 8,
the parent company's increased control led to a redistribution
of work which brought the third CNC to the company. Minor changes
such as the appointment of the new programmer in case 6 and the
Managing Director's take-over of responsibility for day-to-day
production in case 3 also had a significant impact.
Therefore, as can be seen, an understanding of an organisation's
history and development is a necessary prerequisite to understanding
the organisation itself.
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Internal specific factors
The internal specific factors which were put forward as influential
are as follows:-
The size and nature of the proposed change: The companies all
began by introducing one or two CNC5, which meant that the rest
of the sub-unit, other than those most closely affected, initially
remained relatively unchanged. However, as time went on, and
particularly in the cases where more CNC5 were introduced, the
impact on the rest of the sub-unit grew and problems of integration
and change emerged. These problems ranged from the role of
supervisors, such as in cases 1 and 8, to problems of transferring
work from existing machines, as in cases 2 and 4. In some
instances, problems of integration and organisation continued
unresolved for some years, as in cases 1, 3 and 8, whilst in
other instances, cases 4, 5 and 6 for example, stability was
established relatively quickly, though not without some initial
problems. However, in the instance of cases 5 and 6, further
changes, which met resistance, did take place after some years of
stability. Therefore, whilst small-scale change may initially
have little impact on the sub-unit as a whole, this is unlikely
to remain so over time, especially when additional machines are
introduced.
ub-unit performance and importance: In all the cases, the
ub-unit was seen as being important, especially in the smaller
ompanies, where in some cases it constituted virtually the
mtire organisation. It was also the case that CNC was introduced,
in all the companies, to improve the performance of the sub-unit.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the tendency was for senior managers
to involve themselves in the selection and introduction of the
technology, whereas in other instances they might not have done
so.
Sub-unit structure: There was a tendency when first introducing
CNC, particularly noticeable in the large and medium-sized
organisations, to use the existing formal structure as the model
for CNC. However, in a number of instances, the replication of
the formal structure ignored the actual basis on which work was
organised.
Two specific examples of this are the role of supervisors and the
issue of bonus. With regard to the supervisors, in cases 1 and.
B there appears to have been a tacit assumption that their
authority stemmed from their formal position, and the importance
of their knowledge of the technology was ignored. This led to an
undermining of their role and authority, which was transferred,
unofficially, to others. The issue of bonus follows similar
lines, the assumption being, in some cases, that a bonus system
suitable for existing machines would be suitable for CNC. This
was not the case, because on conventional machines operators
could "fiddle" the system with no detriment to quality, whilst on
CNC, the fixed cycle times prevented this.
Therefore, whilst companies wished to replicate the existing
structure of work, the failure to recognise the important elements
on which the formal organisation of work was based caused a number
of the problems that have been described in the case studies.
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lanagement-worker relations: As mentioned in the section on
general factors, management-worker relations across the organisation
did not affect the introduction and use of CNC to any great
extent. However, the situation was different in the particular
sub-units, where in nearly all cases problems arose. In case 1,
there were problems between the Technical Director and the
various setter-operators which had a detrimental effect on the
efficiency and organisation of CNC for some years. Management-
worker problems of a similar magnitude arose in cases 3, 5, 9,
and to a lesser extent in the other cases.
Most of these arose from misjudgments by managers when introducing
CNC or changing the way it was used at a later date. This shows
that even where a workforce is willing to co-operate with the use
of CNC, this co-operation can be lost, and the benefits from CNC
diminished, by poor planning and lack of consultation.
The values, attitudes, self-interest and power of those involved:
The importance of these factors was evident in all the case
studies.
In case 1, the Technical Director's values and attitudes caused
many of the early problems, but it was in his interest, and in
his power, to ensure that the blame was placed elsewhere. In
the same study, the programmer's interests lay in preventing
the setter-operators from programming, and he was able to achieve
this by influencing the Technical Director to use his power to
support him. The programmer in case 4 acted in a similar fashion.
In case 3, the Managing Director's values and attitudes led him to
believe that his interests would be best served by using CNC to
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deskill and control his workforce. However, he was thwarted in
this, partly for technical reasons and partly because his workers
demonstrated that they were not without power. They showed that
without the willing co-operation of a stable workforce, the company
would continue to experience severe problems: in this instance,
their power lay in their ability to leave the company.
Other examples of managers, supervisors, and engineers whose
values, attitudes, self-interest and power led them to advocate
or try a particular form of work organisation, only to be met by
resistance from workers, can also be seen in cases 5, 8 and 9.
In cases 6 and 7, the programmers were able to overcome the values
and attitudes of their superiors in order to benefit themselves,
which shows that it is possible for subordinates, regardless of
:heir formal position, to exert influence, and therefore power,
wer their superiors.
It can be seen in all the case studies that the interplay of these
four factors - values, attitudes, self-interest and power - was
crucial in shaping the outcome of the change process. This does
not mean that other factors did not act as constraints, but that
within these constraints, and sometimes by ignoring or evading
them, these four factors were paramount. This accounts for the
fact that in a number of cases, managers and others were willing
to settle for forms of organisation which were inefficient.
Having examined the internal factors, it now becomes easier to
examine the external ones.
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EXTERNAL SPECIFIC FACTORS
The external specific factors which were put forward as influential
are as follows:-
Product market: As already mentioned, in all cases, the companies'
market position was such that it drove them to introduce CNC as a
cost-cutting/performance-improving device.
Labour market: The most notable labour market feature was the
high incidence of unemployment in South Yorkshire. This meant
that there was no shortage of skilled labour for conventional
machines, though this did not prevent some managers citing the
possibility of a future shortage as part of their justification
for introducing CNC. Nor did there appear to be a shortage of
workers with CNC experience, or who were capable of being trained
for CNC. The ease with which the companies in cases 2, 3, 4, and -
after some initial problems - 5 recruited or trained labour bears
testimony to this, and once again casts doubts on the competence
of the managers in cases 1 and 9 who had difficulty in recruiting
or training labour.
However, it is difficult to say exactly how the high incidence
of unemployment affected the introduction of CNC. Nevertheless,
it does seem reasonable to argue that this, coupled with the
redundancy situation in each company, did reduce both the work-
forces' bargaining power and their willingness to confront their
particular managements. Nor does it seem unreasonable to assume
that this factor may have encouraged managers to introduce change
with less consultation than might otherwise have been the case.
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vai1abi1ity of technology: In the instance of CNC, the companies
had no difficulty with technology availability; indeed, perhaps
the problem was almost the reverse. As mentioned in the intro-
duction to this Thesis, there has been a great deal of publicity
urging companies to adopt new technology if they wish to stay in
business. As regards CNC, it has been impossible, for some years
now, to open an engineering journal without being faced with
advertisements for, or articles advocating, CNC. CNC purchase
has been further encouraged by government grants totalling one
third of the cost price. In these circumstances, it is not
surprising that CNC was seen as the next generation of technology
for the nine companies involved in this study. However, as
nientioned before, whilst for the engineering industry in general
this may be true, in specific cases it may not. Companies
therefore need to examine their individual circumstances and
needs. For the companies in this study, it appears that the -
perhaps - "over"-availability of CNC blinded them to the need to
carry out such an examination.
External general factors
The external general factors which were put forward as being
influential were as follows:-
The nature of the political economy
Culture
History and development of societies
Ideology
Social institutions
Political stability
State of technological development.
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, it was never the intention, nor was
it possible, that the empirical studies should examine these
factors. However, it was felt that the general conclusions drawn
rom an examination of these factors could be tested by the
vidence from those case studies.
The conclusions were that:-
a) in Britain, there had been a long-run tendency for organisations
to develop along the lines prescribed by Scientific Management;
b) this tendency could be either exacerbated or moderated by
contemporary economic or social developments;
c) at the moment, the state of the British economy would tend
to exacerbate it, with the consequence that new technology
would be used in a Tayloristic manner.
The evidence from the case studies would seem to indicate that
these conclusions are correct. It was certainly the case that
most of the companies, especially the large and medium-sized
ones, exhibited Tayloristic tendencies, which were incorporated
not only in the structures and practices of the companies, but
also in the values and attitudes of many employees. It also
appears to be the case that the present economic situation had
exacerbated Tayloristic tendencies, in that companies were
seeking to use new technology to cut costs, mainly by displacing
labour, and that workers' ability to resist this had diminished
as unemployment had risen.
Therefore, insofar as research limited to the internal workings
of companies can, the case studies appear to support the importance
at this fundamental level of these external factors in influencing
the introduction and use of new technology.
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CONCLUS IONS
This Chapter has compared the nine case studies and has also
examined the conceptual framework in the light of these. The
empirical research has shown that the conceptual framework,
based as it is on an extensive review of the literature, is a
relevant and valid device for understanding the impact of technical
change upon job design and work organisation. This is true even
though some factors, especially the external ones, were not, and
could not be, examined by the direct evidence from the case
studies alone.
Nevertheless, the general proposition that the introduction and
use of new technology would be influenced by a wide range of
factors, both internal and external to organisations, has been
borne out. In particular, the role of Scientific Management
beliefs and practices; the financial situation facing the organis-
ations; the rigidity, or otherwise, of company structures and
practices; the limitations imposed by the type of products
being manufactured; and, crucially, the values, attitudes, self-
interest and power of those involved, have emerged, in these
case studies at least, as key factors.
However, two other factors not originally considered also come
to the fore.
The first of these is that those responsible for buying CNC
appeared to be "dazzled" by the fact that it was a, well-publicised,
'New Technology". This caused them to assume, almost unquestion-
ingly, that CNC was an appropriate technology for them and that
it was also essential for their future survival. The result of
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this was that, in a number of cases, CNC may not have been the
most appropriate choice, and may not have fulfilled their
unfounded expectations.
This leads on to the second factor: the level of competence of
those responsible for directing the introduction and use of CNC.
In all the case studies, examples of incompetence were present,
but this was especially so in cases 1, 3, 8 and 9. It was not
simply that in some cases managers, engineers and supervisors
put their own interests above those of the company, though
obviously this did happen. The incompetence arose in the failure
or unwillingness to analyse problems properly and to put forward
and implement adequate solutions.
Therefore, the conceptual framework needs to take account of
the "dazzle" and competence factors. Nevertheless, as stated,
the original framework has been supported by the empirical
evidence.
However, it is not sufficient merely to understand what factors
influence the change process. it is also necessary to understand
how this process can be improved, both from the viewpoint of
the organisation and from that of those in the organisation who
have to live with the results of the change. Therefore, in
conclusion, the following guidelines for the introduction of
CNC, and perhaps with certain modifications for other forms of
new technology, are proposed.
1 Organisations need to carry out a rigorous investigation of
their need for new equipment, which should include comparisons
between all the alternatives available rather than just one.
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The assessment should examine not only the economic and
technical aspects of change, but also the human consequences
in terms of changes to jobs. This process should involve
trade unions/workers at an early stage, not only to gain
their commitment to the change process but also to draw upon
their knowledge of existing production methods and practices
in the organisation.
Whilst large organisations should have the expertise available
to carry out such assessments, the same cannot be said for
smaller organisations. Therefore, it would be appropriate
for some form of government assistance to be given in this
area, especially as the government already offers grants
towards the purchase cost of new equipment.
Trade unions should encourage and provide more positive
assistance to their members who are faced with the intro-
duction of new technology. Eight of the companies studied
were trade union-organised, yet in only one case did the
unions attempt to influence the change process. Whilst one
important reason for this was the despondency brought about
by the employment situation, another was a lack of knowledge
of the technology and its Consequences. Therefore, despite
existing trade union efforts through such devices as training
courses for shop stewards, more support and advice needs to
be made available; especially if, as advocated above, trade
unions are to become more Involved in the assessment process.
1 Before and during the actual introduction process, a number
of points need to be taken into account:-
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1) The process should be planned by the company, along
with trade unions, and should not be allowed to take
place in a haphazard fashion. This should take account
of the formal and informal organisation of work.
ii) Full training should be given to those involved and
affected by the new technaLoqy. The eKperietcc at the
case studies is that one or two months after the initial
training, a further period of training, when those
involved are more familiar with the demands and potential
of the technology, should be given.
iii) In deciding upon job content and the organisation of
work, companies need not only to take account of the
limitations placed upon them by existing structures and
practices and by their products, but also to recognise
that the best results are achieved when those involved
are motivated by and committed to the change process.
Only in this way will flexibility and teamwork - which
are essential with CNC - be achieved.
iv) Short-term financial advantages need to be weighed
against hidden and long-term disadvantages. Examples
of this are where poor job design is adopted in order
to minimise direct wage costs, but where this in turn
leads to poor quality, delays, high labour turnover,
and accidents; or where an output bonus system is
adopted which raises output but reduces quality.
These are problems that can be overcome by employing
skilled, well-paid, operators who are motivated to
produce good work and reduce production delays.
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4 Even after the initial form of CNC organisation has been
adopted and is, hopefully, working successfully, it should
be appreciated that the purchase of additional CNCs or changes
of personnel over time will lead to other changes. Therefore,
the more flexible and committed the workforce, the easier it
will be to accommodate further change.
These are not comprehensive guidelines - such detailed advice
can only be drawn up with a particular organisation in mind - but
they do emphasise the lessons learned from the case studies.
These are that planning and commitment are needed in order to
optimise the technical, economic and human aspects of the
organisation of work and bring about the successful use of new
technology.
At the moment, for most organisations, the adoption of new
technology is still in its infancy; therefore, the scope for
choice is still there. This research has shown that economic
and technical factors are not barriers to the creation of good
jobs - rather the reverse. Only by creating jobs which embody
skill, variety and autonomy, thus establishing a stable and
- well-motivated workforce, can organisations obtain the full
technical and economic benefits of new technology.
Nevertheless, a major barrier to the creation of worthwhile
jobs and the realisation of these benefits does exist. This is
the continuing influence of the philosophy and precepts of
Scientific Management upon management practices. Only when this
influence is removed will it be possible to say that the impact
of new technology will lead to better rather than worse job design
and work organisation.
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llopefuHY by exposing what actually happens in orqanisations
nd the counter-productive nature of Taylorism, thjs research
ill contribute to its removal.
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES
The following are a sample of the interview schedules that were
used in carrying out the nine case studies. In most cases, they
re designed to open up areas for further discussion rather than
to elicit, as such, a specific response. It is also the case that
whilst these schedules indicate the areas of questioning that
took place in all companies, the actual questions asked could,
and did, vary from company to company and from individual to
individual, depending upon the circumstances. As an example, in
the small companies, the questions on structure and size were
relatively straightforward and could be answered by one person;
whereas in the larger companies these questions were more complex
and tended to extend beyond the ability of one individual to
answer them all. The same qualification must be made regarding
the people questioned. In small companies, a person's job might
cover a wide range of functions; whilst in the larger companies
these functions could be, and were, performed by several people
operating in separate departments. Also, the knowledge of
individual interviewees varied; in some companies, managers, say,
might be extremely well-informed of the activities of other areas
than their own; whilst in other companies they might not even be
particularly well-informed about their own area.
Therefore, the separation of managers' questions from supervisors'
questions, and so on, is somewhat artificial, and in practice,
the areas of questioning were wider than perhaps the individual
schedules might suggest.
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It should also be pointed out that though seven of the companies
had already introduced CNC when the studies began, two had not.
Therefore, in the latter two instances, the questions were somewhat
different, whilst covering the same areas, from the former.
It was also the case that when return visits were made to each
company, the questions became.even more tailored to the particular
developments taking place, rather than being of a standard format.
Nevertheless, the following interview schedules, with some
modifications in each case, were used in order to build a picture
of the events in each company surrounding the introduction and use
of CNC.
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MANAGERS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1 Personal details: job title, functions, previous work history
and experience, etc.
2 Company details:
i) Numbers employed
ii) Structure (organisation chart)
iii) Products and markets
iv) Ownership
v) Company history.
3 How has the company been affected by, and how has it
responded to, the recession?
4 How many CNCs does the company have, and what type are they?
5 When were they bought and how much did they cost?
6 Why did you buy your first CNC(s)?
7 Why did you buy subsequent CNCs?
8 Describe the process for assessing and recommending the
purchase of the CNCs.
9 If written purchase justifications were prepared, is it
possible to examine these?
10 Which department of the company are the CNCs installed in?
11 What is the structure and importance of this department?
12 How long did it take to bring the first CNC5 into full
production?
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13 What were the problems that arose in the introduction process?
14 Were there any subsequent problems with these CNCs?
15 How long did it take to bring the subsequent CNCs into full
production?
16 What problems arose when introducing these further CNCs?
17 How is work organised around the CNCs? i.e. who is responsible
for: -
i) supervision
ii) programming
iii) setting
iv) operating
v) inspection
vi) maintenance?
18 Did this change with the introduction of subsequent CNCs?
19 Is this the same form of organisation as the rest of the
department?
20 Has CNC led to any organisational changes within the department
or within other departments?
21 How were staff selected for CNC work?
22 Have there been any staff changes among those involved with
CNC since they were first introduced?
23 What training did staff receive for CNC?
24 Was the training adequate?
25 What is your involvement with CNC?
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26 Have the original objectives in buying CNC been met?
27 Have any unanticipated advantages/disadvantages emerged?
29 Do you believe that CNC5 are the best method of manufacturing
your products, or are there other production methods which
would be better?
29 Do you believe CNC has been a success?
30 How has CNC affected the supervisors' jobs? Does CNC:-
1) make their job easier/harder?
ii) increase/decrease their control over production?
iii) increase/decrease their contact with CNC operators
relative to other machinists?
iv) increase/decrease their need for technical knowledge
of the production process?
v) increase/decrease the importance of their man-management
skills?
31 Is the programmer : -
i) solely responsible for programming or is anyone else
ever involved?
ii) ever involved in proving programs or setting and
operating the CNC?
iii) involved in any supervisory duties?
iv) responsible for any duties other than those related
to CNC?
32 In relation to their counterparts on conventional machines,
do the CNC setters/operators:-
i) have more/less control over their work?
ii) have a more/less varied job?
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jjj) have a more/less skilled job?
iv) have a physically easier/harder job?
v) have a mentally easier/harder job?
vi) have a more/less interesting job?
what trade unions are active in the company and which
sections of the workforce do they organise?
were the trade unions involved in the assessment and intro-
duction of CNC?
1hat attitude have they taken to CNC?
Has there been any change in management-worker relations
in recent years?
Has CNC affected management-worker relations?
Does the company have any plans to acquire more CNCs, and
if so, when do they intend to do so?
Ihat other new technology has the company introduced, or
thought of introducing?
Do you consider this a good company to work for?
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SUPERVISORS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
I Personal details: job title, functions, previous work history
and experience, etc.
2 Why did the company buy CNC?
3 Were you involved in its pre-purchase assessment or its
introduction?
4 How did you view CNC when it was first introduced?
5 How do you view CNC now?
3 What were the problems that arose in the introduction process?
7 Were there any subsequent problems with CNC?
8 What have been the advantages/disadvantages of introducing
CNC?
9 Do you consider that CNC is the best method for manufacturing
your products, or are there other production methods which
would be better?
113 How is supervision organised in your department?
11 Has this been affected by, or has it changed since, the
introduction of CNC?
12 What training did you receive for CNC?
13 Do you consider your training was adequate?
14 Describe your involvement with CNC.
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5 Does CNC:-
1) make your job easier/harder?
ii) increase/decrease your control over production?
iii) increase/decrease your contact with CNC operators
relative to other machinists?
iv) increase/decrease your need for technical knowledge
of the production process?
v) increase/decrease the importance of your man-management
skills?
16 Are you as confident in supervising CNC as the other machines
in your department?
Questions 17 to 24 as per questions 31 to 38 on the Managers'
Interview Schedule.
25 Do you like your job?
26 Do you consider this a good company to work for?
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ROGRAMMERS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
luestions 1 to 9 as per Supervisors' Interview Schedule.
10 Why were you selected to programme?
11 What training did you receive?
12 Was the training adequate?
13 How long did it take you to become competent/confident in
programming CNCs?
14 Does anyone else ever programme?
15 Do you also prove out the programs?
16 How many different types of CNC control systems do you have
to programme?
17 Describe in detail the procedure for writing and proving out
a new program.
18 How many programs are there in total?
19 Are you still adding new programs to this number?
20 What is the split of functions between you and the supervisors?
21 As per question 30 on the Managers' Interview Schedule.
22 What is the split of functions between you and the CNC
machinists?
23 As per question 32 on the Managers' Interview Schedule.
Questions 24 to 27 as per questions 26 to 29 on the Managers'
Interview Schedule.
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uesti.OflS 28 to 34 as per questions 32 to 38 on the Nanagers'
Interview Schedule.
35 Do you like your job?
36 Do you consider this a good company to work for?
346
CNC MACHINISTS' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Questions 1 to 9 as per Supervisors' Interview Schedule.
11 Why were you selected for CNC work?
11 What training did you receive?
12 Was the training adequate?
13 How long did it take you to become competent/confident in
operating CNC?
14 Details of products/programs:-
i) What type of products are made on your CNC?
ii) What is the batch size?
iii) How long does it take to set up?
iv) How long does it take to produce each component?
v) Time per batch?
15 Describe in detail the procedure you follow when you
receive a new program.
16 Describe in detail the procedure you follow when you receive
a program that has been produced before.
17 What is the split of functions between you and the programmer?
18 Who do you go to if a problem arises?
19 Do you do your own inspection?
20 As per question 32 on the Managers' Interview Schedule.
Questions 21 and 22 as per questions 28 and 29 on the Managers'
Interview Schedule.
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Questions 23 to 28 as per questions 33 to 38 on the Managers'
Interview Schedule.
29 Do you prefer working CNC to conventional/automatic machines?
30 Do you like your job?
31 Do you consider this a good company to work for?
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TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1 Personal details: job title, functions, previous work history
and experience.
2 What union are you in and what position do you hold?
3 How many unions are there in the company and how are they
organised?
4 Do the unions have any formal or informal agreement to work
together?
5 Have there been any changes in management-union relations
in recent years?
6 When were you officially informed that the company was
buying CNC?
7 Is it, or has it been, practice for the company to involve
the unions in the assessment/introduction of new equipment?
8 Had you any previous knowledge of CNC?
9 What were the main issues from a union perspective regarding
CNC introduction?
10 How has CNC introduction affected your members?
11 In the areas affected, what was/is your members' view of CNC?
12 In retrospect, do you think CNC has been good/bad for your
members and for the union?
13 Have you or any of your members attended a TUC course on
new technology?
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14 Did you receive any outside help in negotiating the
introduction of CNC?
15 What assistance would you have liked?
16 1-Jave you got, or tried to negotiate, a New Technology
Agreement?
17 What other forms of new technology have been introduced?
18 What is your union's policy regarding new technology?
19 How do you regard new technology?
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